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OBJECTIVES 
This book has been planned as a collective and collaborative effort of 
all international partners affiliated with Global Operations Networks 
(GONE) project. The project has outlined the contours of contempo-
rary global operations networks, risks and benefits as well as manage-
rial and other processes associated with them. 
There are several objectives of this book: 1) to collect some of the pro-
ject results into one summative volume; 2) to disseminate the results to 
academics and practitioners; and 3) to provide supplementary inputs 
to teaching materials on the subject of global operations and opera-
tions strategy.
This volume utilises the rich and diverse empirical foundation gen-
erated during the project activities in Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 
Chapters of the book are based on quantitative data and multiple case 
studies which the project partners have been closely working with, 
and which are best suited to illuminate a particular aspect of organis-
ing and managing global operations in networks.
6THEMES AND STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The book addresses the following broadly defined themes:  
 · Global operations networks: insights from the Scandinavian 
context;
 · Contexts of global operations networks; 
 · Configurations of global operations networks;
 · Capabilities and processes; and
 · Trajectories and reconfiguration.
The themes are intended to incorporate elements which in combina-
tion provide a comprehensive multidisciplinary view on operations 
networks.   
 · Behind these themes lay clusters of questions and topics that 
guide the contributions to the book. To better define the scope 
of the book, these clusters are unpacked and discussed in more 
detail in the following sections. 
Global Operations Networks  
– Insights from the Scandinavian Context
In the current context of global economic liberalisation and techno-
logical advancements, industrial companies are less likely to generate 
products in the traditional vertically integrated value chain. Instead, 
they are doing so by means of elaborate cross-border and cross-organi-
sational networks. As a rule, these networks are configured on a global 
basis and consist of diverse and interdependent affiliates (linked both 
through ownership and nonequity relationships), which are engaged 
in an exchange of goods, services and information. 
The Scandinavian context is no exception to this trend. Nevertheless, 
international comparative studies providing comprehensive insights 
from it are still rare. To contribute to bridging this gap, this book focus-
7es on the general theme of global operations networks originating in 
the Scandinavian context. This is covered through theoretical insights 
and a set of case studies of Danish, Swedish and Finish firms. 
Contexts
In much of the previous work on production networks, the environ-
ment has been treated as an exogenous factor and a source of unde-
fined uncertainties. In other words, traditionally, environment is ‘put 
into brackets’ as opposed to being seen as a field of specific interactions 
coevolving with the organisations embedded in it. The aspirations of 
the GONE project are to treat the environment as a vital part of the 
operations network and to address the relationship between multiple 
levels of analysis (firm-industry-nation). 
Configurations
The ‘configurations’ theme of the book deals with the structural di-
mension of global operations networks. This dimension encompasses 
multiple interrelated variables. In uncovering them, ownership/part-
nership mode and location of sites can be taken as a point of departure 
for the analysis of global operations configuration choices. 
Configurations gravitating towards captive partnership mode can 
be categorised as rooted, while those gravitating towards contractual 
mode may be called footloose (Ferdows, 2008). Driven by forces inside 
and outside the firm, manufacturing companies move towards either 
of the two generic operations strategies: 1) build a footloose opera-
tions network by outsourcing operations units to lower-cost locations 
(offshore outsourcing), or 2) build a rooted operations network, by 
strengthening capabilities in existing vertically integrated operating 
units (captive offshoring). However, the contributions to the book also 
point to the prominent existence of the intermediary form, which en-
compasses elements of both footloose and rooted strategies. 
Capabilities and Processes 
The structural issues focus on ‘bricks and mortar’ decisions about 
number, location, capacity and ownership of sites. However, how these 
are bound together is equally, or perhaps even more important. There-
8fore, the book also attends to the ‘infrastructure’ of global operations 
networks, or in other words, capabilities and processes required for 
aligning internationally dispersed operations into a cohesive global 
network. 
Trajectories and Reconfiguration
Operations networks are not static; rather they are in constant motion 
and may be studied through their temporality. From the outset, sup-
pliers may be given only operational roles, while the focal company 
keeps the responsibility for innovation, product development, design 
and other strategic activities. However, such distribution of roles with-
in a group of companies is likely to change over time. The constant 
‘process of becoming’ that applies to global operation networks poses a 
major challenge for decision making and strategy development in the 
companies involved. The focal organisations are under pressure to or-
chestrate their partners and monitor developments in the network on 
a continuous basis. Therefore, the focus of this concluding part of the 
book is on temporality and the constant reconfiguration of operations 
networks.
OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS
The book opens with the chapter by Bram Timmermans and Chris-
tian Richter Østergaard. The authors take a national perspective on 
the operations networks and investigate the difference in employment 
between offshoring and nonoffshoring firms that are active in man-
ufacturing industries and business services in Denmark. The chapter 
concludes that there are clear differences between Danish offshoring 
and nonoffshoring firms in terms of employment growth and how the 
employee skill composition changes over time. The change in employ-
ment composition differs considerably between manufacturing indus-
tries and business services and has significant implications for wheth-
er firms offshore administrative and technical business functions or 
other types of business functions.
Marja Blomqvist, Virpi Turkulainen, Eero Eloranta and Aki Laiho dis-
cuss roles that are assigned to factories located in the context of high 
9labour costs. Finland is used as an example. The authors discuss exist-
ing models of factory roles and report research findings from a survey 
of factories located in Finland. The chapter adds to the book by provid-
ing a regional point of view and establishing what kinds of roles are 
typical in the context of small local markets and a high labour cost area, 
such as Scandinavia. Practitioners can also use the chapter in assessing 
their own factory networks and the corresponding factory roles.
Yang Cheng and John Johansen investigate a broad theoretical base, 
and based on the analysis of three cases of Danish companies, dis-
cuss various development trajectories in global operations networks. 
The authors propose that the discussions on internationalisation and 
externalisation need to be extended from manufacturing activity to 
other value chain activities. The chapter concludes with recommen-
dations for managers on the importance of maintaining a relative bal-
ance between various trajectories in order to manage a global collabo-
rative value network.
Marcus M. Larsen and Torben Pedersen investigate the concept of the 
‘hidden costs’ of offshoring, i.e. unexpected costs exceeding the initially 
expected costs of offshoring. Using the LEGO Group case, the authors 
argue that a major response to the hidden costs of offshoring is the 
identification and utilisation of strategic mechanisms in the organi-
sational design to eventually achieve system integration of a globally 
dispersed and disaggregated organisation. 
Mikko Mattila focuses on how companies can manage the increasing 
technological complexity associated with the growing variety of the 
products and evolving technology. The situation results in challeng-
es in managing deliveries, manufacturing, order handling and deci-
sion making. The case of the KONE Group is used to illustrate these 
challenges. The chapter concludes with looking at ways to manage 
complexity through the product structure and architecture design 
throughout the lifecycle of a product. 
Johanna K. Jaskari zooms in on an emerging sustainability agenda for 
global operations networks and explores how two emerging sustain-
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ability issues – carbon neutrality and low-energy use for operations 
networks – may transform industrial firms’ processes in different in-
dustrial contexts. Based on interviews in global Finnish manufactur-
ing firms, the issues in this area are analysed from different perspec-
tives. The results of the analysis provide insights into how managers 
can create and maintain sustainable carbon neutral and low-energy 
operations in future industrial contexts.
Dmitrij Slepniov, Brian Vejrum Waehrens and John Johansen focus on 
servitisation, i.e. the refocusing of firms from running fabrication and 
assembly processes to developing integrated product solutions with a 
large service component. Based on multiple cases of Danish compa-
nies, this chapter outlines the main reasons for and strategic impli-
cations of servitisation. Furthermore, it delineates strategies for how 
traditional manufacturers can recoup the desired level of return from 
the developments associated with servitisation.
Aki Laiho and Marja Blomqvist discuss the challenge of operations 
network design in a global environment. The design process is often 
related to a substantial change, specifically strategy change, restruc-
turing or expansion. The chapter is built around case research with 
five Finnish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and a parallel 
literature review. The authors dedicate their effort on the factors that 
need to be taken into account when designing a network and conclude 
with a design framework that can be used by both academics and prac-
titioners. 
Peder Veng Søberg and Brian Vejrum Wæhrens investigate the prob-
lems related to functional integration between manufacturing activ-
ities and research and development (R&D) activities of multinational 
companies in emerging markets. The authors develop a framework 
and use four case studies to illustrate its use. The findings point to the 
importance of adopting cross-functional colocation drivers and con-
tingencies such as clockspeed and technological complexity, as well as 
the extent to which local adaptation is needed as an integral part of 
corporate relocation decisions.
11
Eero Eloranta, Marja Blomqvist and Aki Laiho focus on the future of 
manufacturing in high-cost countries. The perspective of this chapter 
is that of a manufacturing company with production facilities in Fin-
land and other Nordic countries. The authors introduce a multilayer 
model for designing and locating factories in these countries to sup-
port the primary corporate competitive strategy and the related pro-
duction imperative. The chapter concludes that the production of fac-
tories located in high-cost countries should focus on the imperatives of 
the production of the first product, the production of the best product 
and agile production, while mass production in high-cost countries 
seldom seems to be justified.
The book closes with two cases that provide more in-depth empirical 
insights from Sweden and Finland. 
                        
 SECTION 1
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Offshoring and Changes in Firms’ 
Domestic Employment:  
The Case of Denmark
 
Bram Timmermans, Aalborg University, Denmark 
Christian Richter Østergaard, Aalborg University, Denmark
 
ABSTRACT
In this chapter, by merging the Danish linked employer-employee da-
tabase with a large-scale Danish offshoring survey, we investigate, the 
difference in employment between offshoring and nonoffshoring firms 
that are active in manufacturing industries and business services in 
Denmark. The findings of the analyses show that there are clear dif-
ferences between Danish offshoring and nonoffshoring firms in em-
ployment growth and how the employee skill composition changes over 
time. The change in employment composition differs considerably be-
tween manufacturing industries and business services and in whether 
firms offshore administrative and technical business functions or other 
types of business functions.
 
INTRODUCTION  
Over the last couple of years, offshoring and outsourcing have received 
increasing attention in both the business press and within academia 
(see e.g. Bertrand, 2011; Jensen & Pedersen, 2011; Maskell, Pedersen, Pe-
tersen, & Dick-Nielsen, 2007; Rasheed & Gilley, 2005). Offshoring deci-
sions are regarded as being of strategic importance for firms in order to 
(i) reduce the costs of production and/or bring about other efficiency 
gains to remain competitive, (ii) penetrate and strengthen a firm’s po-
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sition in foreign markets and (iii) provide access to international pools 
of knowledge. Traditionally, offshoring involved to relocation of routi-
nised production activities and standardised services (Mudambi, 2007). 
However, in the last 10 to 15 years, a shift has occurred, since these activ-
ities move along a learning path leading to the offshoring of additional 
value-added and related activities (Maskell et al., 2007). This might ex-
plain why we more frequently observe the offshoring of knowledge-in-
tensive activities, such as research and development (R&D), engineer-
ing functions and management and administrative tasks. 
Offshoring has been studied from various angles; however, one of the 
most debated issues related to offshoring is its impact on domestic 
employment. Most studies which investigate the impact of offshore 
outsourcing on the overall employment composition of home country 
industries have been inspired by the pioneering work of Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996). The point of departure in their study was to test wheth-
er offshoring could be an alternative explanation in the increased de-
mand for skilled labour, which negatively influences the wage level of 
low-skilled workers and thus creates more wage inequality in an econ-
omy. Up to this point, most politicians and academics were of the opin-
ion that international trade, including offshoring, hardly had any gen-
eral employment impact and that the increased wage inequality could 
mainly be attributed to the skill-biased technological change (Berman, 
Bound, & Griliches, 1998). Feenstra and Hanson’s findings spurred a line 
of studies investigating the impact of offshore outsourcing on the de-
mand of low-skilled labour in other non-US countries through a varie-
ty of methods (e.g. Egger, Pfaffermayr, & Wolfmayr-Schnitzer, 2001; Falk 
& Koebel, 2002; Hijzen, Görg, & Hine, 2005; Strauss-Kahn, 2004). Most of 
these studies confirmed that offshore outsourcing contributes signifi-
cantly to a relative increase in the demand for high-skilled labour.
In this chapter, we add to the existing work on offshoring and the over-
all effect on firms’ domestic employment by moving beyond the an-
ecdotal evidence and the macroeconomic perspective. We empirically 
investigate the microeconomic effects of offshoring on the change in 
domestic employment by comparing offshoring and non-offshoring 
firms in Danish manufacturing and business services. In addition to 
17
existing studies that focus on employment and the often-used low- 
and high-skill taxonomy, we extend this investigation in two ways. 
First, when firms decide to offshore their activities, it might change not 
only the demand from low- to high-skilled labour but also the demand 
for specific types of skills. This can partly be explained by the impact 
of servitisation, where domestic manufacturing activities are being 
replaced by more developed integrated product solutions, including a 
high service component (see Slepniov et al. in this book for a broad-
er discussion on servitisation within global operation networks). This 
change of focus most likely leads to demand for another type of skills, 
and not necessarily to a change in the overall level of skills. Second, 
firms engaged in offshoring often go through different stages, where 
the company learns from initial offshoring of simple production and 
subsequently offshores a larger share of their productions, including 
other production-related activities, e.g. the offshoring of more val-
ue-added activities such as engineering and R&D (Maskell et al., 2007). 
Consequently, it can be expected that firms which offshore more val-
ue-added activities experience a change in employment that is differ-
ent compared to firms that offshore the more traditional production 
tasks. Therefore, it is necessary to track changes in numbers of employ-
ees in more detail, rather than only looking at the aggregate wage bill.
To investigate these issues, we rely on an offshoring survey conduct-
ed by Statistics Denmark in 2007.1 This survey was part of a wider Eu-
ropean project with the purpose of gathering information on several 
aspects of international offshoring, e.g. target countries, kinds of ac-
tivities that have been offshored, motivation factors, impact, barriers 
and the consequences for domestic employment during the period 
2001–2006. The survey was distributed among all Danish firms with 
more than 50 employees and a sample of firms with 20–50 employees. 
The benefits of using this survey are as follows: (i) a more accurate 
measure of offshoring – existing studies create a proxy for outsourcing 
and offshoring by looking at imports and exports, while international 
outsourcing and offshoring is a much rarer phenomenon than interna-
1  Statistics Denmark refers to this survey as an outsourcing survey. How-
ever, the definition they use refers more to offshoring than to outsourc-
ing. 
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tional procurement and trade; (ii) existing research tends to focus on 
larger firms, but the survey also provides insights into the offshoring 
activities, divided into different types of business functions, of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); and (iii) the large-scale survey 
allow the study of general offshoring trends, not just single cases.  
This survey will be merged with the Danish Integrated Database for 
Labour Market Research (IDA). IDA is a universal and longitudinal da-
tabase that provides detailed information on all establishments and 
all individuals in Denmark in the period 1980 and onwards. Due to the 
unique person and plant identification number, it is possible to identi-
fy the human resource composition of each establishment, as well as 
on the aggregated industry level. Because the IDA provides detailed 
information on education, it is possible to proxy the level of skills and 
type of skills. Consequently, in addition to the strengths offered by the 
survey, another strength is that in contrast to most of the studies that 
exist, it is possible to investigate the change in employment on the firm 
level (a notable exception within international economics is Görg and 
Hanley (2005), who investigated the labour demand effects of interna-
tional outsourcing on plant-level data).
The research conducted in this chapter will contribute to the litera-
ture in the following three ways. First, the study will provide firm-level 
evidence on the difference in the overall change of domestic employ-
ment between offshoring and nonoffshoring firms. In addition, it will 
be possible to observe the trend during an economic recession. A crisis 
situation is often a motivation for firms to engage in offshoring (Lars-
en and Pedersen’s chapter shows that this was the case for Lego). By 
following the trend in employment for the period 2000–2007, it will be 
possible to identify how offshoring and nonoffshoring firms reacted 
during and just after this recession in 2001. Such a recession resulted in 
layoffs, and although the following economic recovery provided new 
jobs recovery may also affect the rehiring of employees differently in 
offshoring compared to nonoffshoring firms, e.g. the economic down-
turn can lead to a restructuring on the allocation of labour. Second, 
the chapter will investigate whether a change can be observed in the 
type of skills required between offshoring and nonoffshoring firms in 
19
the various industries. Third, the study will provide insights into how 
employment changes depend on the type of business function that is 
being offshored.
In the next section, we give more information on the offshoring phe-
nomenon and how offshoring has moved from primarily production 
to other, more valued added activities. Afterwards, we will discuss how 
offshoring has affected firms’ domestic employment, and based on this 
existing work, we will identify the major shortcomings of the literature 
and formulate the research questions that will be addressed in this 
chapter. After this theoretical exercise, we will move towards the em-
pirical analysis by presenting the method of analysing the difference 
in employment growth, the data and the empirical results. The chap-
ter will conclude with a discussion of the findings and suggestions for 
future research.
THEORY 
The offshoring phenomenon
Offshoring refers to ‘the process by which companies undertake some 
activities at offshore locations instead of their countries of origin’ (Ku-
mar, van Fenema, & von Glinow, 2009, p. 642). The term offshoring can 
refer to two types of relocation activities: (i) when a firm offshores ac-
tivities to a firm’s own affiliate outside the home country, this is called 
internal or captive offshoring; while (ii) offshoring to an independent 
unaffiliated partner or supplier is referred to as offshore outsourcing 
(Kenney et al., 2009). In this chapter, we refer to either of these two 
activities as offshoring. The offshoring phenomenon has been part of 
the corporate landscape for several decades, and more than 30 years’ 
worth of research can be found on the topic (Hätönen & Eriksson, 2009; 
Jensen & Pedersen, 2011; Lewin & Peeters, 2006; Maskell et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, only recently has the offshoring phenomenon received 
increased attention in the public media and academic literature (Ber-
trand, 2011; Jensen & Pedersen, 2011; Maskell et al., 2007; Rasheed & Gil-
ley, 2005). This increasing interest can be attributed to the increased 
fragmentation of production processes and the associated rise in off-
shoring activities as a result of technological changes, e.g. lowering of 
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transportation costs and advancements in communication technolo-
gies, economic and competitive pressures to reduce costs and improve 
productivity and institutional developments that are in favour of trade 
liberalisation (Bertrand, 2011; Olsen, 2006). By offshoring, firms attempt 
to gain access to the comparative advantage of offshore locations (e.g. 
low cost of production and/or labour, access to skilled labour and new 
markets) in combination with their own resources and competencies 
(McCann & Mudambi, 2005; Mudambi, 2008). These benefits are then 
weighted against the costs associated with having a geographically dis-
persed production network. Since offshoring primarily involves pro-
duction, as well as the most routinised production activities, combined 
with the decreasing costs of logistics and the often low cost of produc-
tion factors in the offshore location, these benefits generally outweigh 
the cost of offshoring.
When firms started to engage in the relocation of firm activities, this 
primarily affected production and blue-collar jobs. Since the mid-1990s, 
a shift occurred where offshoring has been moving up the value chain, 
not only affecting production and standardised services, but also activ-
ities such as R&D – a process that was mainly driven by advancements 
in communication technology (Lewin & Peeters, 2006). Up to that point, 
it was difficult to imagine that firms would be offshoring administra-
tive and technical business functions, including information technol-
ogy, call centres, engineering tasks and R&D activities, to non–Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations 
(Kenney et al., 2009). Nevertheless, this change from offshoring solely 
production to the offshoring of other, more value added, types of ac-
tivities is not that easy. Maskell et al. (2007) identified this shift much 
more with a learning process, where firms started out with offshoring 
for cost reasons, but slowly moved into more differentiated offshoring 
strategies, including more innovation-based ones (Kenney et al., 2009). 
Arguably, depending on where firms are in this offshoring learning 
process, a different pattern in the demand for skilled labour might 
emerge, for example, amongst firms that are exclusively engaged in the 
offshoring of core business functions, e.g. production. Instead of only 
losing domestic employees, firms might put their focus on other types 
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of activities within the value chain close to their home base. The activ-
ities developed in the home market focus more on the provision of ser-
vices related to the core business function, a process often referred to 
as servitisation (see Slepniov et al. in this volume for a more thorough 
discussion on this phenomenon). It can be assumed that this process 
of servitisation would require a different skill-set.
Given the learning process of offshoring, firms will gradually offshore 
these value–added activities, which will again lead to a change in the 
demand of skills, i.e. the domestic demand of skills associated with the 
servitisation process will be negatively affected due to the offshoring 
of other, more value added business functions. Consequently, treating 
offshoring as a general phenomenon when investigating the overall 
domestic employment effect would be inconclusive and it is necessary 
to consider the type of activities offshored in order to provide a more 
accurate picture on the change in employment.
Offshoring and domestic employment
The topic of offshoring is closely related to the demand for labour. 
Early offshoring activities were mainly motivated by labour cost re-
duction but the access to talent in offshoring destination gained in 
importance as a motivation for offshoring (Florida, 1997). Nowadays, 
firms are actively engaged in accessing pools of talent in countries like 
China, India and Brazil (Couto, Mani, Lewin, & Peeters, 2007; Lewin & 
Peeters, 2006; Manning, Lewin, & Massini, 2008), partly due to the avail-
ability of cheap skilled labour in these countries and partly the lack of 
trained personnel, in particular science and engineering graduates, in 
the developed world (Manning et al., 2008). 
Despite this changing offshoring pattern, there are hardly any studies 
at the firm level that have addressed the issue of how firms’ domestic 
employment changes as a result of offshoring and taken into account 
the type of business function being outsourced and in what industry 
the outsourcing firm is active. An exception is Teirlinck et al. (2010), 
who addressed the issue of R&D outsourcing and R&D employment 
intensity. However, undisputedly, offshoring activities have a direct im-
pact on firms’ employment because of plant closures, plant relocations 
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or large reductions in operations (Di Gregorio et al., 2009) and offshor-
ing of more value added activities might lead to a relative decrease in 
the demand of this more highly skilled type of labour.
The study of Feenstra and Hanson (1996), which adopted a broad defi-
nition of offshoring (referred to as outsourcing), investigated the role 
of both skill-biased technological change and outsourcing, the two 
most heavily cited explanations for the relative decline in the wages 
of low-skilled workers. Up to that point, the role of offshoring had 
hardly been investigated, as most researchers and policymakers put 
emphasis on the impact of skill-biased technological change, i.e. the 
relative decrease in the demand for low-skilled labour is a result of 
investments in technology that can replace this type of labour, (see, 
e.g. Berman, Bound & Grilliches, 1994). Feenstra and Hanson, howev-
er, followed a comparative advantage perspective of outsourcing by 
stating that the import competition resulting from offshore outsourc-
ing will result in a move of nonskilled activities abroad and a shift of 
employment towards skilled workers within these industries. To in-
vestigate this, they used import data for all US manufacturing indus-
tries from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) trade 
database for the period 1972–1994 in combination with disaggregated 
data on input purchases from the Census of Manufacturing to esti-
mate the industry-by-industry outsourcing for the period 1972–1992.2 
To distinguish between low-skilled and skilled workers, they use non-
production workers’ share of the industry wage bill to measure the 
relative demand for skilled labour. The result of their study was that 
skill-biased technological change played an important role in the wage 
gap between skilled and unskilled workers, but approximately 15% of 
this gap could be explained by outsourcing (Feenstra & Hanson, 1999).
Following this pioneering work, other studies investigated the impact 
of offshoring on the employment structure in other non-US countries 
like Austria (Egger & Egger, 2003; Egger et al., 2001), Germany (Falk & 
Koebel, 2002; Geishecker, 2006), Sweden (Ekholm & Hakkala, 2008), 
2  They measured the extent of offshoring as the share of imported inter-
mediate inputs in the total purchase of non-energy materials. 
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France (Strauss-Kahn, 2004), Denmark (Munch & Skaksen, 2009), the 
United Kingdom (Hijzen et al., 2005), Ireland (Görg & Hanley, 2005) and 
Japan (Head & Ries, 2002). Based on various types of methods, some 
more elaborate than others depending on the availability of data, and 
definitions, whether using a broad or more narrow definition, all of 
these studies identified a negative impact of offshoring on the low-
skilled labour force. 
Despite their similar results, these macro-based studies have some ma-
jor shortcomings. The first problem is with their definitions of offshor-
ing and outsourcing. On their level of aggregation, there are hardly 
any data available that indisputably indicate offshoring; instead, the 
studies rely mainly on import and export data. Offshoring, however, 
is a rarer phenomenon than international trade. Second, these studies 
are based on country or industry aggregates and do not provide any in-
sights into how offshoring firms perform in relation to nonoffshoring 
firms. Finally, they all take a position whereby offshoring involves the 
relocation of low value added activities. Although most of the jobs that 
are offshored are low-skilled jobs, which amounts to approximately 
two-thirds of all job losses (Munch & Skaksen, 2009), this disregards the 
effect of offshoring administrative and technical business functions.
In this chapter, we investigate the issue of change in domestic employ-
ment using three related research questions that have to do with the 
effect of offshoring:
1. How does the overall level of employment differ between Dan-
ish offshoring and nonoffshoring firms? This research question 
focuses on the level of the firm, but also makes a distinction 
between manufacturing and business services.
2. Focusing on both the level of skills and the types of skills, how 
do offshoring and non-offshoring firms in Denmark differ in 
terms of the change in high-skilled workers?
3. Is there a difference in the change in employment between 
firms whose offshoring includes administrative and technical 
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business functions compared to firms that offshore other busi-
ness functions?
METHOD
The purpose of this study is to compare how offshoring firms differ 
in the growth of (high-skilled) employment compared to nonoffshor-
ing firms. A problem that arises is that, based on their characteristics, 
some firms are more likely to (not) engage in offshoring than others 
(e.g. based on size and industry characteristics). Consequently, there is 
a selection bias which makes it is difficult to assess whether the differ-
ence in employment is a result of offshoring or another feature. This 
issue can be addressed using matching estimators. In essence, it is pos-
sible to test what a firm that offshored business functions (a treated 
firm), with a given set of characteristics, would have done if it had not 
offshored (not received treatment). Thus, in order to evaluate how off-
shoring firms differ from nonoffshoring firms, it is important that for 
each offshoring firm a match is found among the subsample of non-
offshoring firms.3
There is a choice between several matching approaches. In this study, 
we will incorporate a partial propensity score matching method, where 
we use a combination of covariate matching and propensity score 
matching. The covariate matching technique matches treated and un-
treated firms based on a set of covariates on which they have to be sim-
ilar. A problem of this approach is the curse of dimensionality (Calien-
do & Kopeinig, 2008), which occurs because conditioning on all relevant 
covariates is limited when the number of covariates is high. On the 
other hand, propensity score matching can solve this problem (Rosen-
baum & Rubin, 1983) and this is why we combine the two matching 
methods. With this matching procedure, we start by using a logit mod-
3  This approach is similar to testing the impact of a specific type of 
medication on a patient. To assess this, two individuals with identical 
characteristics (same age, gender, health condition, etc.) are selected, 
where one receives the medication and the other person does not (often, 
her or she will receive a placebo). After the treatment period, how the 
medication affected the person in question is assessed by comparing the 
progression of the two individuals.
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el to estimate the propensity for a firm to engage in offshoring based 
on a set of variables that can explain a firm’s decision to offshore. This 
propensity score is then used as a matching criterion. In our partial 
propensity score matching approach, we take the point of departure 
in the propensity score, but include two additional covariate-matching 
criteria that should be met, i.e. the firms must be active in the same 
industry class and be in the same size category. Thus, after we calculate 
the propensity scores and matched the treated and untreated firms on 
industry and size class, we will conduct calliper matching.4 In this ap-
proach, we impose a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score 
distance, which we set at 5 percentage points. All matches in this range 
will be included in the analysis.5
As a result of this matching procedure, those firms that are so unique 
that they cannot be matched with another firm will be removed from 
the sample. To illustrate this, Denmark has several national champions 
– large multinational companies that are active within a specific in-
dustry (e.g. Danfoss, Grundfos, Lego, Vestas, Novo Nordisk). It appears 
to be impossible, within the Danish context, to find a firm that matches 
any of these champions’ characteristics and which at the same time 
did not engage in offshoring; similarly, some firms have such a low pro-
pensity to outsource that it is impossible to match them with a firm 
that, given its characteristics, has engaged in offshoring. For this rea-
son, it is likely that these national champions and those firms with a 
very low propensity score will be excluded from the matched sample.6
A limitation of this matching approach is that it is only possible to se-
lect observable covariates. Consequently, one assumes that there are 
no unobserved characteristics that explain whether a firm is engaged 
in offshoring. Although it is impossible to observe all the determinants, 
4  Other often-used matching techniques are: nearest neighbor matching, 
radius matching, stratification and interval matching and kernel matching 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).
5  In other matching procedures, e.g. nearest neighbor matching, only 
one match per treated firm is often included.
6  Due to the anonymity of the data, it is not possible to identify whether 
this is the case for (all of) these Danish national champions.
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we maintain the assumption that we can observe all the important de-
terminants of offshoring.
DATA AND SAMPLE
To investigate the issue at hand, we will investigate the change in em-
ployee composition in Danish manufacturing and business services. 
As indicated by Jensen and Pedersen (2011), ‘[t]he Danish economy is 
closely tied to the international economy and is thus subject to global 
economic flows and trends, including offshoring trends’ (p. 9). The sam-
ple which will be used for the analysis is taken from a Danish survey 
on the offshoring of business functions; this was conducted in 2007 as 
part of a wider European-based project. This project investigated dif-
ferent aspects of offshoring, e.g. target countries, kinds of business ac-
tivities the firm has offshored, motivation factors, effects, barriers and 
the consequences for domestic employment in the period 2001–2006 
in 13 EU member states and European Economic Area (EEA) countries. 
7The survey was distributed among all Danish firms with more than 
50 employees (with a response rate of approximately 97%). In addition, 
the survey was supplemented with a sample of firms in the size cate-
gory of 20–49 employees. The total number of observations in the Dan-
ish offshoring survey was 4,161.
This survey provides a number of advantages over other methods of 
investigating this issue. First, it presents the possibility of identifying 
firms that are actually engaged in offshoring; earlier studies provid-
ed proxies of both offshoring and outsourcing by defining offshoring 
and outsourcing in terms of procurement activities, e.g. imported in-
puts, parts and components purchased abroad, etc. (Horgos, 2009). As 
mentioned by Gilley and Rasheed (2000), offshoring and outsourcing 
cannot be defined as simply a purchasing decision, because all firms 
have some procurement element in their operations, while offshoring 
and outsourcing are less common activities. In this survey, offshoring 
is defined as ‘the total or partial movement of business functions (core 
7  Countries that participated are: Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Norway, Spain Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.
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or support business functions) performed in-house or domestically 
outsourced by the resident enterprise to either non-affiliated (external 
suppliers) or affiliated enterprises located abroad’ (Statistics Denmark, 
2008, p. 13).8
A second advantage of this survey is that it offers a broader perspec-
tive regarding offshoring. Many studies on offshoring focus on anec-
dotal evidence of strategies conducted by large firms. Nevertheless, 
globalisation pressures and offshoring are not only present within 
large firms; they are also part of the competitive landscape of SMEs. 
This survey includes small and medium-sized firms, i.e. firms that had 
at least 20 employees in 2007.
A final strength of the offshoring survey is the possibility to merge it 
with IDA. IDA is a longitudinal linked employer-employee dataset con-
structed from government registers and maintained by Statistics Den-
mark; see Timmermans (2010) for a thorough description of this data-
base and its use. Its longitudinal nature enables us to identify changes 
in employment structures and labour mobility flow by comparing em-
ployer-employee relationships in consecutive years. A change in this 
relationship would indicate a change in the employment composition. 
The education background (based on a detailed eight-digit education 
class) is the employee characteristic that attracts our main interest. 
This variable makes a distinction between higher and lower education 
and the type of background. In this study, we are particularly con-
cerned with the divide between science and engineering, which has a 
strong manufacturing angle, and social sciences and administration, 
which can be linked more with the servitisation perspective.
All the firms in the survey can be merged with IDA, but before starting 
the analysis, we set a number of criteria for the firms that are select-
ed for our final sample. First, we will only select those firms that are 
active in manufacturing industries (NACE 15–37) and business services 
8  Statistics Denmark refers to this survey as an outsourcing survey. How-
ever, the definition they use refers more to offshoring than to outsourc-
ing. Furthermore, this definition is narrower compared to the definition 
provided by Kumar et al. (2009).
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(NACE 72–74), which narrows the sample down to 2,631 observations. 
Furthermore, we are interested in the change in employment struc-
ture; thus, we select two years in which this change occurs. It would 
be ideal to evaluate the change in skill composition just before and 
shortly after offshoring has taken place; however, the survey does not 
allow for such an analysis, since it asks about the outsourcing activi-
ties in the period 2001–2006. For this reason, we select those firms that 
were active in both years and analyse the subsequent change between 
these two years. In the survey, 2,098 firms fulfil both criteria. Further-
more, it is possible to see how the general employment trend varies 
between offshoring and nonoffshoring firms during times of crisis. A 
crisis situation is often a motivation for firms to engage in offshoring 
(Larsen and Pedersen’s chapter shows that this was the case for LEGO). 
Denmark, like many other parts of Europe, was hit by an economic re-
cession in the early 2000s. This recession caused an increase in Danish 
unemployment. It is thus possible to identify how the different firms 
reacted during the upswing of the economy in the following years.
In addition to the above-mentioned advantages of the survey, there 
are, next to the general limitation of survey-based studies, some sur-
vey-specific limitations. First, this offshoring survey asks only on 
whether firms offshore, but not about the magnitude of offshoring. 
It is therefore not possible to identify whether firms engage in large 
offshoring activities that affect the domestic operations to a large ex-
tent, or whether it involves the relocation of a single job position. Sec-
ond, we only observe whether firms have been engaged in offshoring 
over a five-year period (2001–2006). A more precise indication on the 
offshoring activity, e.g. the year of offshoring, is not available. Third, 
the indications of business functions, in particular core business func-
tions, are not strictly defined. Firms might perceive any of the support-
ing business functions, i.e. information technology (IT), logistics, sales, 
R&D, etc., as core activities. Finally, we only select surviving companies. 
This means that firms that engaged in offshoring in the period 2001–
2006 but closed down in the same period will not be observed.
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Treatment variables
The treatment variable is a dummy variable that has the value 1 when-
ever the firm in the sample indicates that it was engaged in offshoring 
in the period 2001–2006 (OFFSHORE=1); otherwise, the variable has the 
value 0 (OFFSHORE=0). A firm is considered active in offshoring when 
it has offshored one or more of the following business functions: (i) core 
business functions; (ii) distribution and logistics; (iii) marketing, sales 
and after sales services; (iv) information and communication technol-
ogy (ICT) services; (v) administrative and management functions; (vi) 
engineering and related technical services; (vii) R&D; and (viii) other 
functions. In total, 440 firms answered that they had offshored one or 
more business functions during the period 2001–2006.
Offshored functions
Offshoring (n=440)
# %
% of offshoring 
firms
Core business functions* 268 12.77 60.90
Distribution and logistics 78 3.72 17.73
Marketing, sales and after sales services 69 3.29 15.68
ICT services 83 3.96 18.86
Administrative and management func-
tions 47 2.24
10.68
Engineering and related technical services 105 5.00 23.86
R&D 74 3.53 16.82
Other functions 37 1. 76 8.41
* Statistics Denmark (2008, p. 13) states that core business functions include the produc-
tion of final goods or services intended for the market/for third parties carried out by 
the enterprise and yielding income. The core business function in most cases equals the 
primary activity of the enterprise. It may also include other (secondary) activities if the 
enterprise considers these to comprise part of its core functions
Table 1. Offshored functions of firms in the full sample
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Table 1 presents the distribution of the different types of functions 
that have been offshored. The majority of offshoring firms offshore 
only one business function (i.e. 265 firms), primarily the core business 
functions (i.e. 155 firms). The remaining 175 firms offshore a combina-
tion of business functions in the period 2001–2006.9 
Control variables
The control variables are those observable characteristics of the firm 
that can be considered as important determinants of offshoring. 
Whenever possible, these variables are measured at the beginning of 
the period, i.e. all at the start of 2001. Due to the longitudinal nature of 
the IDA, it is possible to obtain various firm characteristics from the 
end of 2000, which is prior to the observation period 2001–2006.10 
 It is crucial to include only variables that have a significant impact on 
the likelihood to offshore. Some variables are known to determine the 
likelihood of offshoring, e.g. industry and size. 
For industry classes we applied a relative narrow industry definition 
based on the NACE (rev 1.1.) industry classification, i.e. manufacturing 
of food beverages and tobacco; manufacturing of textiles and leather; 
manufacturing of wood and paper products; publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media; manufacturing of chemical products; 
manufacturing of plastics; manufacturing of other nonmetallic miner-
al products; manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal prod-
ucts; manufacturing of machinery and equipment; manufacturing of 
electrical and optical equipment; manufacturing of transport equip-
ment; manufacturing of furniture and other manufacturing; computer 
and related activities; R&D; business consultancy; technical consultan-
cy; and other business services. As a measure of size, we identified the 
size of each firm in the sample in 2000. To control for the skewness in 
size, the natural log is taken.
9  It is likely that firms already offshored some of their business activities 
in the period before 2001. A limitation of this study is that we cannot 
check which firms have done this.
10  All information for the year 2000 was obtained in the end of the year 
(primarily in November). This would give a good estimation on the char-
acteristics of the firm at the start of 2001
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Industry Total 
(n=2,058)
Offshoring (n=440)
# % #
6
24
22
32
%
215
23
77
% of industry
7.90
10.21
20.94
28.89
Manu. of food, beverages and to-
bacco
158 7.53 25 5.68 15.82
Manu. of textiles and leather 47 2.24 23 5.23 48.94
Manu. of wood and  
paper products
107 5.10 12 2.73 11.21
Publishing, printing and reproduc-
tion of recorded media
107 5.10 11 2.50 10.28
Manu. of chemicals products 63 3.00 15 3.41 23.81
Manu. of plastics 102 4.86 19 4.32 18.63
Manu. of other nonmetallic miner-
al products
74 3.53 8 1.82 10.81
Manu. of basic metals and fabri-
cated metal products
283 13.49 47 10.68 16.61
Manu. of machinery and equip-
ment
303 14.44 87 19.77 28.71
Manu. of electrical and optical 
equipment
154 7.34 64 14.55 41.56
Manu. of transport equipment 47 2.24 15 3.41 31.91
Manu. of furniture, manufacturing 
n.e.c.
109 5.20 24 5.45 22.02
Computer and related activities 126 6.01 45 10.23 35.71
Research and development 24 1.14 7 1.59 29.17
Business consultancy 128 6.10 5 1.14 3.91
Technical consultancy 124 5.91 23 5.23 18.55
Other business services 142 6.77 10 2.27 7.04
Table 2. Industries and size category distribution
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Firm size categories # % #
6
24
22
32
%
215
23
77
% of industry
7.90
10.21
20.94
28.89
< 20 employees* 79 3.77 16 3.64 20.25
20–50 employees 
50
668 31.81 95 21.59 14.22
51–100 employees 565 26.93 100 22.73 22.73
101–250 employees 479 22.83 120 27.27 25.05
251–500 employees 173 8.25 50 11.36 28.90
> 500 employees 134 6.39 59 13.41 44.03
*The survey implemented the size criteria for firms in 2007; in the year 2000, some firms 
were smaller than the minimum requirement of 20 employees. In the partial propensity 
score matching method, this category will be merged with 20–50 employees.
Table 2 presents how these firms are distributed based on the 
above-mentioned industry classification. In total, 440 firms were en-
gaged in offshoring during the period 2001–2006. There are clear differ-
ences based on industry and size on whether firms offshore. Offshoring 
appears to be a strategy primarily conducted by firms in manufactur-
ing industries; however, some industries (e.g. manufacturing of textiles 
and leather, manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment, man-
ufacturing of transport equipment, and computer and related activi-
ties) are more engaged in these activities than others (e.g. publishing 
and printing and business consultancy). Although the Danish textile 
industry started outsourcing and offshoring in the 1970s, textile firms 
still offshored in the survey period. As expected, there is a clear size 
effect where large firms tend to be more active in offshoring compared 
to smaller firms. 
Other potential variables that characterize offshoring firms are rela-
tively unknown. For this reason, we rely on the statistical significance 
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of a set of variables, both demographic characteristics and financial 
indicators, to find other variables that have an effect on the likelihood 
to offshore. This approach is common within propensity score match-
ing when the specifications are unknown (Caleindo & Kopeinig, 2008). 
In this case, we started with a simple model including the size and in-
dustry variables and then test by iteratively adding variables into the 
specification. In this way, we can identify what other variables have a 
significant impact on the likelihood that a firm is engaged in offshor-
ing; in the process, we also take into account the improvement in mod-
el fit statistics.  
In addition to total size in employees (LN_EMPL2000), we tested other 
employee characteristics, e.g. the number of highly educated workers 
(LN_HEEMPL2000), the number of employees with a foreign citizen-
ship (LN_FOREIGN2000) and various age variables of the employees 
(i.e. MEAN_AGE2000, STD_AGE2000 and Q3_AGE2000). The number 
of employees with foreign citizenship did not have any effect while 
the logarithm to the number of highly educated employees turned out 
to have a positive impact on the likelihood to offshore. However, this 
effect disappeared when we added the age characteristics, in particular 
the standard deviation in age (STD_AGE2000). Since adding this vari-
able improved the model considerably, we retained this standard devi-
ation variable to calculate the propensity scores. The average age had 
no significant effect, while a high third quartile in age (Q3_AGE2000) 
led to a lower likelihood of engaging in offshoring, although this effect 
disappeared when STD_AGE2000 was added. It can be assumed that 
the significant negative impact of a higher standard deviation of age is 
strongly dependent on a deviation towards the older ages.
Various financial data about the firm were also included. The measures 
were exports, value added, turnover and wage cost. Exports (LN_EX-
PORT2000) was included because this indicates to what extent firms 
are engaged in international trade, where we assume that a firm with 
high level of exports is more likely to engage in offshoring. Value add-
ed (LN_VALUEADDED2000) and turnover (LN_TURNOVER2000) indi-
cate an overall performance measure of the firm, which might affect 
the likelihood to offshore either positively or negatively, depending on 
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the motives for offshoring. Wage costs (LN_WAGECOST2000) provide 
information on the firm’s total expenses in wages and pensions. It can 
be expected that high wage costs might have a positive impact on the 
likelihood to engage in offshoring. When including these variables in 
the model, only two turn out to have a significant effect on the likeli-
hood to offshore. First, there is the export variable. Firms with a high 
level of exports have a higher likelihood of engaging in offshoring. On 
the other hand, value added has a negative relation to the likelihood to 
engage in offshoring. Other financial indicators, e.g. growth indicators 
of the above-mentioned variables in the period 1999–2000 did not have 
any significant effect.
Finally, we tested the impact on whether the firm is located in the Capi-
tal Region of Denmark (CPH=1) or in another region (CPH=0). Our argu-
ment for including this control variable is that firms in the Capital Re-
gion are known to have a more international profile compared to firms 
in any of the other four regions, i.e. Region Zealand, Region of Southern 
Denmark, Central Denmark Region and North Denmark Region. 
Outcome variables
In this study, we want to investigate how offshoring affects a number 
of firm employment characteristics. First, we will measure the differ-
ence in growth in the overall employment (EMPL_GROWTH) between 
offshoring and nonoffshoring firms. To calculate this growth, we iden-
tify the number of employees in 2000 (LN_EMPL2000) and subtract 
this from the number of employees in 2007 (LN_EMPL2007) to get the 
change in number of employees (on a logarithmic scale) between these 
two years. 
Furthermore, we investigate the growth in high- and low-skilled em-
ployees. Previous studies that investigate the impact of offshoring on 
skill composition have, in line with Berman et al. (1994) and Slaughter 
(2000), defined high- and low-skilled employees in terms of production 
and nonproduction workers. We will not make a distinction between 
production and nonproduction workers but take the education level of 
employees, which has been identified as a better method to proxy the 
level of skills within a firm (Anderson et al., 2001). Thus, we will inves-
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tigate the respective change in employees with a high education (HE_
GROWTH), employees with a medium-level education (ME_GROWTH) 
and employees with a low level of education (LE_GROWTH). Highly 
educated employees are employees with a university or polytechnic 
degree. Employees with a medium-level education are those with a 
certificate from the dual vocational training system. The remaining 
employees are classified as having low education. 
Finally, in addition to the effect of offshoring on the change of em-
ployment between high, medium and low levels of education, we also 
test the difference in growth in terms of specific high educational 
backgrounds. High-, medium- and low-level education only accounts 
for part of the story; therefore, we distinguish between people with a 
high-level degree in science and engineering (S&E_GROWTH) and so-
cial sciences and administration (ADM_GROWTH).11 All these variables 
will also be measured within the period to see the trend in the entire 
period 2001–2006.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As a first step in creating the matched sample, we needed to estimate 
the propensity scores. In order to do this, we included all the control 
variables in a logit model with the dependent variable OFFSHORE, i.e. 
whether the firm was engaged in offshoring in the period 2001–2006. 
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics in the full sample, compar-
ing offshoring and nonoffshoring firms in terms of their mean differ-
ences. The firms in the two subsamples differ significantly in terms 
of the variables that will be used to calculate the propensity scores. 
Regarding employment in offshoring and nonoffshoring firms, there 
are clear differences between them. First, the average growth in the 
number of employees is significantly different between offshoring and 
nonoffshoring firms, where nonoffshoring firms grow more compared 
to offshoring ones. The growth in employees with both low and high 
11  In making a distinction in the level of education, there is the possibil-
ity that some firms will have 0 employees in one or more categories. To 
solve this problem, we apply a log transformation for the more detailed 
employment figures, i.e. ln(x+1).
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educational backgrounds is higher in nonoffshoring firms (for offshor-
ing firms, there is a decline in employees with a low level of education); 
nevertheless, there are no significant differences between the two sub-
samples. The growth in employees with a medium level of education 
is significantly higher in nonoffshoring firms. When looking at the dif-
ferences between offshoring and nonoffshoring firms in terms of the 
growth in employees with an academic background in science and engi-
neering and social science and administration, Table 3 shows that there 
is no significant difference between these two types of firms for science 
and engineering, but offshoring firms have significantly higher growth 
in employees with a social science and administration background. 
 Variable Off- 
shoring=1
N1=433 Off- 
shoring=0
N0=1,634 p-value of 
two-tailed 
t-test on 
mean differ-
ence
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Ln_empl2000 4.704 1.263 4.030 1.018 0.000
Std_age2000 10.471 1.785 11.118 2.149 0.000
Ln_ex-
port2000
15.313 6.163 11.277 7.597 0.000
Ln_value_add-
ed2000
17.488 1.847 16.884 1.451 0.000
Cph 0.333 0.472 0.282 0.450 0.040
Propensity 
Score
0.244 0.189 0.174 0.141 0.000
Empl_growth 0.013 0.639 0.121 0.753 0.006
He_growth 0.258 0.654 0.272 0.693 0.719
Me_growth -0.033 0.678 0.094 0.730 0.001
Le_growth -0.049 0.741 0.085 0.801 0.468
S&E_growth 0.174 0.655 0.173 0.655 0.987
Adm_growth 0.302 0.613 0.201 0.612 0.002
Note: The total number of observations and the number of offshoring firms has de-
creased due to missing observations in the financial data, i.e. export and value added. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics (full sample)
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To start the matching procedure, we created a propensity score by run-
ning a logit model on the control variables presented earlier and de-
scribed in Table 3. The propensity scores for offshoring firms, as expect-
ed, are significantly higher compared to those of nonoffshoring firms; 
through matching, these propensity scores will become more similar.12
After matching, which gives a sample of 367 treated (firms that offshore) 
and 1,399 untreated firms, we observe some differences in the various 
employment figures compared to the full sample (see Table 4). Total 
growth in employment remains significantly positive for nonoffshor-
ing firms. Growth in the number of employees with an academic or 
polytechnic education is higher in nonoffshoring firms, but the differ-
ence is not significant. Nonoffshoring firms have a significant increase 
of employees with a medium and low level of education; for offshoring 
firms, the number of firms with these two educational backgrounds de-
creases. Despite the slightly stronger increase in employees with an ac-
ademic background in science and engineering in nonoffshoring firms, 
the increase is not significant, while the offshoring firms experience a 
significant stronger increase (at the 10% level of significance) in employ-
ees with an academic background in social sciences and administration.
Variable Off- 
shoring=1
N1=367 Off- 
shoring=0
N0=1,399 p-value of 
two-tailed 
t-test on 
mean dif-
ference
Mean Std. 
dev.
Mean Std. dev.
Empl_growth 0.026 0.631 0.172 0.685 0.000
He_growth 0.259 0.675 0.301 0.660 0.277
Me_growth -0.017 -0.086 0.140 0.104 0.000
Le_growth -0.024 0.695 0.139 0.732 0.000
S&E_growth 0.171 0.662 0.180 0.641 0.797
Adm_growth 0.285 0.616 0.222 0.580 0.068
12  The logit model used to calculate the propensity scores is presented 
in the Appendix.
Table 4. Mean difference in the change in domestic employment be-
tween offshoring and non-offshoring firms (matched sample)
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The results presented in Table 4 are based on the entire match sam-
ple. There may be some industry differences in the change in employ-
ment. For this reason, we look at the mean difference amongst firms in 
manufacturing (NACE 15–39) and business service (NACE 72–74). Table 
5 presents the matched sample of firms that are active in the manu-
facturing industries. In this manufacturing subsample, there are 303 
treated and 1,066 untreated firms. The results are very similar to the 
results of the overall analysis: Nonoffshoring firms in manufacturing 
experience significantly higher growth in the number of employees 
compared to offshoring firms. There is no significant difference in the 
growth of employees with a higher education; however, the growth 
is slightly higher in offshoring firms, which is different from the full 
sample. The growth in employees with a low and medium level of ed-
ucation is significantly higher in nonoffshoring firms. Nonoffshoring 
firms experience a lower growth in employees with both science and 
engineering and social science and administration academic back-
grounds, but only the latter is significantly different.
Variable Off- 
shoring =1
N1=303 Off- 
shoring =0
N0=1,066 p-value of 
two-tailed 
t-test on 
mean dif-
ference
Mean Std. 
dev.
Mean Std. dev.
Empl_growth 0.013 0.588 0.127 0.598 0.003
He_growth 0.264 0.632 0.247 0.598 0.677
Me_growth 0.008 0.575 0.112 0.584 0.002
Le_growth -0.037 0.684 0.119 0.639 0.000
S&E_growth 0.150 0.081 0.123 0.090 0.448
Adm_growth 0.302 0.578 0.182 0.533 0.001
Table 5. Mean difference in the change in domestic employment 
between offshoring and nonoffshoring firms in manufacturing 
(matched sample)
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Table 6 shows the mean differences between offshoring and non-off-
shoring firms in business services, which contains 63 treated and 333 
untreated firms. Interestingly, the significance disappears for the 
majority of the employment growth variables. Nevertheless, nonoff-
shoring firms experience a significant growth in the total number of 
employees compared to the offshoring firms. The other rather unex-
pected finding is that nonoffshoring firms experience a significantly 
stronger increase in the number of employees with an academic and 
polytechnic background.
Variable Off- 
shoring=1
N1=63 Off- 
shoring =0
N0=333 p-value of 
two-tailed 
t-test on 
mean dif-
ference
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. 
dev.
Empl_growth 0.087 -0.115 0.314 0.893 0.061
He_growth 0.023 0.086 0.471 0.806 0.032
Me_growth -0.058 1.014 0.227 0.899 0.238
Le_growth 0.040 0.749 0.204 0.970 0.200
S&E_growth 0.269 0.879 0.357 0.866 0.414
Adm_growth 0.202 0.771 0.351 0.696 0.123
 
 
In the tables presented above, we only investigate whether there is a 
significant difference in the growth of domestic employees between 
offshoring and nonoffshoring firms in 2000 and 2007. From these ta-
bles, it is not possible to identify the difference in the overall trend 
in employment, which we will discuss below. Analysing this trend 
can provide some interesting insights into how offshoring firms have 
Table 6. Mean differences in domestic employment change between 
offshoring and nonoffshoring firms in business services (matched 
sample)
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changed their employment strategies as a result of economic down-
turn. Denmark experienced a recession starting in 2001, followed by 
slow growth in 2002–2003, and from 2004, a period of economic pros-
perity and low unemployment. 
In Figure 1 we observe that there is an overall upward trend of em-
ployment with a small dip in employment because of the economic 
recession. Changes in employment usually lag behind changes in the 
business cycle, since firms want to retain their employees as long as 
possible to avoid costs related to hiring and firing. The recovery fol-
lowing this recession is only visible in nonoffshoring firms. The do-
mestic employment growth of offshoring firms is lagging behind, and 
involves a slower rate of recovery, i.e. the peak that is visible in 2002 
is again reached in 2007, while nonoffshoring firms surpass this peak 
already in 2005. 
Again, this pattern varies considerably between manufacturing and 
services. In Figure 2 we present the numbers for manufacturing indus-
tries. In manufacturing, the ‘peak’ for 2002 is again reached in 2007, and 
the nonoffshoring industries are responsible for the overall recovery. 
Offshoring firms in this industry follow a similar decline in employees 
compared to nonoffshoring firms during the recession, but the recov-
Figure 1. Trend in employment, 2000–2007 (matched sample)
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ery follows a more divergent path. The economic recovery does not 
lead to any form of employment growth for these firms, at least not 
within Denmark. 
In services, Figure 3, there is strong growth visible for both offshoring 
and nonoffshoring firms. Since the share of offshoring firms is relative-
ly low, the pattern of nonoffshoring firms closely resembles the pattern 
of the overall business service industry (not shown in the figure). Nev-
ertheless, for both types of firms, the impact of the recession is visible 
in terms of declining employment levels, but here there is also a slower 
rate of recovery for offshoring firms.
The last table, Table 7, presents the mean differences in employment 
growth between firms that offshore administrative and technical busi-
ness functions (ATBF=1) and other offshoring firms.13 There is no sig-
nificant difference between the growth rates in overall employment. 
However, firms that offshore administrative and technical business 
functions exhibit significantly lower growth in the number of highly 
educated employees. They also have a significant lower growth rate, 
13  Those firms that offshore administrative and technical business func-
tions can also offshore other activities.
Figure 2. Trend in employment in manufacturing, 2000–2007 
(matched sample)
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which on average is decreasing, in the number of employees with a 
medium level of education (although significant on the 10% level of 
significance). Although the average increase in the number of employ-
ees with a science and engineering degree is higher in those firms that 
offshore technical administrative business functions, the mean differ-
ence is not statistically significant. Finally, firms that offshore admin-
istrative and technical business functions have a significantly lower 
increase in employees with a social science or administration degree.
 
Figure 3. Trend in employment in business services, 2000–2007 
(matched sample)
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Variable ATBF=1 N1=135 ATBF =0 N0=232 p-value of 
two-tailed 
t-test on mean 
difference
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
EMPL_GROWTH -0.031 0.709 0.059 0.581 0.187
HE_GROWTH 0.127 0.800 0.335 0.579 0.004
ME_GROWTH -0.094 0797 0.028 0.583 0.095
LE_GROWTH -0.077 0.697 0.007 0.694 0.264
S&E_GROWTH 0.110 0.775 0.206 0.282 0.177
ADM_GROWTH 0.159 0.703 0.358 0.547 0.003
 
DISCUSSION
As expected, offshoring has an impact on the employment levels in 
Danish firms and the development of employment in offshoring firm 
differs compared to that of nonoffshoring firms. However, contrary 
to previous studies, which mainly focus on manufacturing firms, this 
study showed that it is problematic to generalise earlier findings across 
industries, on the various offshored business functions and between 
different types of skills.
The cost motivation for offshoring has resulted in the offshoring of 
production, and for this reason, it is understandable that many studies 
have focused on the offshoring activities of manufacturing firms. Nev-
ertheless, service industries are involved in offshoring to an increasing 
Table 7. Mean differences in domestic employment change between 
firms that offshore administrative and technical business functions 
(ATBF) and other offshoring firms
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extent, and despite the relatively lower levels of offshoring in service 
industries compared to manufacturing industries, there are particular 
types of service industries that are just as active in offshoring as the 
most active offshoring manufacturing industries, e.g. computer and 
related activities. Given that services consist of a much larger share 
of Danish employment, including the largest share of high-skilled la-
bour, it can be expected that the increasing offshoring activity in this 
industry will have a considerable impact on the Danish economy. Con-
sequently, we recommend that attention to the impact of offshoring 
on this industry in particular should be increased. 
This need is illustrated by the differences in the offshoring pattern and 
the impacts on employment between these industries, which can part-
ly be explained by some fundamental differences in the underlying 
characteristics of both industries. Due to the stronger knowledge-in-
tensive character of firms in service industries, we can argue that 
these firms are more prone to offshore knowledge-intensive business 
functions compared to manufacturing firms. For this reason, it is also 
not surprising that nonoffshoring firms in services experience a high-
er growth rate in highly educated employees compared to offshoring 
firms. This difference is not visible in manufacturing firms; instead, 
based on the change in employment, we might argue that these firms 
are mainly engaged in the offshoring of core business functions, most 
likely production, which negatively influences the number employees 
with a low and medium level of education. 
The offshoring of these core functions does not appear to affect the 
overall growth in highly educated employees, since offshoring and 
nonoffshoring firms are increasing the number of higher educated 
employees to a similar extent. However, it may be that offshoring man-
ufacturing firms focus on supportive tasks, since there has been a sig-
nificantly different increase in the number of employees with a social 
science background in offshoring firms. The latter might provide sup-
port for the increasing attention to servitisation. 
Despite the difference that can be observed in employees with a social 
science background, there are no significant differences in the growth 
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of employees with an engineering or science background. However, on 
average, the number of employees with an engineering and science 
background is increasing. It is difficult to say what this means for the 
loss or gain of technological knowledge in the offshoring and nonoff-
shoring firms; this would require further investigation. 
The type of business function being offshored is an important deter-
minant in how the employee structure of offshoring and nonoffshor-
ing firms differs. It is expected that firms that offshore ATBF would 
have a relatively lower domestic demand for high-skilled labour. This 
expectation is confirmed by our results; nevertheless, both types of 
firms experience an increase in this type of employees. In addition, 
this change is only visible employees with a social science background, 
although there are differences in the average increase of engineers and 
scientists. Again, a more detailed analysis could provide a thorough de-
scription of this phenomenon.
CONCLUSION
This chapter attempted to contribute to the offshoring discussions by 
moving beyond the existing anecdotal and macroeconomic evidence 
and providing microeconomic evidence on the role of offshoring on 
changes in employment. By making use of a Danish offshoring sur-
vey, in combination with the Danish register data, our study provided 
strong evidence that the effect of offshoring on employment cannot 
be taken at face value, but rather has to be considered in light of the 
type of industry and the type of activity that is being outsourced. To 
analyse the difference in growth rates, we used a partial propensity 
score method where we identified multiple firms that can act as a com-
parable control group for the offshoring firm. We also identified firms 
that were unique in such a way that no nonoffshoring counterpart 
would be removed from the analysis.  
As expected, we found that the offshoring firms experienced lower 
growth in the number of employees compared to nonoffshoring firms. 
In addition, they experienced a lower growth in the number of em-
ployees with a medium and low level of education; on average, there 
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was even a decrease. This picture changed, however, when taking into 
account the type of industry, i.e. manufacturing industries vs. business 
services, and when considering the type of activities being offshored. 
Manufacturing industries followed roughly the same overall pattern. 
The change in employment of business services, however, presented 
a different picture. It appeared from the analysis that nonoffshoring 
firms had a higher increase in the number of employees with a higher 
education. This can potentially be explained by the fact that manufac-
turing firms are mainly involved in the offshoring of their core-activi-
ties, while business services offshore other supportive business func-
tions to a higher extent, i.e. sales and marketing, IT, administration and 
management functions, technical and engineering functions and R&D. 
When looking at offshoring of administrative and technical business 
functions, it was shown that this has a stronger impact on the change 
in employees with a higher education background, where those firms 
that offshore experienced a lower growth in the number of employees, 
especially employees with a background in social sciences and admin-
istration; there was also lower average growth in employees with a sci-
ence and engineering background, but there was no significant differ-
ence between the two subsamples. Furthermore, overall, the number 
of employees with a background in social sciences and administration 
seemed to increase more in offshoring firms.
Many issues remain to be investigated in future research. One topic is 
the broader employment issue: The labour effects of offshoring might 
be underestimated and relatively ambiguous due to the disregard of 
labour spillovers and feedback effects among firms and industries 
(Egger & Egger, 2005). What happens to those employees that leave 
the firms? Do they move out of the active labour force? Do they move 
to other firms in the same industry or are they ‘forced’ to take a job 
in other industries. Furthermore, what impact does offshoring have 
on the suppliers of the offshoring firms, i.e. what are the indirect em-
ployment effects? Another issue to be explored is what happens to 
the overall performance of these firms, focusing in particular on in-
novation. Firms have traditionally offshored simple manufacturing 
tasks, but when these tasks become more complex, firms might lose 
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the ‘factory as a laboratory’. Many innovative activities occur on the 
work floor in relation to manufacturing tasks, and when these activi-
ties disappear abroad, this might hamper the capacity for innovation 
of domestic firms. This problem might be enhanced when firms start 
to offshore activities like R&D (called ATBF in our study), which is why 
the OECD (2008) suggests assessing the impact of R&D offshoring on 
a country’s innovative capacity. Answering these and others questions 
would certainly increase our understanding of how offshoring affects 
the demand for labour and the economic performance of firms, and to 
what extent this influences the economy as a whole. Finally, although 
offshoring firms do not appear to perform as well as nonoffshoring 
firms, there are no grounds to conclude that offshoring is bad for em-
ployment. An offshoring decision is often driven by the need to remain 
competitive, and not offshoring might lead to more job losses.
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APPENDIX: Logit model on the offshoring dummy  
 
Variable Coefficient
Std. 
err.
Odds
Marginal 
effect
Intercept -0.154 0.763  
Ln_empl2000 0.635 *** 0.075 1.887 0.502
Std_age2000 -0.238 *** 0.037 0.788 -0.188
Other business services -1.127 *** 0.343 0.474 -0.891
Technical consultancy 0.012  0.252 1.481 0.009
Business consultancy -1.940 *** 0.484 0.210 -1.534
Research and development -0.265  0.579 1.124 -0.209
Computer and related activities 0.271  0.234 1.920 0.214
Manu. of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 0.523 ** 0.249 2.470 0.414
Manu. of transport equipment 0.785 ** 0.328 3.209 0.620
Manu. of electrical and optical equipment 1.049 *** 0.185 4.181 0.830
Manu. of machinery and equipment 0.668 *** 0.157 2.854 0.528
Manu. of basic metals and fabricated metal 
products
0.162  0.179 1.721 0.128
Manu. of other nonmetallic mineral products -0.503  0.378 0.885 -0.398
Manu. of plastics 0.030  0.262 1.509 0.024
Manu. of chemicals products -0.233  0.322 1.160 -0.184
Publishing, printing and reproduction of 
recorded media
-0.389  0.325 0.992 -0.308
Manu. of wood and paper products, -0.443  0.311 0.940 -0.351
Manu. of textiles and leather 1.782 *** 0.308 8.700 1.409
Manu. of food, beverages and tobacco ---Benchmark---
Ln_export2000 0.035 *** 0.011 1.036 0.028
Ln_value_added2000 -0.113 ** 0.048 0.893 -0.090
Capital Region of Denmark 0.193 *** 0.073 1.472 0.153
N 2,067
Offshoring firms 433
Likelihood ratio 343.857
Adjusted R2 23.88
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ABSTRACT
Today’s global manufacturing landscape is changing dramatically; in 
the quest for lower costs and access to new markets, companies are 
moving production into fast-growing market areas and low-cost coun-
tries, increasingly engaging in the outsourcing of their operational ac-
tivities. This raises the question about the future of manufacturing in 
the Western world. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the roles of 
factories located in areas with high labour costs, using Finland as an ex-
ample. We discuss existing models of factory roles and report research 
findings from a survey of factories located in Finland. The objectives of 
the chapter are to take a regional point of view and discuss the types of 
roles that are typical in the context of small local markets and a high 
labour cost area, such as Scandinavia. For practitioners, the chapter 
gives insights into the variety of roles which factories may have in order 
to assess their own factory networks and corresponding factory roles.
INTRODUCTION
Western European companies are becoming increasingly global in 
terms of both the markets to which they sell their products and the 
locations of their manufacturing. Establishing manufacturing units 
abroad has traditionally been seen as the final step in the internation-
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alisation of a company (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), but re-
cently in particular, many companies are also globalising their research 
and development (R&D) activities (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007). Es-
tablishing manufacturing abroad can be motivated, for example, by 
proximity to the markets, access to skills and knowledge and access 
to low-cost manufacturing resources (e.g. Brush, Maritan, & Karnani, 
1999; Ferdows, 1989). Like in many other Western countries, companies 
in Finland are also radically developing their manufacturing activities. 
The manufacturing function is becoming increasingly global due to 
major business changes such as focused strategies, the reduction of 
the viability of mass production in the high-cost context, mergers and 
acquisitions as well as emerging new markets—for example, in Asia 
(Lovio, 2006). This has major consequences for the manufacturing in-
dustries in Finland and the Finnish economy (Eloranta, Ranta, Salmi, & 
Ylä-Anttila, 2010); what kinds of manufacturing will companies have in 
the future in Finland? A dramatic example is the change in the Finnish 
electronics industry, which experienced a rapid growth largely driven 
by Nokia, passing the forest industry as the largest industry in Fin-
land in 2000. Within the past ten years both Nokia as well as the sup-
plier base of the whole industry, including companies like Aspocomp, 
Efore, Elcoteq, Elektrobit, Perlos and Scanfil have largely moved out of 
Finland, moving their production partly or even totally closer to main 
markets and lower-cost production resources (Eloranta et al., 2010). 
In this chapter, we build on research on factory roles to understand 
what kind of factories are located in the Western world and elaborate it 
further in the following sub-chapter. The chapter focuses on Scandina-
vian countries as the context for discussing factory roles. Scandinavian 
countries make an interesting context because of small local markets 
and high labour costs. Critical question for the economy thus is: What 
kind of roles do factories in Scandinavia have? Addressing the status 
of current manufacturing activities in the context allows us to discuss 
also what activities will be feasible to be located in Scandinavia in the 
future. In order to understand the roles of factories located in Finland, 
we present results of a survey of nearly one hundred mid- to large-
sized factories, containing factories of both Finnish and foreign own-
ership. Factories represent variety of industries and process types. In 
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the survey, unit managers evaluated factory competences and reasons 
for the factory location. Additional questions related to operations, 
suppliers, and performance were also addressed. In this chapter, the 
term ‘factory’ is used to describe an industrial production site covering 
activities beyond the traditional production such as order manage-
ment, research and development, and sourcing. The rest of the chapter 
is organised as follows: First, the theoretical background is discussed, 
starting with different research streams around factory roles and con-
tinuing with the origins of the factory roles in operations strategy and 
in subsidiary roles. We present and discuss the key frameworks of fac-
tory roles. The second part of the chapter presents a survey on Finnish 
factories. Finally, the findings are discussed and conclusions are made.
FACTORY ROLES  
Background
Research on global manufacturing has been carried out from several 
different points of view. Early research on operations strategy already 
highlighted the importance of the roles of factories; operations should 
be designed to support the corporate and business strategies of the 
firm (Skinner, 1969). Skinner (1974) also introduced the concept of fo-
cused factory, emphasising the strategic importance of the task given 
to a factory. In addition to, for example, assigning the operational pri-
orities for each factory, factory location is one of the key decisions of 
operations strategy (Hayes, Pisano, Upton, & Wheelwright, 2005; Hayes 
& Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985; Skinner, 1969).
In recent discussions about offshoring (moving operations to offshore 
locations), access to low-cost production resources has been empha-
sised as a key rationale for producing abroad (Farrell, 2006; Lewin & 
Peeters, 2006). This is a rather limited point of view and other reasons 
have also been pointed out: In a recent Finnish study, the main rea-
sons for transferring the production abroad were identified as prox-
imity and access to markets, cost and increased flexibility (Ali-Yrkkö, 
2006). Offshoring is increasingly being discussed along with outsourc-
ing (moving work previously done by the company itself to be done by 
a third party) (e.g. Aron & Singh, 2005; Kinkel & Maloca, 2009). It has 
58
been proposed that organisations should approach the outsourcing of 
current operations at least from two points of view: costs and compe-
tencies (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007). These views have been addressed when 
assessing outsourcing decisions by combining transaction cost theo-
ry and resource based view (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; McIvor, 2009). The 
combination of these two theories has also been used more broadly 
in areas involving both aspects of manufacturing location and owner-
ship, for example, global sourcing (Ettlie & Sethuraman, 2002). 
Another stream of research has focused on different supply chain 
types, which also has direct implications for the roles of manufactur-
ing units. While it had been recognised within the context of manu-
facturing systems that one size does not fit all (Sewchuk, 1998), the dis-
cussion has been extended to supply chains, proposing that different 
supply chains may provide the best fit in different situations. As an 
example, highly variable and unpredictable demand, in combination 
with short product lifecycles, calls primarily for a responsive rather 
than a cost-efficient supply chain (Fisher, 1997). Further identified driv-
ers for differentiated supply chains have been, for example, demand 
volume and order dynamics, customer requirements for lead times 
and order decoupling points, supply uncertainty and product type 
and variety (Childerhouse, Aitken, & Towill, 2002; Childerhouse, Peck, & 
Towill, 2006; Christopher, Peck, & Towill, 2006; Collin & Eloranta, 2009; 
Lee, 2002). The idea of differentiation in supply chains implies that fac-
tories may and should have different competences (Christopher et al., 
2006): For example, a factory serving a lean supply chain should focus 
on producing as cost efficiently as possible, whereas a factory in an ag-
ile supply chain should have high flexibility to accommodate changes 
in demand. 
A fourth stream of research has taken a network perspective and as-
sessed the collection of various organisational units located in differ-
ent parts of the world within a company: What different roles are as-
signed – intentionally or unintentionally – to the different units and 
how are these units with varying roles managed as a network (Brush 
et al., 1999; Ferdows 1989, 1997)? This stream of study builds partly on 
research on global corporations and the management of multibus-
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iness organisations; within a corporation, various business units are 
assigned different roles, which then should support the given strategy 
of the firm (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). In this chapter, we build on this 
research stream.
Roots of factory roles in operations strategy
According to prior research, production and operations can contrib-
ute to the competitive advantage through, for example, cost, quality, 
flexibility, delivery and recently also innovation (Boyer & Lewis, 2002; 
Hayes et al., 2005; Rosenzweig & Easton, 2010). The relative impor-
tance of these competitive priorities may vary in different business 
situations. Finding a balance between the different objectives can be 
seen as the foundation of manufacturing or operations strategy (Da 
Silveira & Slack, 2001). Although there is general agreement that the 
operational priorities do exist, the discussion about the relationship 
between these priorities remains active. Some suggest that these pri-
orities are tradeoffs (Skinner, 1969), so that it is, for example, difficult to 
simultaneously improve quality and reduce costs. Others, on the other 
hand, argue for cumulative competencies and suggest that different 
priorities like quality and costs can be improved at the same time, at 
least if the order of the priorities is carefully considered (Boyer & Lew-
is, 2002; Da Silveira & Slack, 2001; Ferdows & De Meyer, 1990; Schmenner 
& Swink, 1998). 
Operations strategy can be seen as a set of goals, policies and self-im-
posed restrictions that together describe how the organisation propos-
es to direct and to develop all the resources invested in operations so as 
to best fulfil and possibly redefine its mission (Hayes et al., 2005). Fac-
tory location is one of the key decisions of operations strategy (Hayes 
et al., 2005; Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985; Skinner, 1969). While 
the choice of location may be driven by different criteria, such as cost, 
proximity to market or access to skills and knowledge (Ferdows, 1989), 
it affects the nature of the production facility and the role it has in the 
whole manufacturing network. For example, the capabilities in a facto-
ry geared to the lowest possible cost are at least partly different from 
those of a factory, where the main target is high agility for serving dif-
ferent customer needs. Further operational strategy decisions influ-
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encing the role of the factory include the choice of produced products, 
on a scale from mass production to more project-type products which 
are highly standardised and customised (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984; 
Hill, 1985). This might also affect how widely additional functions such 
as R&D exist on the site. The served markets and segments contribute 
to the breadth of responsibility: Is the factory a local niche-factory or 
does it have global responsibilities? Make or buy decisions have a sim-
ilar effect: Is the company serving the end customers of the company, 
or is it feeding materials and components to another factory in the 
company network? With the concept of focused factories, it was ar-
gued that no factory can be good at everything, but in order to excel, 
factories should be focused, for example, on to the products they pro-
duce, process technologies or served markets (Hill, 1985; Skinner, 1969). 
It was also noted that the focus of a factory may change according to 
the lifecycle of a product, and that the factories themselves may have 
lifecycles (Hill, 1985; Schmenner, 1983; Skinner, 1974). As a conclusion, the 
fundamental seeds for differentiated factory roles within a company’s 
operations network are already found in the fundamental operation 
strategy decisions.
Research on multinational corporations and subsidiary roles
Whereas operations strategy research pointed out the importance of 
assessing the roles of factories, research on different roles emerged in 
the context of a more general discussion on subsidiary roles in multi-
national corporations. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986) suggested in their 
pioneering work on subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs) 
that in successful MNCs, the roles of subsidiaries are differentiated 
rather than homogeneous, and the responsibilities are dispersed rath-
er than concentrated. Based on their empirical research, they suggest-
ed a two-dimensional model for the subsidiary roles: The competence 
of the local organisation and the strategic importance of the local envi-
ronment. Consequently, there are four different types of subsidiaries, 
which are shown in Figure 1.
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While Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986) approached the role of a subsidi-
ary from the top level company point of view, the issue has also been 
tackled from national or regional point of view. In the Scandinavian 
context, Benito, Grogaard and Narula (2003) examined how business 
environment influences subsidiary roles of MNCs by focusing on the 
European integration as the context. Their framework was based on 
the scope of activities and the level of competence, and is presented in 
the following figure. This framework was used in a large-scale survey 
of foreign-owned units in Denmark, Finland and Norway. Participa-
tion in the European integration as an example of external factors was 
found to affect both the scope and the competence level of subsidiar-
ies, and the results suggest that more developed roles can be expected 
for subsidiaries located within the European Union area compared to 
those outside the European Union (Benito et al., 2003).
Figure 1. Roles for national subsidiaries (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986)
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As a conclusion, research on subsidiary roles focuses on the level of the 
MNC and its various subsidiaries, paying less attention to specifically 
operational units (e.g. factories) within the subsidiary. Whereas the dif-
ferent subsidiaries can have different roles within the MNC, following 
the same logic, so could the operational units within a subsidiary.
Research on factory roles
The research on factory roles originates from the seminal work of Kas-
ra Ferdows (1989, 1997). His work describes the strategic roles assigned 
to different factories within a company, assuming that there are sever-
al factories in the firm. He also suggests a pattern for how these roles 
evolve through time. The framework is based on two dimensions. The 
first is the extent of activities or level of competence at the factory. The 
basic activity is the production task itself, and additional activities or 
competences include production-related tasks such as maintenance, 
production planning and control and process improvement, but also, 
more general operational activities such as procurement and product 
improvement and R&D. It should be noted that according to Ferdows 
(1989), the order of development of these activities is not fixed, but it 
is the total extent of the activities which is significant. The second di-
mension is the primary strategic reason for the location of the factory. 
The framework is presented in the following figure.
Figure 2. Different types of subsidiaries (Benito et al., 2003)
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The individual roles are characterised as follows (Ferdows 1989, 1987):
 · Offshore factories utilise local low-cost production input fac-
tors, producing either components for further work in another 
factory or final products for sale;
 · Source factories have also primarily been established for ben-
efitting from low-cost production, but have a broader strategic 
role in the network, with more managerial and technical activi-
ties and higher competences on site;
 · Server factories supply specific national or regional markets, 
and typically originate in the need to overcome tariff barriers 
and reduce taxes, logistics costs or exposure to exchange rates;  
 · Contributor factories also serves a specific national or regional 
market, but in comparison to server factories, have more exten-
sive responsibilities such as product and process development 
Figure 3. Roles of different global factories (adapted from Ferdows, 
1997)
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and supplier management, as well as possessing corresponding 
competences;
 · Outpost factories’ primary role is to collect information; they 
are thus located in areas where advanced suppliers, competi-
tors, research laboratories or customers are located; and
 · Lead factories create new processes, products and technologies 
for the entire company by actively using the local knowledge; 
they can be seen as a partner of headquarters in building stra-
tegic capabilities in the manufacturing function.
The arrows in the figure illustrate the development of the roles over 
time. Ferdows (1989) pointed out that although companies tend to es-
tablish their foreign factories with strategically lower roles such as off-
shore or server, it is important to develop them to higher roles such 
as source, contributor and even lead factory in order to maximise the 
benefit from the potential of the international units. 
Ferdows’ roles can be seen as descriptive rather than prescriptive in 
nature (Meijboom & Vos, 2004), and the roles are mainly conceptual. De-
spite this, Ferdows’ framework is widely recognised and is considered 
to have strong face validity (Meijboom & Vos, 2004; Vereecke & De Mey-
er, 2002). It has also been tested and the empirical findings seem to give 
support to the existence of the various roles illustrated in the model. 
Ferdows (1997) sees the lead factory as the ultimate role for a factory, 
towards which all factories should be developed in order to maximise 
the benefit from them. This argument also implies that the factories in 
the proximity of headquarters are lead factories and remain so. How-
ever, the development of the Danish manufacturing industry, with 
its significant outflow of activities from the country, shows different 
trends (Johansen & Riis, 2005; Riis, Johansen, Vejrum Waehrens, & En-
glyst, 2007). In their multiple case study of six Danish companies, Riis 
et al. (2007) found that some Danish factories evolve away from lead 
factory, either to strategically less significant roles in Ferdows’ terms 
(contributor, source) or remain in the lead factory role but with lower 
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volume and other emerging lead factories abroad. While the lead fac-
tories abroad have assumed the responsibility of the main volumes, 
the Danish factories have been described with a different taxonomy, 
which is suggested to better illustrate the roles of factories located in a 
high-cost context such as Denmark (Riis et al., 2007):
 · Full-scale: Fast, reliable delivery to customers at competitive 
prices; main source;
 · Benchmarking: Providing knowledge about production possi-
bilities and the costs associated carrying out effective, small-
scale production (while main volumes are produced elsewhere);
 · Ramp-up: Setting up the delivery of a new product or a cus-
tomer-adapted version of an existing one; may also serve as an 
integrator with product development;
 · Prototype: Assists the product development function in devel-
oping and testing products; and
 · Laboratory: Develops develop new manufacturing processes 
and new production configurations.
Four of the five roles above could be seen as specialist roles, where 
full-scale production is not necessarily carried out, but a strategically 
important role is still vested upon the site. The roles are based on di-
mensions other than the Ferdows’ typology; consequently, the roles are 
different from those of Ferdows. Thus, these four roles can be consid-
ered roles that expand the single role slot of Ferdows’ lead factory. It 
could even be claimed that these roles can be considered ‘post-lead fac-
tory’ roles. Moreover, we consider that there is perhaps a chance to com-
bine the two factory roles by Ferdows (1989, 1997) and Riis et al. (2007). 
 
Discussion of factory roles
Interesting questions arise when the different frameworks of subsid-
iary and factory roles are compared. One of these is the imperative of 
developing factories towards lead factories: Is the competitiveness of 
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manufacturing really enhanced when all factories are developed to-
wards a lead factory, as suggested by Ferdows (1997)? Consider a sit-
uation where a company is expanding its manufacturing footprint 
through establishing production sites in foreign countries. Would it 
be worthwhile to develop all the factories towards full lead factories, 
or would some factories remain contributors serving a given market 
area? Alternatively, would current lead factories even change from 
lead factories to contributors, responsible only for the local market, 
while other factories take the position of lead factories? 
Developing all factories towards a lead factory can be seen to include 
significant risks in the light of the findings of Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1989) on subsidiary roles. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) emphasised the 
importance of differentiated subsidiary, criticising an overemphasised 
role of headquarters and uniform treatment of subsidiaries’ roles; it 
could be claimed that developing all factories towards a similar role 
as lead factory entails a risk of decreasing or even losing the differ-
entiation between the subsidiaries. The findings of Johansen and Riis 
(Johansen & Riis, 2005; Riis et al., 2007) suggest that there are roles be-
yond lead factories – roles where the factory does not have full-scale 
production any more, but nevertheless serves an important purpose 
within the company network. Finally, although in Ferdows’ model, 
lead factories are considered to be more strategic and more competent 
than others, developing all factories to that role basically ignores all 
potential differences between locations in terms of sources of inputs 
and markets. In some cases, for example, if a company has regional 
strategy and has a single factory in each region, and the nature of the 
product does not allow transportation across the world in a cost-effi-
cient manner, these regional plants might be developed towards a lead 
factory role. However, the perception that a lead factory role is the aim 
regardless of strategy and context lacks explanation and reasoning. 
When different roles are assessed, a further interesting question is also 
that of which dimensions would best describe the potentially differ-
entiated roles. Combining previously presented literature about facto-
ry and subsidiary roles, several dimensions are recognised. Different 
models take into account the scope of activities and/or competences at 
67
the site (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Benito et al., 2003; Ferdows 1989, 1997). 
However, the interpretation of this aspect is slightly different in differ-
ent models. While Benito et al. (2003) recognise the scope of activities 
and level of competences as two different things, other models only 
consider one of them. Separating these two would imply that there is 
at least the theoretical possibility of a site carrying out a wide scope 
of activities with low competences (for example, a situation of inade-
quate resourcing), or having high competences but only limited scope 
of activities (such as a stand-alone R&D unit). Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1986) use competence as their dimension. In his original model, Fer-
dows (1989) used the dimension scope of activities, but later changed 
this to competences (Ferdows, 1997), although he was referring more to 
the actual functions or activities present at the site rather than com-
petences in the sense of capabilities. A further note on the scope of ac-
tivities is that in the model of Johansen and Riis (Johansen & Riis, 2005; 
Riis et al., 2007), all roles except the full-scale production role describes 
a set of activities that is in some way less than a complete, full-scale 
production facility. However, the roles require high-level competences; 
for example, a ramp-up factory needs intense cooperation with R&D. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the scope of activities and the corre-
sponding capabilities are an important factor when assessing the role 
of a factory or a subsidiary in general. 
Besides these internal dimensions, fully or partly external dimensions 
have also been recognised. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986) used as one di-
mension the strategic importance of the local environment, which is 
clearly a dimension that the site itself can only influence very limit-
edly. Another external dimension is the second dimension of Ferdows, 
i.e. the strategic reason for a site (Ferdows, 1989, 1997). This dimension 
has a somewhat different character from the other suggested dimen-
sions. First, it is the only one which cannot be described on the scale of 
low to high. Rather, it describes a set of choices. Although Ferdows has 
emphasised that the dimension should be understood as the primary 
strategic reason for the site, the question still arises of whether the 
primary reason for the site can be identified at all in all situations, or 
whether multiple, equally important reasons for the site can be iden-
tified in some cases.
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Ferdows’ (1989, 1997) original model looks into the factory roles from 
the point of view of a global company and its network of factories. 
Further research on the model also mostly considers the networks of 
individual companies in various locations. As discussed above, in the 
literature on subsidiary roles, the national or regional viewpoint also 
can be found pertaining to what kind of subsidiaries exist overall in a 
given area. This approach to factory roles was adopted by Feldmann, 
Olhager and Persson (2009), who build on Ferdows’ model to assess the 
types of factories that exist in Sweden. They carried out a survey of 
Swedish factories with two guiding research questions: What do man-
ufacturing networks around Swedish factories look like? What roles 
can be assigned to the Swedish factories? Our research presented in 
following sections builds on the ideas of Ferdows (1989) and Feldmann 
et al. (2009), as the purpose of the chapter is to understand what kind 
of factories are found in the Finnish context, which is characterised by 
small local markets and high costs.
ROLES OF FACTORIES LOCATED IN FINLAND 
Data collection
The data for this study were collected using an Internet-based survey. 
The aim of the survey was to develop a better understanding about 
what kinds of factories exist in Finland, the reasons for locating a fac-
tory in Finland and what kinds of roles can be assigned to factories 
located in Finland. The survey focused on assessing the management 
of manufacturing networks and included questions related to the fol-
lowing topics: location decisions, plant roles and competences, supplier 
selection, competitive priorities and plant performance, risk manage-
ment and coordination. In order to allow comparability and to be able 
to make some broader conclusions about the Scandinavian manufac-
turing context, the questionnaire closely followed the survey of Feld-
mann et al. (2009) conducted in Sweden in 2007 (articles based on the 
survey data include Feldmann et al., 2009; Feldmann & Olhager, 2008; 
Olhager & Feldmann, 2008). 
The survey was targeted to factories located in Finland with more than 
50 employees, altogether approximately 1,000 plants around the coun-
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try. Industries included metal industry, food industry, biotechnology, 
lumber industry, mechanical engineering and construction industry. It 
is notable that in contrast, for example, to Ferdows’ ideas, our purpose 
is not to assess various factory roles within a specific manufacturing 
network of a company, but rather to use the factory role framework to 
assess the roles of factories at a national level. 
Plant managers were contacted by email and invited to participate in 
the survey. Three reminders were sent by e-mail and a further reminder 
was sent by mail to about third of the sample (randomly chosen), with 
a questionnaire and a return envelope. Some of the respondents were 
contacted by phone as well. Nearly 200 of the possible respondents 
could not be reached due to, for example, changed contact information 
or because the email was filtered as junk mail, giving a population of 
about 800 plants. In total, 67 plants responded to the survey. This gives 
a response rate of about 8.5%. The main characteristics of the plants 
that responded to the questionnaire are shown in the following illus-
tration. Most of the respondents were either plant or production man-
agers, and most plants had 50–250 employees. It can be seen that the 
sample is highly diverse in terms of size and industry, as was intended. 
Assessment of differences between the first and later response waves 
showed no statistically significant difference in most performance 
factors, which implies that the potential nonresponse bias is likely 
not significant (Lambert & Harrington, 1990). Furthermore, there was 
no difference in the response rate between the small- and larger-size 
plants. Finally, a comparison was made between the sample factories 
and the total population. The comparison indicated that even though 
the size of the sample is small, it reflects the population rather well; in 
terms of number of employees, the sample includes only slightly larger 
factories.
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Analysis
The analysis aimed at developing a better understanding of the kinds 
of factories which exist in Finland. The plants were considered stand-
alone objects, as the purpose was to understand the roles of units 
within the chosen context, and not within their respective networks. 
The survey data were analysed on the two dimensions of Ferdows’ 
(1989, 1997) model, specifically the strategic reason for the factory and 
responsibilities of the factory. The strategic reasons for the plant loca-
tions were operationalised by asking the respondent to evaluate the 
importance of eight location factors for the factory or advantages of 
the present location:
 · Proximity to markets;
 · Proximity to transportation centres;
 · Proximity to cheap labour;
 · Proximity to knowledge centres;
Figure 4. Sample characteristics
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 · Proximity to competitors;
 · Proximity to raw materials;
 · Access to cheap energy; and
 · Favourable sociopolitical climate.
The evaluation was conducted using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = not 
important at all, 7 = absolutely the most important). The descriptive 
results are presented in Figure 5.
 
The results indicate the importance of local markets; the most import-
ant element in the location of factories in Finland seems to be prox-
imity to the market (average 4.58/7), which is one of the three main 
strategic reasons in Ferdows’ model (1989, 1997). Good transport con-
nections were also considered very important. This would imply that 
Figure 5. Importance of different criteria in factory location deci-
sions
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factories in Finland have a strong role in serving nearby markets. The 
other two main reasons which Ferdows lists, access to low-cost pro-
duction (cheap labour and cheap energy) and access to knowledge, 
were not considered very important on average. The former result is 
not surprising, since Finland is considered a high-cost country. The 
low importance of the proximity to knowledge centres, i.e. access to 
knowledge, on the other hand, is rather surprising and even somewhat 
alarming. In current political discussion, a high education level and an 
educated work force are considered to be Finland’s strengths and the 
basis for future operational activities in the country. It is also a sur-
prising finding when comparing the results to the research on Swe-
den (Feldmann et al., 2009), where the proximity to knowledge centres 
was found to be the most important reason for factory location. Other 
than the importance of proximity to knowledge centres, the Swedish 
survey shows very similar results: The proximity to the transportation 
centres and proximity to the market, which in Finland are considered 
the two most important elements, are the second and third most im-
portant in Sweden. 
Looking at the strategic reasons for factory location alone, it would 
seem that Finnish factories are mainly contributors (or even servers) 
in Ferdows’ roles, since the most important element is proximity to the 
markets. Due to the cost level of the country, we were not expecting to 
see offshore or source factories, as the results also indicate. The low-
er importance of proximity to knowledge centres, on the other hand, 
implies that the factories are not likely to be outpost or lead factories 
either.
In order to measure the activities or the competence level of the fac-
tory, 11 competence areas were assessed based on prior literature (Fer-
dows, 1989, 1997; Feldmann et al., 2009):
 · Production;
 · Production planning;
 · Technical maintenance;
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 · Process development;
 · Purchasing;
 · Logistics;
 · Introduction of new process technologies;
 · Supplier development;
 · Introduction of new product technologies;
 · Product development; and
 · Supply of global markets.
With each of these competence areas, responsibility can be assigned to 
the factory or held centrally or regionally. In the surveys, the respon-
dents were asked to evaluate the extent to which the factory is respon-
sible for these areas on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = no local authority, 
7 = full local authority). The descriptive results are presented in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Extent of responsibility held by the plant
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On average, the factories have fairly high authority in the different ar-
eas of responsibility. Logically, production is the activity most often 
given local authority, followed closely by production planning, techni-
cal maintenance and process development. All of these areas are close-
ly related to the actual production activities. On the other end, sup-
plier development, introduction of new product technologies, product 
development and supply of global markets are activities for which the 
factory is not responsible. This is understandable, particularly when 
the company has several factories, and these issues are often decided 
globally or regionally at the corporate or business unit level. The low 
level of responsibility for the supply of global markets, on the other 
hand, also supports the idea that the factories located in Finland serve 
local markets. Notable is that even in the areas with the lowest respon-
sibility, the rating was fairly high, which indicates that the plants have 
a lot of responsibilities and act quite independently.  
In order to find out whether there are correlations between the items 
within the two respective dimensions, the reason for the location and 
the competence level of the factory, a more detailed analysis was con-
ducted. Previous research has often operationalised the level of strate-
gic role of the factory as a single item (e.g. Maritan, Brush, & Karnani, 
2004; Vereecke & Van Dierdonck, 2002), in which case potential patterns 
are not necessarily revealed. Previous research has mostly used a sin-
gle or rather simple measure for determining the level of factory com-
petence, and has manually grouped the factories in terms of the rea-
son for the location. An exception is Olhager and Feldmann (2008), who 
performed both a factor analysis and a cluster analysis to study the 
two dimensions and their joint variation. The analysis in the present 
chapter was carried out in a similar fashion. 
In the first phase, a factor and cluster analysis were performed to as-
sess whether the eight location factors are interrelated, and specifically 
whether same major reasons can be found as pointed out by Ferdows 
(1989, 1997) and Vereecke and Van Dierdonck (2002). However, neither 
the factor nor the cluster analysis which we performed gave any clear 
results. It can thus be concluded that the reason for factory location 
among the factories in Finland cannot be used to determine the roles 
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of the plants following Ferdows (1989, 1997) and the empirical findings 
among Swedish plants (Olhager & Feldmann, 2008). This implies that 
within the sample of factories in Finland, the underlying reasons for 
the factory location are complex and no clear major reasons can be 
found – location is rather a combination of factors differing from case 
to case. Another potential explanation can be found in historical rea-
sons; especially in cases of rather small companies which might have 
just a single factory, the factory is still located where it was established, 
likely to serve a very local market at that time. 
A similar analysis was conducted for the 11 items related to factory 
competence. First, principle component analysis with varimax rota-
tion was conducted. The analysis gives four factors, which were called 
(1) development, (2) supply chain, (3) manufacturing and (4) process. The 
first component consists of new product development, introduction 
of new product and process technologies and global market introduc-
tions, which are all related to development efforts. Logistics, procure-
ment and supplier development are related to the supply chain. The 
third component includes the basic operations functions at a factory: 
production and production planning. The final component then in-
cludes process maintenance and process improvement. The results of 
the principle component analysis are somewhat different than what 
was found in the Swedish sample (Olhager & Feldmann, 2008), as they 
focused on only the three first factors.
As a second step, a cluster analysis was conducted. In further analysis, 
it was found that while the factories can be characterised using the 
four factors of development, supply chain, manufacturing and process, 
the factories can also be clustered according to their level of activities 
into three clusters, which show a cumulative pattern: The first group 
of plants is somewhat high on manufacturing and process competen-
cies, second group is high on these as well as supply chain competen-
cies and the final group on all three of these elements, as well as devel-
opment competencies. This is illustrated in Figure 7, which also shows 
the number of factories in each cluster.
76
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on the survey results, it can be concluded that factories in Fin-
land seem to have roles which involve rather high local decision mak-
ing authority and a lot of responsibilities. The main reasons for the 
location of factories in Finland seem to be related to proximity to lo-
cal markets. For a high-cost location like Finland, it is logical that low 
production cost is not important as a location factor. However, it is 
somewhat surprising that the proximity to knowledge centres does 
not seem to be a major reason to locate a factory in Finland. This is 
even somewhat alarming from an economic point of view in terms of 
the future of manufacturing in Finland, or potentially, other Scandina-
vian countries. Based on these results, factories in Finland seem to es-
pecially resemble contributor factories in Ferdows’ (1989) typology, i.e. 
factories, which  serve a specific national or regional market, but have 
in comparison to a server factory more extensive responsibilities, such 
as product and process development, supplier management and pos-
sesses corresponding competences. The low importance of access to 
knowledge centres and the relatively low share of factories with glob-
al delivery responsibilities suggest that lead factories, which Ferdows 
(1989, 1997) considered to be the most desirable role for a factory, exist 
Figure 7. Cumulative factory competences
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only in limited numbered in Finland. However, supply of global mar-
kets had a very high standard deviation, so the responsibility level of 
factories varies a lot. Factories also have quite a lot of responsibility for 
product development and introduction of new product technologies, 
which indicates that many factories have the competencies required 
by a lead factory. It should also be noted that the results point to signif-
icant variety in the factories’ roles regarding competence level.  
The current political discussion strongly emphasises the importance 
of education and a qualified workforce as a strength of Finland as a 
host of manufacturing activities, especially in the future. However, the 
survey findings indicate that the access to knowledge centres is one of 
the least important location factors for Finnish factories. Furthermore, 
only a few factories with truly global delivery responsibility could be 
found in this sample. Ferdows (1997) suggests that factories should be 
developed towards lead factories in order to fully utilise their potential. 
If factories in Finland are mainly of the contributor-type, the question 
arises of what will happen to them if the market loses importance and 
decreases. Most likely, contributor factories serving only those region-
al markets will suffer, and this will have significant implications for the 
Finnish economy. 
One explanation for the lack of high competence factories, such as lead 
factories which cannot be tested with this survey data could have to 
do with the ‘post-lead’–type of factory role. Based on Danish research, 
Johansen and Riis (Johansen & Riis, 2005; Riis et al., 2007) have sug-
gested roles beyond lead factories such as laboratory, benchmarking, 
prototype and ramp-up. The low number of lead factories in our sam-
ple might partly be due to the fact that, with the operationalisation 
that was used, not all roles were identified in our study. Thus, some of 
the factories may well have high competences and no global supply 
responsibility but still serve important roles in their respective factory 
networks as, e.g. prototype or ramp-up factories. There may even be 
unrevealed roles which require high levels of competence but do not 
involve global delivery responsibilities, or even full-scale production 
(Blomqvist & Turkulainen, 2011). 
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From a managerial point of view, the models of factory roles provide 
structured frameworks to analyse the roles of the factories and the 
operations networks of their companies. Relevant questions for an in-
dividual company include the following: What kinds of roles do the 
factories currently have? What kind of operations network do they 
build together? Is this network balanced as a whole? Do the individual 
factories and the network as a whole support the corporate strategy 
and help to reach the goals and targets of the company? And finally, 
what improvements and changes are needed for individual factories 
and the whole network? 
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ABSTRACT
Since the late 1980s, manufacturing systems have gradually evolved 
from factory/plant-based systems towards globally collaborative inter-
firm networks. Shi (2004) proposed a roadmap for the manufacturing 
system evolution. Taking this work as a starting point, this chapter first 
investigates the existing literature on the factory/plant, international 
manufacturing network, supply network and global manufacturing 
virtual network (GMVN). Claiming that conceptual insights describe 
only one of the two worlds (i.e. research and practice) of operations man-
agement, this chapter successively explores what is actually happening 
in practice to address potential queries. Then, three cases are selected 
from GONE project for in-depth analyses in order to understand the 
internationalisation and externalisation of manufacturing. The empir-
ical findings derived from the case studies suggest that the discussions 
on internationalisation and externalisation need to be extended from 
manufacturing activity to other value chain activities. The roadmap 
proposed by Shi (2004) thus has to be extended in the internationalisa-
tion and externalisation dimensions. Accordingly, two new development 
trajectories, that is, the internationalisation and the externalisation of 
value chain activities, are proposed. Their similarities and differences 
are further compared and discussed. Finally, this chapter indicates that 
the case companies tend to combine two development trajectories, and 
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suggests that managers must make a tradeoff between internationali-
sation and externalisation and maintain a relative balance in order to 
manage a global collaborative value network.
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980s, manufacturing has become more international be-
cause it is the single largest type of foreign direct investment in most 
countries (Ferdows, 1997a; Kogut, 1990; Yip, 1989). Accordingly, manu-
facturing companies have attempted to globalise their geographical-
ly dispersed plants by coordinating them with a synergetic network 
(Ferdows, 1997a, b; Shi & Gregory, 1998), and their role has accordingly 
changed from supplying domestic markets with products via supply-
ing international markets through export, to supplying international 
markets through local manufacturing. This integration has further 
resulted in a rapid change in manufacturing system concepts, which 
have moved from a focus on the plant to one on international manu-
facturing networks (Ferdows, 1989; Rudberg & Olhager, 2003). 
Meanwhile, it has also become more accepted for all types of companies 
to downsize and outsource non–core manufacturing tasks and to orga-
nise interfirm collaborations (Lambert, Cooper, & Pagh, 1998; Lamming, 
Johnsen, Zheng, & Harland, 2000). This development has pushed com-
panies further into new relationships beyond the conventional con-
cepts of the firm that owns and operates its own factories. Although 
companies may own only a very small portion of a supply chain, they 
still are strategically able to coordinate or integrate the whole supply 
chain to deliver a competitive product to the targeted market (Shi, 2004).
Combining both developments, Shi (2004) proposed a matrix derived 
with the characteristics of internalisation and externalisation of man-
ufacturing activities in order to illustrate a roadmap for the evolution 
of manufacturing systems (see Figure 1). Many other studies on global 
outsourcing and partnership have also sought to develop a framework 
with similar architecture and strategic capabilities pursuing higher 
value and innovation (e.g. Bovel & Martha, 2000; Normann & Ranfrez, 
1993; Parolini, 1999).
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Taking this matrix as a starting point, the purposes of this chapter are 
threefold. First, it aims to investigate what has been done in the two 
indicated developments by reviewing the relevant literature. Second, 
based on explorative case studies, it will explore what is happening 
in the development of manufacturing systems (networks) in practice. 
Third, it attempts to determine what we can learn from current theo-
ries and practices by providing an integrated understanding of inter-
nationalisation and externalisation, as well as seeking to identify fur-
ther developmental trends.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The aim of this section is to investigate what has been done in the two 
indicated developments, that is, the internationalisation and external-
isation of manufacturing activities. Taking Figure 1 as an analytical 
framework, we attempt to review the existing literature on those four 
boxes in the figure, that is, (1) the strategic roles of plants, (2) the in-
ternational manufacturing network, (3) supply networks and (4) global 
manufacturing virtual networks (GMVNs), in order to generate a deep 
understanding on the two developments.  
Figure 1. Manufacturing system evolution matrix and key drivers 
(Source: Shi, 2004)
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The strategic roles of plants
Global manufacturing did not attract much attention in the operations 
management (OM) community until the 1980s. During the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s, more scholars noticed the need to manage not 
only a single factory but also multiplant organisations. However, the 
research during this period was mainly concerned with location-based 
criteria (Shi & Gregory, 1998) and mostly focused on plant location deci-
sions (Meijboom & Voordijk, 2003). At that time, plant location decision 
making referred merely to selecting a site for a new plant. For some 
plants, the choice was straightforward, involving only the selection of 
the least costly site (Schmenner, 1979). In the OM literature, these choic-
es are often based on mathematical programming (Canel & Khumawa-
la, 1996; Katayama, 1999), which mainly concentrates on the where as-
pect, paying little attention to why issues. The only why issue described 
is cost minimisation (Meijboom & Voordijk, 2003). On the other hand, 
more recent research has argued that cost evaluation does not reveal 
the complete story. Furthermore, it sometimes does not show differ-
ences that are significant enough to make a location choice strictly on 
their merit. Researchers and managers should therefore look beyond 
the obvious in choosing plant locations. An exploration of the intangi-
ble and qualitative features of a location is expected to contribute to 
the company’s competitive success (Schmenner, 1979).
Because plants are expected to contribute more than lower costs to 
companies, they are recognised as being capable of playing different 
roles in manufacturing networks (Ferdows, 1989, 1997b). Although the 
concept of plant roles was first introduced by Ferdows (1989, 1997b), 
the discussions generally began by looking at the roles of subsidiar-
ies in multinationals. The literature on international strategy provides 
several taxonomies describing the strategic roles of these subsidiaries 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1993; Roth & Morrison, 
1992; Taggart, 1998), giving rich insights into the distinct strategic roles 
subsidiaries may play in multinationals. Ferdows (1989, 1997b) trans-
lated the strategic classifications of subsidiaries into the manufactur-
ing classification of plants. His model distinguishes plants based on 
plant competences and location advantages, and identifies six types 
of plants, which he labels offshore, source, server, contributor, outpost 
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and lead plant. Furthermore, Ferdows makes interesting assertions 
about the evolution of strategic roles that can or should be expected 
due to the pressure to reduce costs, which may call for concentrating 
production in a smaller number of plants, or the appearance of new 
opportunities (De Meyer & Vereecke, 1996).
Ferdows’ model gained academic recognition, and many research-
ers have taken it as a point of departure for their research (Fusco & 
Spring, 2003; Maritan, Brush, & Karnani, 2004; Meijboom & Voordijk, 
2003; Meijboom & Vos, 2004; Vereecke & Dierdonck, 2002). In addition 
to Ferdows’ model, other plant typologies were introduced from the 
different perspectives of other researchers. For example, Vereecke, Van 
Dierdonck and De Meyer (2006) proposed a new, empirically derived 
typology of plants in international manufacturing networks based on 
knowledge flows between plants. The analysis led to the identification 
of four types of plants with different network roles: the isolated plant, 
the receiver, the hosting network player and the active network player.
Internationalisation: From plant to international manufacturing 
network
Although during the late 1970s and the early 1980s more scholars no-
ticed the need to manage not only a single factory, but also multiplant 
organisations, researchers still tended to treat each factory as a sepa-
rate single facility and thereby ignore networking issues (Schmenner, 
1982). This is because manufacturing was fairly geographically con-
centrated even if markets became global at that time. Nevertheless, 
during the later 1980s and 1990s, models and frameworks which were 
developed in the fields of international business and strategy further 
facilitated manufacturing strategy research focusing on international 
operations (Vereecke & Dierdonck, 2002). More scholars, for example, 
Ferdows (1989, 1997b), Flaherty (1986, 1996), and Shi and Gregory (1995) 
attempted to build a link between manufacturing strategy concepts 
and views from international strategy and/or international business, 
and accordingly, international manufacturing networks gradually be-
came one of the foci. 
Within the decision-making process related to the global manufactur-
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ing network, two types of decisions can be distinguished: configuration 
and coordination (Fawcett, Birou, & Taylor, 1993; Porter, 1986). Config-
uration indicates the plants’ locations and the interfacility allocation 
of resources along the value chain (Meijboom & Vos, 1997). It concerns 
issues such as the building of a network of subsidiaries with particu-
lar emphasis on the differentiated structural requirements of different 
environments. This aspect has its origins in multiplant research and is 
dominated by location-based criteria of various sorts (Dubois, Toyne, 
& Oliff, 1993; Ferdows, 1997b). Initially, much research concentrated on 
identifying the drivers for allocating manufacturing facilities in specif-
ic locations (Bolisani & Scarso, 1996; Ferdows, 1989, 1997b; MacCarthy & 
Atthirawong, 2003; Meijboom & Vos, 1997; Vos, 1991). However, because 
more researchers have recently recognised the importance of entire 
manufacturing networks, studies have no longer been limited to plant 
location decisions and have extended to international manufacturing 
network configurations. Schmenner (1979, 1982), although concentrat-
ing on plant-by-plant decisions, hinted at the network idea and devised 
five possible types of multiplant strategies. Shi and Gregory (1998) put 
forward an international configuration map which groups seven net-
work configurations into four blocks along two dimensions: degree of 
geographical dispersion and level of coordination. Hayes et al. (2005) 
suggested four network configurations – a horizontal network (prod-
uct-focused network), a vertical network (process-focused network), a 
mixed network and an ‘orchestrated’ network (collaborative network 
with one major hub). More recently, Ferdows (2009) expanded his origi-
nal model of strategic plant roles to include global manufacturing net-
works. 
Coordination is related to managing a network and refers to the ques-
tion of how to link or integrate the production and distribution fa-
cilities in order to achieve the firm’s strategic objectives. The aim of 
coordination is to achieve an efficient and effective plan for global pro-
duction activities, which involves primarily tactical decisions in differ-
ent business areas and within several processes. In addition, this plan-
ning aim is concerned with technology transfer and diffusion, as well 
as within-network learning (Ferdows, 2006; Flaherty, 1996; Gailbraith, 
1990). Bhatnagar et al. (1993) provided an extensive literature review of 
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the available models for general and multiplant coordination and dis-
tinguished two broad levels of coordination: a general level and a mul-
tiplant level. Das et al. (1998) proposed an approach based on reinforce-
ment learning to coordinate a multiplant and multicountry facility 
network that spans manufacturing and distribution stages. Rudberg 
and West (2008) presented a concept that describes how companies 
can manage their international operations to facilitate coordinating 
their manufacturing networks, focusing on blending cost competitive-
ness, flexibility and innovativeness.
Configuration and coordination are closely related. Therefore, in some 
instances, attempts have been made to integrate the two issues to 
achieve an overall view of the manufacturing network (Porter, 1986; Shi 
& Gregory, 1998; Vereecke & Dierdonck, 1999). Pursuing a similar line 
of research, Rudberg and Olhager (2003) presented a typology for an-
alysing network systems that resulted in four basic network configu-
rations: plant, intrafirm network, supply chain and interfirm network. 
These configurations correspond to four coordination approaches: uti-
lise, optimise, synchronise and harmonise.
Externalisation: From plant to supply network
Related to the internalisation of manufacturing activities, another 
trend often observed is externalisation from traditional vertical inte-
grated firms in almost every sector (Shi, 2004). Due to the increased 
focus on the externalisation or outsourcing, topics related to the sup-
ply chain/network become even more relevant and necessary. Setting 
roots in physical distribution and materials management, research on 
the supply chain/network tends to analyse the network as an external 
network with facilities owned by different organisations. Traditionally, 
research focused on the links between the nodes (and to some extent 
distribution nodes), whereas manufacturing network research tends 
to focus on the (manufacturing) nodes themselves (Rudberg & Olhager, 
2003). 
Similar to the international manufacturing network, the externalised 
interfirm supply network has extended its boundaries from the plant-
based manufacturing system, as illustrated in Figure 1, but with quite 
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different focuses, such as collaboration, partnerships, trust, customer 
relationship management, customer service management, demand 
management, order fulfilment and procurement (Lambert & Cooper, 
2000).  This further makes the supply network a new unit of analysis 
with more features than the classical plant (Shi, 2004). Since the 1980s, 
supply chain networks as a research topic have attracted increasing 
attention. In addition, various supply chain network models have been 
developed. For example, Fisher (1997) suggested that two distinct types 
of supply networks exist: those for ‘innovative-unique’ products and 
those for ‘functional’ products. Lambert and Cooper (2000) proposed 
a supply network framework which consists of three closely interre-
lated elements: the supply chain network structure (i.e. the member 
firms and the links between these firms), the supply chain business 
processes (i.e. the activities that produce a specific output of value to 
the customers) and the supply chain management components (i.e. 
the managerial variables by which the business processes are integrat-
ed and managed across the supply chain). Andersen and Christensen 
(2005) provided an ideal-type model of the international supply net-
work, encompassing the five principal positions (i.e. local integrator, ex-
port base, import base, international spanner and global integrator) in 
a supply network spanning international and local business contexts. 
Camuffo, Furlan, Romano and Vinelli (2007) identified three different 
routes toward supplier and production network internationalisation: 
traditional subcontracting, coordinated subcontracting and supply 
system relocation. Actually, the main contents of supply network man-
agement are not new to production/OM, and three streams can gen-
erally be recognised (Shi, 2004): inventory models and control mecha-
nisms;  strategic management about collaboration and value creation; 
and clustering studies.
A possible combination: Global manufacturing virtual networks 
(GMVNs)
Shi and Gregory (2005) discussed the internalisation and externalisa-
tion of manufacturing activities in a holistic way by addressing intra-
firm and interfirm (external) networks at the same time. The authors 
reported that the manufacturing industry is currently transforming 
from the traditional, vertically integrated value chain to collaboration 
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between specialised independent companies, and the collaboration be-
tween original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and contract (elec-
tronics) manufacturers (CEMs) leads global manufacturing networks 
(GMNs) to evolve into global manufacturing virtual networks (GMVNs). 
Furthermore, combining research on global manufacturing networks, 
international strategic alliances and virtual organisations, the authors 
proposed that a GMVN can be considered the synthesis of views along 
four basic dimensions:
 · ‘G’: Global disposition and the evolution of manufacturing in-
ternationalisation are represented in the manufacturing inter-
nationalisation dimension;
 · ‘M’: Value-creation-oriented manufacturing activities and posi-
tioning are represented in the value and supply chains dimen-
sion;
 · ‘V’: Collaborations with other companies to formulate a strate-
gic alliance or temporary virtual supply chain are represented 
by the strategic alliance dimension;
 · ‘N’: A synthesis process, which must include network strategy 
process, communication platform and operational mechanisms.
The GMVN provides a new platform that engages developing countries’ 
manufacturing firms to play complementary roles and to be integrated 
into a global supply chain. However, current research on manufactur-
ing systems and OM is still limited to two-dimensional constructs – ei-
ther on the GxV ‘plane’ dealing with internationalisation and alliances, 
or the GxM plane dealing with supply chain and internationalisation 
(Harland et al., 1999).
EMPIRICAL EXPLORATIONS
The literature review in the last section revealed the research which 
has been conducted and the theories which have been developed in 
terms of two development trends, that is, the internationalisation and 
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externalisation of manufacturing activities. Derived from academic re-
search, these conceptual insights merely address one of the two worlds 
(i.e. research and practice) of OM (Slack, Lewis, & Bates, 2004), which 
is not enough, since OM treated as an ‘empirical science’ (Swamidass, 
1991) normally focuses on ‘real’ managerial preoccupations (Wilson, 
1995) and regularly rededicates itself to the needs of practitioners (e.g. 
Hayes, 2000). Accordingly, more empirical studies are needed to inves-
tigate how the real world responds to these theories. Queries need to 
be addressed such as: What are the implications of the manufacturing 
evolution for the practitioner? Are the existing theories are sufficient 
to describe and explain what is happening in the practice? What are 
the ongoing and/or further development trends of manufacturing sys-
tems (networks)? This necessity indicates that empirical explorations 
have become significant.
The Global Operations Networks (GONE) project provides an excellent 
opportunity to address the potential queries mentioned above. The 
case study was selected as the primary research method for the GONE 
project and mainly used for explorative purposes (Handfield & Melnyk, 
1998; Yin, 2003). Unconstrained by the limits of questionnaires and mod-
els, the case study can lead to new and creative insights and has high 
validity with practitioners (Voss, Tsikiktsis, & Frohlich, 2002). The GONE 
project involved 17 companies from five different industries (i.e. furni-
ture, marine, telecom, textile and shoes), where 14 companies (82% of 
the case companies) had internationalised or externalised their man-
ufacturing activities, or both. To fundamentally understand the inter-
nationalisation and externalisation of manufacturing, three companies 
were then selected from the GONE project for in-depth analyses: 
 · Aalborg Industries was selected because it is one of the case 
companies that mainly internationalises its manufacturing ac-
tivities globally to other sites within its intranetwork, but at the 
same time, externalises its manufacturing activities to other 
suppliers.
 · Fritz Hansen and Trio Line were selected because they are the 
only case companies which can represent the whole external-
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isation picture. The brand owner, that is, Fritz Hansen, out-
sourced its manufacturing activities to the external supplier, 
that is, Trio Line.
These companies are from different industries (marine and furniture) 
and have different characteristics. See Table 1 for key information 
about each case company.
Trend Internationalisation Externalisation
Company Aalborg Industries Fritz Hansen Trio Line
Size in  2009 2,906 employees in 13 
countries
211 employees 
in 11 countries
195 employees 
in two coun-
tries
Product Boiler, inert gas sys-
tems, thermal fluid 
systems and shell 
and tube heat ex-
changers
Furniture 
(tables, sofas, 
chairs, uphol-
stery)
Chairs
Revenue  
(EUR mil-
lion) in 2009
370 54 10
Current mfg. 
footprint
China, Denmark, 
Brazil and Vietnam
N/A Denmark, 
Poland
Aalborg Industries
Aalborg Industries is a Danish company which is highly specialised 
in boiler engineering and production, with headquarters in Aalborg. 
Established in 1912, Aalborg Industries has supplied and serviced ma-
rine and offshore industries and produced boilers, inert gas systems, 
thermal fluid systems, burners, control systems and other related ac-
cessories, including heat exchangers, for almost a century. Today, Aal-
Table 1: Key characteristics of the case companies 
(Source: Rundberg and Olhager, 2003)
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borg Industries has 24 sites in 12 countries. The setup is centred on four 
production sites in Denmark, China, Vietnam and Brazil, while the re-
maining subsidiaries focus on purchasing or after-sales services. 
Decades ago, Aalborg Industries’ entire production was in Aalborg. 
However, developments in the marine industry meant that Aalborg 
Industries needed to move most of its production to developing coun-
tries to save costs and be close to its customers. Since the 1990s, Aal-
borg Industries has made a clear objective to locate its activities, that 
is, keeping costs at a minimum while maintaining uniform product 
quality and delivery accuracy. The result has been a movement of 
manufacturing activities from Aalborg to China. The trend seems like-
ly to continue in the future and includes moving other functions like 
research and development (R&D) as well. Today, because some custom-
ers have preferences for where their products should come from, some 
production activities are still retained in Denmark, despite the high 
production costs. In addition, the majority of the R&D department is 
still in Aalborg. The products produced in China are most likely prod-
ucts that have been developed and tested in Denmark, and thereafter 
moved to China, for instance, with certain adaptations.
Currently, two subsidiaries are located in China. The one in Qingdao is 
the largest production site within the company, producing 1,500 boil-
ers per year. Due to the rapid development in China in the last five 
years, the company recently planned a further enlargement of this 
site. So far, the site’s capacity has increased by 30–40% each year. Ad-
ditionally, in order to keep pace with the rapid development, the com-
pany has chosen to place a knowledge centre at this production site, 
which is used to support production activities and provide knowledge 
and thorough insights into the Chinese market and practices. Anoth-
er subsidiary, in Shanghai, is a service subsidiary, which is composed 
of a development and purchasing centre. The development centre in 
Shanghai studies development and standardisation initiatives, where-
as the purchasing centre initially worked with order processing, but 
has turned into a trade centre to evade Chinese import and export bar-
riers. These knowledge-intensive activities were moved to Shanghai 
because of the shortage of available engineers in Denmark a few years 
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ago, as well as improved cultural understanding, the establishment of 
local relationships and the decomposition of language barriers.
Compared to the Chinese subsidiaries, the production sites in Vietnam 
and Brazil are less developed. Aalborg Industries acquired a production 
site in Vietnam to be the first to market. Aalborg Industries viewed 
the possibilities in Vietnam positively, and considered the subsidiary a 
strategic basis for production with very low costs. The company hopes 
that the marine market will evolve in Vietnam, giving the advantage 
of being present before its competitors. Similarly, facing quotas and 
high tariffs for importing goods, Aalborg Industries had to acquire a 
subsidiary in Brazil to provide service to the South American market. 
However, the Brazilian manufacturing facility is focused only on the 
industrial sector, because of unrealised rumours that the Brazilian 
ship market would develop in the last 20 years.
Fritz Hansen
Established in 1875, Fritz Hansen fits in the class of small and medi-
um-sized enterprises (SMEs), and traditionally, the company’s self-per-
ception has been based on the fact that it is the producer behind some 
outstanding furniture classics. The company aims to become the pre-
ferred and successful brand within exclusive design furniture and 
to enhance the image of the company’s customers, which are mostly 
businesses and public sector institutions in western Europe, Japan and 
the United States by supplying exclusive design furniture.
A number of years ago, Fritz Hansen fully mastered a broad line of 
production lines of tables and lounge, dining, meeting and stackable 
chairs in-house. However, at the beginning of the new millennium, the 
company, like many other export firms, experienced problems with ef-
ficiency in sales and marketing. An analysis clarifying the company’s 
internal and external values suggested that it needed to build value 
for its brand, ‘Fritz Hansen,’ rather than products. In 2003, manage-
ment developed a mission that stretched even further. The mission 
statement signalled that Fritz Hansen intended to shift from a prod-
uct- and production-oriented mind set to a focus on sales and interna-
tional branding; as a result, the roles of the sales, marketing, logistics 
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and development processes increased tremendously and emerged as 
new core processes, replacing the actual manufacturing competence. 
Then, along with the mental turnaround, Fritz Hansen started to out-
source its production of tables and upholstery processes to suppliers, 
leaving product development, quality and prototype production, along 
with the fully automated production line of stacking chairs and some 
low-volume and ‘difficult’ products the only activities kept in-house. 
As a result, the large number of production lines and processes tra-
ditionally mastered in-house were reduced dramatically, decreasing 
the number of production lines managed in-house to approximately 
36%. Outsourcing the table production line and upholstery processes 
changed and challenged the company’s managerial focuses. Manage-
ment related not only to the internal affairs of operations and logistics, 
but also to a higher degree, to interaction with the increasing number 
of external actors in different supply chains.
Specifically, the upholstery process outsourced to the supplier Trio 
Line was traditionally considered a core capability of Fritz Hansen, due 
to the company’s strict quality demands. However, with the shifts in 
the corporate focus, internal control of these activities was seen as less 
significant to the company. Today, the supplier’s (i.e. Trio Line) factory 
in Poland takes care of the process. The development of Trio Line’s op-
erations network will be introduced below.
Trio Line
Trio Line is a family-owned furniture company. Founded in Odense, 
Denmark, in 1984, Trio Line has transformed from a sofa producer into 
Scandinavia’s biggest producer of high-quality design furniture. The 
firm cooperates with many of the great Danish furniture producers 
and functions as their supplier within upholstery. At the same time, 
Trio Line has its own collection of relax chairs which is mainly sold in 
Europe, Asia and North America. However, only 5–10% of the compa-
ny’s revenue comes from Trio Line’s relax chair brand; the rest comes 
from being a supplier to the high-end industry.  
Initially, the company mainly focused on producing chairs. Things 
started to change in 1999, however, when Trio Line became the sole 
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supplier for Fritz Hansen. In the following years, the company quickly 
grew, and in 2003, it offshored some of its production to Poland. This 
was done for three reasons. First, moving to Poland allowed the com-
pany to reduce the hourly cost per employee by 20 Euros. This meant 
that more time could be used per product, thereby increasing quali-
ty at the same time. Second, selecting Poland allowed the company to 
deliver the processed order to the customer within 16 hours. Third, a 
qualified labour force could be easily accessed in Poland, as the coun-
try has a long tradition and relatively large talent mass within uphol-
stery. First, the Polish facility was a regular supplier for Trio Line, but 
with no capability to manage growth and quality levels. This led to the 
Polish facility being acquired by Trio Line. When Trio Line started pro-
duction in Poland, training of local employees was treated as the first 
priority. Once the proper quality level was ensured, first, the products 
with the highest consumption of labour hours were transferred to Po-
land. Today, most production activities are in Poland. In addition, the 
Polish facility is responsible for handling the incremental innovation 
of already existing furniture, since this facility possesses the greatest 
knowledge about the products and processes used in daily operation. 
Accordingly, the Danish facility mainly focuses on (1) key accounting 
activities, which involve handling customer contact and negotiating 
prices and claims; (2) ramping up production and training Polish em-
ployees; and (3) production innovation with the brand owner, which 
cannot be offshored to Poland, as the Danish upholsterers know the 
Danish design traditions and have the tacit knowledge involved in de-
veloping new high-end furniture.
Along with the growth of Trio Line, its cooperation with Fritz Hansen 
has also been gradually reinforced. Initially, all materials were sent 
from Fritz Hansen to Trio Line, where the furniture was upholstered 
and assembled. As time passed, Trio Line was handed the responsibility 
of purchasing and invoicing material for some suppliers. This process 
continued and was finalised when Trio Line was able to send a finished 
product without interference from Fritz Hansen. Other customers be-
gan to see the advantages that could be gained from outsourcing activ-
ities to Trio Line. The customers benefited from the framework agree-
ments that Trio Line had with its suppliers. By increasing the purchase 
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volume, Trio Line has been able to negotiate better material prices for 
its customers. The customers not only benefited from reductions in 
material costs, but also cost reductions due to decreased stock, which 
furthermore increased the customers’ comfort and flexibility. By hav-
ing a contribution margin on those activities, Trio Line was able to in-
crease profitability, while ensuring a strong position in the chain as a 
value creator. More recently, the company has been involved in Fritz 
Hansen’s innovation activities. Trio Line’s knowledge of the materials 
and production processes is of great value to Fritz Hansen when devel-
oping new furniture. Furthermore, Trio Line has knowledge about the 
newest material through interactions with sub-suppliers. The compa-
ny’s involvement in innovation is a deliberate step in its strategy of 
making its customers more dependent.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The empirical studies indeed confirm the roadmap for the manufac-
turing system evolution illustrated in Figure 1. Companies such as 
Aalborg Industries and Trio Line attempt to internationalise their geo-
graphically dispersed plants by coordinating them with a synergetic 
network whereas other companies (such as Fritz Hansen) try to down-
size and outsource non–core manufacturing tasks and to organise in-
terfirm collaborations. However, Figure 1 seems to be insufficient to 
cover/illustrate the entire picture of the ongoing phenomena.
Internationalisation
In the case studies of Aalborg Industries and Trio Line, sales/market-
ing and manufacturing are normally the first value chain activities in-
ternationalised in a bid for cost savings and/or market proximity. As 
shown in the Trio Line case, starting manufacturing in a new place is 
much more complicated than starting sales/marketing, and requires 
long-term preparations. Local employees need to be trained; their 
knowledge about how to operate machines needs to be developed. This 
start-up phase usually lasts until certain performance indicators are 
satisfied, which in the case Trio Line had to do with quality level. Even 
when allowed to take responsibility for mass production, the facility 
basically starts by producing simple products, but can be given more 
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responsibility for producing more products and performing more pro-
cesses after accumulating corresponding experience. Along with the 
development of the overseas plants, the companies (Aalborg Indus-
tries and Trio Line) have gradually shifted their focus from the plant to 
the international manufacturing network.   
As revealed by the Aalborg Industries case study, the internationalisa-
tion of production activities is not an end, but rather a starting point 
for internalising other value chain activities, such as global sourcing, 
global engineering and even increasingly dispersed R&D. After the 
manufacturing activities are internalised, more value chain activities 
are gradually redistributed from developed countries to developing 
ones. With globally distributed plants and other centres of service, 
sales, engineering and R&D, Aalborg Industries has to extensively look 
into its global functional networks of multiple operations and address 
individual manufacturing, sales, service, engineering and R&D func-
tional networks simultaneously, as network configuration decisions 
that are based on traditional geographical advantages or the subopti-
misation of the manufacturing network might no longer provide suffi-
cient competitiveness.
At the same time, facilities in developed countries keep on shrinking 
and accordingly become more focused (e.g. on new product/process 
development), since many more value chain activities are moved out. 
However, some value chain activities are retained in developed coun-
tries for two main reasons, that is, location-related considerations and 
site competence. On the one hand, in Aalborg Industries, some custom-
ers do not want to see components from China or India in their prod-
ucts because of their political standpoints. These customers are willing 
to pay high prices if the products are produced in Denmark. On the 
other hand, in Trio Line, product innovation cannot be moved from 
Denmark to Poland, mainly because Danish design traditions and tacit 
knowledge about developing new high-end furniture are difficult to 
transfer to the Polish site.
Externalisation
Manufacturing was also the first value chain activity outsourced from 
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Fritz Hansen and redistributed to Trio Line. Fritz Hansen’s primary 
intention was to achieve a reduction in the cost structure, to be able 
to handle large growth and to enhance capacity flexibility driven by 
market pull instead of production push. Accordingly, the actual man-
ufacturing competence was no longer viewed as the company’s core 
competence and was thereby outsourced to selected partners (such 
as Trio Line). Outsourcing the table production line and upholstery 
processes changed and challenged the company’s managerial focuses. 
Management related not only to the internal affairs of operation and 
logistics, but also, to a higher degree, to interaction with the increasing 
number of external actors in different supply chains. In other words, 
Fritz Hansen gradually shifted its focus from plant management to 
supply network management. 
From the very beginning, Fritz Hansen aimed to build up strategic 
partnership with Trio Line, but seemed to not totally trust Trio Line. 
Materials were sent from Fritz Hansen, and final products needed to 
be returned to Fritz Hansen for final quality control and distribution. 
Taking care of only upholstering and assembling, Trio Line at that 
time was a typical OEM. After manufacturing, procurement was also 
outsourced to Trio Line for similar reasons to those indicated in the 
previous section. While increasing the purchase volume and variety, 
Trio Line tended to have framework agreements with its material sup-
pliers, which further made it possible for Trio Line to negotiate better 
material prices for its customers. Better prices, in turn, attracted more 
customers and encouraged them to outsource more production. In 
other words, Trio Line was more like a ‘global procurement function’ 
to its customers. Afterwards, on pace with the company’s growth, Trio 
Line had increased capabilities to handle more complicated tasks, such 
as product/process improvement. This process continued until Trio 
Line was able to send a finished product without interference from 
its customers, such as Fritz Hansen. Thus, for reasons similar to those 
reasons indicated– specifically that Trio Line’s knowledge of the mate-
rials and production processes is of great value to Fritz Hansen when 
developing new furniture – Fritz Hansen recently involved Trio Line 
in the company’s innovation activities. Thus, Fritz Hansen can enjoy 
fast and frequent new product introduction, and Trio Line can make 
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its customers more dependent on the company. Evolving in this way, 
Trio Line has the potential to grow up to be an original design manu-
facturer (ODM).
In summary, the specialisation and collaboration trends between Fritz 
Hansen and Trio Line are not limited only to manufacturing tasks, but 
also extend to other non–core value chain activities such as procure-
ment, product/process improvement and innovation activities. In oth-
er words, the concept needs to be broadened to include the general 
integration of all functions and business processes throughout the 
total value chain, including marketing, manufacturing, distribution, 
R&D, etc. (Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997). This new development goes 
beyond the traditional make-or-buy decision and creates another type 
of network, which tends to concern new value proposition and new 
strategic collaboration in the supply, or more clearly, value network. 
DISCUSSIONS
The above empirical findings seem to suggest that our discussions on 
internationalisation and externalisation need to be extended from 
manufacturing activity to other value chain activities. Moreover, two 
development trajectories can actually be identified, that is, the inter-
nationalisation of value chain activities (taking Aalborg Industries as 
an example) and the externalisation of value chain activities (taking 
Fritz Hansen as an example). The two trajectories are actually similar 
to each other. In both development trajectories, manufacturing (or 
sales) is normally the first value chain activity to be redistributed. This 
is because, internally, manufacturing is normally viewed as a lower val-
ue-added and less knowledge-intensive activity, but at the same time 
comprises a large part of the investment and cost; externally, emerg-
ing developing countries provide good locations for companies to off-
shore/outsource their manufacturing activities in order to reduce their 
cost. Moreover, the redistribution of manufacturing further triggers 
the transfers of other related value-chain activities (e.g. procurement, 
product/process improvement and R&D/new product development, as 
shown in the three case companies), which thereby creates a snowball 
effect. 
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The fundamental difference between these two development trajec-
tories is whether the redistributions of relevant value chain activities 
go beyond the company’s boundaries. For example, Aalborg Industries 
redistributed its manufacturing and other value-chain activities glob-
ally, but mainly to sites that were still under the company’s control. In 
contrast, Fritz Hansen gradually released its manufacturing, procure-
ment, engineering and even R&D to Trio Line, making the company ac-
cordingly focus on innovation and brand management. It is certainly 
difficult to judge which development trajectory is better, since the se-
lection is always case specific and might be influenced by many factors, 
including product characteristics, market characteristics, firm or busi-
ness unit characteristics and strategies. In addition, selecting a specific 
development trajectory can only initiate and indicate the directions for 
redistributing value chain activities. During the development, it is still 
necessary to trace different factors for internationalisation and exter-
nalisation in order to monitor the developments and further provide 
relevant inputs for future decisions. For internationalisation, relevant 
factors, as suggested by the study of Aalborg Industries, seem to be 
site competencies, location conditions and flows of products, processes 
and knowledge between sites. For externalisation, relevant factors – as 
suggested by the study of Fritz Hansen and Trio Line – might involve 
supplier development and a mutual relationship with the supplier. 
Last but not least, it should also be noticed that the case companies 
actually tried to internationalise and externalise their value-chain ac-
tivities at the same time. Aalborg Industries intended to view its core 
competency as controlling the entire process in the company’s global 
setup in order to understand and fulfil customers’ needs. This, howev-
er, does not mean that the company refuses to collaborate with sup-
pliers. Instead, Aalborg Industries, for instance, produced only 20% of 
an entire boiler application, and sourced the rest of the component 
production to suppliers. Meanwhile, Fritz Hansen outsourced all of its 
production to Trio Line and gradually treated Trio Line as a strategic 
partner. Therefore, to some extent, these two companies can be viewed 
as an extended company, which has also started to internationalise 
production activity, as Trio Line offshored most of the production op-
erations from Denmark to Poland. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Since the late 1980s, manufacturing systems have gradually evolved 
from factory/plant-based systems toward globally collaborative inter-
firm networks. Derived with the characteristics of internalisation and 
externalisation of manufacturing activities, a matrix (Figure 1) was 
proposed by Shi (2004) to illustrate a roadmap of the evolution of man-
ufacturing systems. Taking this matrix as a starting point, this chapter 
first investigated the existing literature on factory/plants, internation-
al manufacturing networks, supply networks and GMVNs to examine 
what has been done on the two indicated development trajectories, 
that is, the internationalisation and externalisation of manufacturing. 
Claiming that conceptual insights address only one of the two worlds 
(i.e. research and practice) of OM, this chapter successively explored 
what is actually happening in practice in order to address potential 
queries related to the implications of the manufacturing evolution 
for the practitioner, whether the existing theories are sufficient to de-
scribe and explain what is happening in practice and the ongoing and/
or further developmental trends of manufacturing systems (networks). 
Aalborg Industries, Fritz Hansen and Trio Line were selected from the 
GONE project for in-depth analyses in order to fundamentally under-
stand the internationalisation and externalisation of manufacturing. 
The empirical findings derived from the three case studies suggested 
that the discussions on internationalisation and externalisation need 
to be extended from manufacturing activity to other value-chain ac-
tivities at the same time. The proposed matrix (Figure 1) has to be mod-
ified accordingly: (1) For the internationalisation dimension, discus-
sions cannot be limited to the international manufacturing network, 
but need to be extended to global operations or a multifunctional net-
work; and (2) for the externalisation dimension, discussions also need 
to be extended from the supply chain or network to the collaborative 
value network. Two developmental trajectories, that is, the interna-
tionalisation and the externalisation of value-chain activities, were 
accordingly proposed. Their similarities and differences were further 
compared and discussed. Finally, this chapter indicated that the case 
companies actually tended to combine the two developmental trajec-
tories at the same time, and suggested that managers must make a 
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tradeoff between internationalisation and externalisation, and keep a 
relative balance in order to face and manage the global collaborative 
value network. 
The findings of this chapter indeed suggest that the existing literature 
has become less sufficient to describe and explain the ongoing empiri-
cal phenomena, since companies internationalise/externalise not only 
manufacturing activities, but also other value-chain activities. Several 
theoretical gaps therefore need to be addressed and bridged. 
First, it is not difficult to find studies addressing various global func-
tional networks and covering the globalisation/internationalisation of 
relevant value-chain activities, for example, those of Zuo and Cavusgil 
(2002) on global marketing, Zhang (2007) on global engineering and Ko-
tabe (1998) on global sourcing. However, the existing research remains 
fragmented and unintegrated and exclusively focuses on the networks 
of specific facilities (i.e. R&D centres, engineering centres) and dis-
cusses them independently. Except for a very small number of stud-
ies, for example Wang (2009), there is limited research on global OM 
that offers a comprehensive and integrated framework for managing 
multifunctional networks of geographically dispersed operations. The 
interactions among different kinds of networks are generally ignored. 
Second, research on the supply chain/network tends to neglect the 
dynamics of the intramanufacturing network and tends to treat the 
international manufacturing network as something of a ‘black box’. 
Without integrating the knowledge from OM, the supply chain man-
agement curriculum usually adopts a different perspective from those 
on international manufacturing network and mainly focuses on in-
ventory management, distribution and information flows. Again, few 
studies try to integrate the knowledge of intra- and inter-networks and 
analyse them in a holistic way. 
Finally, this paper was mainly proposed to investigate the ongoing em-
pirical phenomena of the operations network. Our focus was there-
fore on the relevant theories, empirical situations and how to adjust 
the former to reflect the latter. In contrast, other managerial problems 
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(such as how to manage the internationalisation and externalisation 
of value-chain activities, how to make tradeoffs between internation-
alisation and externalisation and which developmental trajectory 
should be followed) are relatively neglected in this paper. They can be 
taken up as a direction for future research.
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ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates the concept of the ‘hidden costs’ of offshoring, 
i.e. unexpected offshoring costs exceeding the initially expected costs. 
Due to the highly undefined nature of these costs, we position our anal-
ysis towards the strategic responses of firms’ realisation of hidden costs. 
In this regard, we argue that a major response to the hidden costs of 
offshoring is the identification and utilisation of strategic mechanisms 
in the organisational design to eventually achieving system integration 
in a globally dispersed and disaggregated organisation. This is heavily 
moderated by a learning-by-doing process, where hidden costs motivate 
firms and their employees to search for new and better knowledge on 
how to successfully manage the organisation. We illustrate this thesis 
based on the case of the LEGO Group.
Keywords: Offshoring, hidden costs, system integration, organisational 
learning, case study
INTRODUCTION
How do firms respond to situations in which unforeseen costs of off-
shoring are undermining anticipated benefits? Dell Inc., for instance, 
the multinational IT corporation, decided in 2003 after many problems 
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and challenges regarding cultural differences, language difficulties and 
time delays, to eventually close and source back the Indian service cen-
tres that it had offshored and outsourced some years earlier (Frauen-
heim, 2003; Graf & Mudambi, 2005). Indeed, Aron and Singh (2005) ar-
gue that many firms are caught up by the ‘harsh realities of offshoring’ 
(p. 135), as they fail to pick up the right processes, calculate the opera-
tional and structural risks and match organisational forms to live up to 
the initial expectations of the offshoring activities. 
The surge of offshoring as a business practice is increasingly docu-
mented and investigated in the literature. Reporting the findings of a 
comprehensive, international research project on offshoring, the Off-
shoring Research Network (ORN), Lewin and Peeters (2006) argue that 
offshoring as a business practice on a more general level is still at an 
early stage but is growing rapidly. In particular, they assert that as a 
result of its growing significance, offshoring will fundamentally change 
the way in which companies compete globally. It has accordingly been 
suggested that the acceleration of offshoring might challenge conven-
tional international business and strategic management theory (Doh, 
2005). Although the benefits of offshoring are clear from both a theo-
retical and an empirical viewpoint – relating to cost reduction, market 
proximity and access to strategic resources, among other things (Lewin 
& Peeters, 2006; Mol, van Tulder, & Beije, 2005) – there are at the same 
time indications that these benefits are often undermined by costs that 
seem difficult to identify and calculate ex ante. This has led some schol-
ars to begin inquiring about the idea of ‘the hidden costs of offshor-
ing’, which can be defined the as unexpected and difficult to measure 
costs of relocating and offshoring business activities abroad, and can 
include costs related to control, coordination, knowledge transfer and 
design/specification (Dibbern, Winkler, & Heinzl, 2008; Larsen, Manning, 
& Pedersen, 2012; Stringfellow, Teagarden, & Nie, 2008). The locus of the 
academic inquiry in this field has consequently been to understand the 
very nature of these costs. More specifically, research has attempted to 
understand both the antecedents and the characteristics of these hid-
den costs (Dibbern et al., 2008; Larsen et al., 2012; Stringfellow et al., 2008).
In this chapter, we employ a different perspective on the hidden costs 
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of offshoring. Rather than aligning our unit of analysis with the un-
foreseen nature of hidden costs, we are interested in the effect of these 
costs. Specifically, we argue that the ‘hidden costs’ of offshoring are by 
definition difficult to identify and measure until they are revealed for 
firms as realised costs of offshoring that exceed the initially expected 
costs. The knowledge interest of this chapter is accordingly to under-
stand how firms respond to situations in which these unforeseen costs 
undermine the expected benefits of offshoring. 
We suggest that firms’ major response to the hidden costs of offshor-
ing is to identify and utilise strategic mechanisms that can successful-
ly facilitate a sophisticated systems integration of a globally dispersed 
and disaggregated organisation. At the same time, while systems inte-
gration may eventually overcome the hidden costs of offshoring, the 
process whereby firms realise the need and mechanisms to integrate 
the globally dispersed and disaggregated organisation can best be de-
scribed as a learning-by-doing process in which it makes qualitative 
sense to distinguish between failure and success experiences. The ex 
post realisation of hidden costs of offshoring provides the company 
the necessary motivation for challenging existing knowledge and to 
search for superior alternatives. This initiates a process of reorganisa-
tion of which system integration becomes the ultimate goal.
These suggestions are illustrated through the case of the Danish-based 
LEGO Group, the world’s fifth-largest toy manufacturer. We investigate 
the aftermaths of an internal financial crisis that drove the company 
to offshore and outsource larger parts of its production to third-party 
providers. During this process, the company found that the new or-
ganisational setup presented more challenges than benefits, and even-
tually decided to insource production once again.
This chapter is organised in three broad sections. First, we present its 
theoretical development by emphasising the concept of the hidden 
costs of offshoring and how firms respond to these. Second, we intro-
duce the case of LEGO Group to illustrate our theory. Third, we discuss 
the case in the light of our theoretical background, and relate this to a 
broader debate on the role of the organisation in offshoring.
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THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT  
The hidden costs of offshoring
Offshoring describes firms’ process of sourcing internal or external 
business activities from abroad (Contractor, Kumar, Kundu, & Ped-
ersen, 2010; Lewin & Peeters, 2006; Manning, Massini, & Lewin, 2008). 
Although labour-intensive activities such as manufacturing and pro-
cessing were originally the main targets for offshoring, companies 
have increasingly begun to source higher-value activities such as 
research and development (R&D) from abroad. Lewin, Massini and 
Peeters (2009), for instance, studied the determinants of the small but 
growing tendency of firms to offshore innovation activities, arguing 
that this can be explained by an emerging domestic shortage of highly 
skilled employees, in which firms access qualified personnel around 
the world through offshoring innovation. Offshoring as a business 
practice is thus no longer only confined to restricted lower-value, la-
bour-intensive and peripheral firm activities such as scale production 
and call-centre activities, but essentially encompasses the reallocation 
of firm tasks and activities from the entire value chain (Doh, 2005). The 
scope of this chapter is accordingly confined to the global reallocation 
of activities within an orchestrated value-generating system, regard-
less of the chosen ownership model. 
As offshoring has been growing in scale and scope, business managers 
and scholars alike have begun to realise that the practice of sourcing 
activities from abroad might present firms with unexpected costs. For 
instance, practitioner-oriented literature has been aware of the poten-
tial dangers and pitfalls of offshoring in the sense that the decision 
might become more expensive than originally anticipated, and thus 
eventually challenge the very rationale of the practice by pointing to 
the costs of selecting a vendor, culture, ramping up, etc. (e.g. Barthéle-
my, 2001; Overby, 2003). This literature has stressed that offshoring 
might include certain ‘hidden costs’ that will eventually have negative 
financial consequences, and thus undermine the initial expectations 
of the decision to offshore. Likewise, the literature on international 
outsourcing has pointed to hidden costs of losing ownership of busi-
ness tasks and activities, emphasising the potential erosion of firms’ 
capabilities and resources, in contrast to retaining the activities and 
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processes in-house (Fisher & White, 2000; Hendry, 1995; Reitzig & Wag-
ner, 2010). 
As this chapter conceptualises offshoring as the relocation of business 
activities abroad, regardless of chosen ownership model, we argue that 
hidden costs should be understood from a generic value chain perspec-
tive (Porter, 1986). Accordingly, hidden costs occur when firms incur 
unexpected costs in relocating certain business tasks and processes 
within an orchestrated value-generating system abroad (Aron & Singh, 
2005; Dibbern et al., 2008; Herath & Kishore, 2009; Stringfellow et al., 
2008). Obviously, these costs can stem from different sources and take 
different shapes. What is important, however, is that firms encounter 
more costs than originally anticipated. 
One noticeable perspective on the hidden costs of offshoring is pre-
sented by Stringfellow et al. (2008). In their conceptual work, the au-
thors set out to identify the antecedents or underlying drivers gener-
ating hidden costs of offshoring. The authors argue that these relate, 
on the one side, to the content and the process of the particular activ-
ity being offshored, labelled as the interaction intensity. On the other 
side, they claim that the costs are associated with the offshore loca-
tion, specifically with inherent differences in geography, language and 
culture. These drivers are aggregately labelled as interaction distance. 
Another important contribution to our understanding of hidden costs 
is Dibbern et al.’s (2008) systemic classification of the costs themselves. 
The authors posit that hidden costs of offshoring occur during three 
different stages of the offshoring process: the pre-contractual phase, 
the onshore transition phase and the onshore-offshore delivery phase. 
As the authors narrow their research to focus on costs occurring after 
the decision to offshore has been made, they highlight four particu-
lar costs deriving from the firm’s internal environment: requirement 
specifications and design costs (the costs of accurately specifying and 
designing the business tasks to be offshored); knowledge transfer costs 
(the costs of transferring and communicating knowledge between the 
client and the vendor); coordination costs (the costs of coordinating 
and integrating the vendor and the client’s resources to achieve the 
specified objectives); and control costs (the costs of controlling the 
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performance and coherency of the offshored activity). In sum, these 
contributions illuminate our understanding to what causes hidden 
costs – their antecedents – as well as the nature and characteristics of 
hidden costs.
It is in this regard important to emphasise that although many au-
thors treat firms’ primary objectives of offshoring as the reduction of 
production costs through the sourcing of business tasks and objectives 
from low-wage countries such as China and India (Dossani & Kenney, 
2003), offshoring might also be driven by knowledge, technology and 
market seeking objectives (Lewin & Peeters, 2006). Furthermore, it may 
incorporate tactical, strategic and transformational goals (Kedia & La-
hiri, 2007). This makes the assessment of what might drive the hidden 
costs of offshoring and their nature more complex. In addition, previ-
ous research suggests that firms’ objectives in offshoring change over 
time with experience (Jensen & Pedersen, 2011; Maskell, Pedersen, Pe-
tersen, & Dick-Nielsen, 2007). For instance, it can easily be assumed that 
different objectives of offshoring will influence different levels of the 
client-vendor relationship. While interaction intensity and distance 
might explain how certain costs emerge in, for instance, cost-reducing 
offshoring strategies, these variables might become less relevant if the 
objective of the offshoring is to increase innovativeness or to attract 
highly skilled personnel, as the firm would normally expect more costs 
to emerge. In other words, as the drivers and the characteristics of hid-
den costs can vary significantly from situation to situation and might 
also change, we propose that understanding the hidden costs of off-
shoring translates into an inquiry to determine whether firms’ realised 
costs by offshoring have exceeded the expected costs or not. Moreover, 
in order to advance our understanding of the nature of these hidden 
costs, we argue that it is important to understand what the ex post 
consequences of these hidden costs are (see Figure 1), as it is at this 
point in the assessment that their hidden nature becomes revealed. 
More particularly, in order to operationalise the nature of hidden costs, 
it becomes interesting to investigate how firms respond to situations 
in which their realised costs exceed the initially expected costs. 
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Responding to hidden costs: Achieving system integration
Firms respond to the hidden costs of offshoring in an array of differ-
ent ways. For instance, firms might allocate extra resources to manag-
ing offshoring activities; they might continue as if nothing has hap-
pened; or they might decide to insource their activities again. In order 
to understand how firms respond to hidden costs, however, we follow 
a tradition of seeing firms as entities of interconnected tasks and ac-
tivities that systematically contribute in fulfilling the objectives of an 
organisation (Grandori, 2001; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1967; 
Porter, 1986; Thompson, 1967). Offshoring can therefore be conceived 
as an initial organisational redesign through the reallocation of firms’ 
tasks and activities abroad, either internally in the company hierarchy 
(captive offshoring) or to an external partner (offshore outsourcing) 
(Contractoret al., 2010; Tanriverdi, Konana, & Ge, 2007; UNCTAD, 2004). 
In this respect, organisational decisions must be made regarding a 
number issues, including the contractual ownership and relationship 
of the offshoring setup (Quinn & Hilmer, 1995), the geography of the 
host location (Graf & Mudambi, 2005), the level of disaggregation or 
‘fine slicing’ of the overall value chain to identify the specific tasks to 
be offshored (Mudambi, 2008; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997), the interfaces 
and interdependences between the spatially differentiated organisa-
tional tasks and activities (Kumar, Van Fenema, & von Glinow, 2009; 
Figure 1. Conceptual understanding
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Thompson, 1967; Ven & Delbecq, 1976) and the overall coherence and 
integration of the globally dispersed organisational system (Ernst & 
Kim, 2002).
Ultimately, as we are interested in offshoring from a value chain per-
spective (Porter, 1986), we propose that firms’ response to the hidden 
costs of offshoring can be explained through the concept of systems 
integration (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001; Hobday, Davies, & Prenc-
ipe, 2005; Prencipe, Davies, & Hobday, 2003). According to Brusoni et 
al. (2001), system integrators are firms that ‘lead and coordinate from 
a technological and organisational viewpoint the work of suppliers 
involved in the network’ (p. 613). The authors argue that ‘While mar-
kets satisfy the need for distinctiveness, and hierarchies the need for 
prompt responsiveness, system integration reconciles them for spe-
cific products and technologies’ (2001, p. 614). Likewise, Hobday et al. 
(2005) characterise systems integrators as firms ‘concerned with the 
way in which firms and other agents bring together high-technology 
components, subsystems, software, skills, knowledge, engineers, man-
agers, and technicians to produce a product in competition with other 
suppliers. The more complex, high technology, and high costs the prod-
uct, the more significant systems integration becomes to the produc-
tive activity of the firm’ (p. 1110). This suggests that the system integra-
tor finds the optimal governance and integration mechanisms for the 
organisational system based on internal and external factors such as 
complexity, component criticality and resources. 
In essence, system integration becomes an important strategic mech-
anism in response to a growingly complex organisation (Simon, 1962). 
Thus, in an organisational system consisting of a number of offshored 
components and entities, the system integrators becomes the architect 
that integrates and coordinates the different capabilities and resources 
of the different actors into a final output. A fully systems integrated or-
ganisation would therefore understand the interactions and dynamics 
of the entire organisation, and would implement design mechanisms 
to address and avoid unexpected costs.
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The moderating role of organisational learning
Having suggested how system integration is essential in managing the 
hidden costs of offshoring, and thus contributing to firms’ successful 
offshoring experience, an obvious question becomes: How do firms 
achieve system integration? We assert that organisational learning 
(Argyris & Schön, 1978; Fiol & Lyles, 1985) plays an inevitable role – both 
conceptually and practically – in nurturing and sophisticating the sys-
tem integration of a globally dispersed and disaggregated organisation. 
Organisational learning is popularly defined as ‘the development of 
insights, knowledge, and associations between past actions, the effec-
tiveness of those actions, and future actions’ (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p. 811), 
and much literature elucidating the processes of offshoring has already 
employed an organisational learning perspective (e.g. Carmel & Agarw-
al, 2002; Dibbern et al., 2008; Jensen, 2009; Manning et al., 2008; Maskell 
et al., 2007). For instance, Maskell et al. (2007) suggest how offshoring 
to low-cost countries is best described as a learning-by-doing process 
in which, ‘over a period of time the outsourcing experience lessens the 
cognitive limitations of decision-makers as to the advantages that can 
be achieved through outsourcing in low-cost countries: the insourcer/
vendor may not only offer cost advantages, but also quality improve-
ment and innovation’ (Maskell et al., 2007, p. 239). Equally, based on 
evolving organisational learning in both home and host country firms, 
Jensen (2009) proposes that offshoring of advanced services should be 
understood as an antecedent for strategic business development and 
organisational change. 
In contrast to these views, we suggest that from the perspective of 
hidden costs of offshoring, it makes qualitative sense to distinguish 
between ‘learning by success’ and ‘learning by failure’ (cf. Madsen & 
Desai, 2010). While organisational learning is the change in the organ-
isation’s knowledge derived from an aggregation of experiences (Fiol 
& Lyles, 1985), studies have shown that it makes theoretical and em-
pirical sense to disaggregate between success experience and failure 
experience (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Mad-
sen & Desai, 2010). Success experiences provides means for firms and 
their employees to confirm that existing organisational practices and 
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knowledge work and support the objectives of the firm – thus provid-
ing stability in the organisational knowledge. Experiences with fail-
ure, however, challenge existing wisdom and structures, and motivate 
firms to search for new and better knowledge. According to Madsen 
and Desai (2010), ‘experience with failure is more likely than experience 
success to produce two of the necessary conditions for experiential 
learning […]: the motivation to alter knowledge, and ability to extract 
meaningful knowledge from experience’ (p. 454).
In sum, we propose that firms’ respond to hidden costs through incre-
mental knowledge absorption from encounters with the hidden costs 
of offshoring. This determines the strategic response involving organ-
isational change in the direction of organisational system integration. 
In other words, through their experience with failure, firms learn 
about themselves, their processes and structures, as well as learning 
more specifically how to offshore.
THE CASE: LEGO GROUP
In the following, we use the case of the LEGO Group to illustrate the 
theoretical propositions of this book chapter. The case of the LEGO 
Group (LEGO) has proven to be ideal when investigating the strategic 
responses to hidden costs of offshoring. The company is the fifth-larg-
est toy manufacturer in the world, and is the producer of the twice-
named ‘toy of the century’, the LEGO brick (Larsen, Pedersen, & Slep-
niov, 2010). It was founded in 1932 in Denmark as a small workshop for 
wooden toys, and has since grown into a large multinational company. 
The focus of this case study, however, is the period from the late 1990s 
to 2009, with particular emphasis on the latter five years. In 2004, the 
group entered the greatest financial crisis in its history, in which its net 
losses were skyrocketing and sales falling dramatically. This initiated a 
larger restructuring process in the company, where the ineffective and 
inflexible supply chain was particularly targeted. In this regard, LEGO 
decided to undertake a comprehensive offshoring journey: In 2004, it 
chose to relocate as much as 80% of its production to foreign suppliers. 
The company did have some captive offshored activities at the time, 
but the majority of the production was still conducted in Denmark 
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and the US Among the suppliers, particularly Flextronics, a large Asian 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) was targeted. A merely four 
years later, offshoring was scaled up; however, LEGO decided to in-
source production again while maintaining the international network 
of production (from offshore outsourcing to captive offshoring). The 
company increasingly realised that its outsourcing collaborations were 
too costly and challenging, and that new measures had to be taken. 
The data for the case consist mainly of a set of semi-structured inter-
views with managers and key stakeholders from LEGO which were 
conducted by the authors of the present chapter. Moreover, other in-
ternal and external secondary sources like newspaper articles, mana-
gerial reports and company presentations were also used to achieve 
a comprehensive understanding of the case. We structure the case in 
three broad parts. As we are interested in the events sparked by the 
internal crisis, the first part describes the company immediately after 
the crisis, when it decided to outsource and offshore its production (i.e. 
pre-outsourcing). The next part describes LEGO during its outsourc-
ing collaborations (i.e. outsourcing), and the last part deals with the 
firm after the decision to insource its production again (insourcing). 
Pre-offshore outsourcing (2004)
The major financial crisis in LEGO in 2003 and 2004, which drew the 
company close to bankruptcy, initiated a comprehensive assessment 
to identify problematic areas and solutions to these issues. The then 
newly appointed CEO, Jørgen Vig Knudstorp, indicated in 2004 that 
there would be a radical change in the company to bring it back on 
track:
“LEGO shall first and foremost drop its arrogance. We have 
been too sacred with our own virtues, not open enough, and 
not willing to listen to what other people say. We listen to 
customers and consumers, simply drop the sacredness. We 
must be aggressive in the market, work closely with retailers, 
and manage LEGO very tightly, also financially” (Larsen et 
al., 2010, p. 3).
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Under the strategy labelled ‘Shared Vision’, LEGO initiated a broad re-
structuring process organised around three core principles: 
 · Be the best at creating value for customers and sales channels; 
 · Refocus on the customer value;
 · Increase operational excellence.
While the first and the second principles were dominantly market 
oriented, the last signified a careful scrutiny of the firm’s entire value 
chain; the inflexible and highly complex supply chain and production 
were particularly targeted as areas that required attention.
In 2004, the company owned and operated a network of production 
facilities in Denmark, the US, Switzerland, the Czech Republic and 
South Korea. The vast majority of the production was undertaken in 
Denmark and the US. The post-crisis assessment of the company, how-
ever, showed that the production network caused a number of ineffi-
ciencies. First of all, it proved to be inflexible, simply because much of 
the production knowledge was highly tacit. One LEGO manufacturing 
vice president elaborated as follows:
We have had the pleasure of being in Billund [in Denmark] 
for 40 years with many loyal employees. The downside to 
this, however, is that you become rather lazy on the docu-
mentation side as everybody knows exactly what to do, and 
they have done it for years so there is no need for it either.
As LEGO’s international network of production facilities required com-
munication across national borders, it became evident that the lack 
of explicit procedures and documentation complicated the organisa-
tional orchestration. For instance, at the time, LEGO sourced materials 
from roughly 11,000 suppliers, a number almost twice as large as what 
Boeing uses for its airplanes. The extreme complexity of maintaining 
such a network combined with poor and inadequate procedures ham-
pered the creation of a sound and flexible business platform. Another 
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issue was the high alternative costs of dominantly carrying out the 
production in Denmark and the US. On the one side, management rec-
ognised that by allocating production to low-cost countries that were 
strategically in close proximity to key markets, labour and distribution 
costs could be cut considerably. On the other hand, with the produc-
tion of roughly 24 billion bricks per year, the huge potential for econ-
omies of scale by targeting large subcontractors was identified. These 
insights led LEGO management to completely rethink its production 
network under the banner of achieving a ‘total cost benefit’; large-scale 
outsourcing was the result of this. A LEGO vice president expressed 
this clearly: 
We were basically turning the 50 year old idea that Denmark 
and Switzerland were good countries for automatic produc-
tion upside down. The new mantra was aggressive outsourc-
ing to low-cost countries.
Offshore outsourcing (2005–2008)
In 2005, LEGO identified a number a subsuppliers that would carry 
out the bulk of the company’s production. In total, LEGO management 
decided to relocate up to 80% of its production to external partners. 
The most prominent of these was Flextronics, a leading multinational 
electronics manufacturing services (EMS) provider based in Singapore 
that had much experience in servicing OEMs. Other sub-suppliers 
included Sonoco, Greiner, Weidenhammer and 2B Pack. However, the 
relative sizes of these collaborations were marginal compared to that 
with Flextronics. 
In the period of 2004 to 2006, LEGO relocated the following activities to 
Flextronics: Some production facility capacity in Denmark and Swit-
zerland was transferred to Flextronics’ plants in Nyíregyháza and Sar-
var, Hungary; the operating control of LEGO’s Kladno site in the Czech 
Republic was given to Flextronics; and the LEGO Enfield plant in the 
US was shut down in favour of using Flextronic’s newly opened facil-
ities in Juarez, Mexico. Besides the obvious sourcing and economies 
of scale potentials, Flextronics had been a preferred sourcing partner 
due to its vast experience and expertise in transferring business ac-
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tivities between different geographical units. A LEGO vice president 
explained:
It has been important for us to find the right partner, and 
Flextronics is a very professional player in the market with 
industry-leading plastics capabilities, the right capacity and 
resources in terms of molding, assembly, packaging and dis-
tribution. We know this from looking at the work Flextron-
ics does for other global companies.
Above all, as the LEGO management targeted the ‘total cost benefit’ in 
the production, extensive assistance was required due to the high de-
gree of tacit knowledge in LEGO’s work processes. Indeed, the collabo-
ration with Flextronics presented LEGO with a number of advantages 
besides the pure sourcing benefits. Particularly, from the collaboration, 
LEGO learned the act and value of documenting and standardising 
work processes. A LEGO manufacturing vice president pointed this 
out:
It [the collaboration with Flextronics] has had a major effect 
on how we think about things, what we are focusing on, and 
when it is important to take care of the process ourselves 
and when we can use the industry standards. There are is-
sues concerning the implementation and documentation 
of standards, the documentation of what we are doing, that 
we have learned big-time from Flextronics. Documentation 
is not something we have had the tradition of being partic-
ularly good at. Our employees have been here [in Billund, 
Denmark] for 20 and 30 years at the time, so why do then 
you want spend time on these issues? But then it is really an 
advantage as a business being able to document things.
A senior LEGO production director explained how standardisation 
had been taken to new frontiers within the company:
We are standardizing on three levels: the upper level: that is 
our way of thinking, our mindset, values, attitudes; on the 
129
mid-level: how we operate our planning processes, follow-up 
processes, etc.; and the lower level: that is more the hardware 
part, the machines, lines and the layout in the production.’
Moreover, in 2005, LEGO introduced a deliberate sales and operation 
planning (S&OP) process to monitor and coordinate the roles, capabil-
ities and responsibilities of the different production facilities found 
around the world in relation to the supply situation. The S&OP became 
a central mechanism in ensuring flexibility through coordination and 
transparency between the different units in LEGO’s fragmented and 
globally distributed network of production facilities. These measures 
were therefore taken to manage and overcome the extreme complexi-
ty of LEGO’s production network.
At the same time as LEGO saw the learning potential in collaborating 
with Flextronics, unexpected challenges began to appear. The LEGO 
management increasingly found that it was not achieving the oper-
ational flexibility it had sought through large-scale outsourcing. Due 
to the relatively high pace of the transition from in-house production 
to outsourced production, a reliable and coherent transfer of produc-
tion knowledge proved problematic to ensure. For instance, there was 
the challenge of successfully aligning the seasonal fluctuations of the 
LEGO production with Flextronics’ business model emphasising sta-
ble and predictable operations to ensure economies of scale. The three 
parameters that characterised LEGO’s production (i.e. about 60% of 
the LEGO production was carried out in the second half of the year; 
the average lifespan of the products was 16–18 months and demand 
uncertainty fluctuated with plus/minus 30%), however, rather signified 
a need for flexible and highly market responsive business solutions.
Eventually, in 2008, LEGO management announced that the collabora-
tion with Flextronics would be phased out. In an official press release, 
the executive vice president for the global supply chain, Iqbal Padda, 
stated the following:
“We have had an intensive and very valuable cooperation 
with Flextronics on the relocation of major parts of our pro-
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duction. As expected this transition has been complicated, 
but throughout the process we have maintained our high 
quality level. Jointly we have now come to the conclusion 
that it is more optimal for the LEGO Group to manage the 
global manufacturing set up ourselves. With this decision 
the LEGO supply chain will be developed faster through go-
ing for the best, leanest and highest quality solution at all 
times” (Larsen et al., 2010, p. 1). 
Given the challenges that LEGO encountered through the offshoring 
collaborations, the long-term contracts with Flextronics were can-
celled after merely three years.
Insourcing/captive offshoring (2008)
The decision to phase out the collaboration with Flextronics initiated 
a process of insourcing the extensive network of production facilities. 
First, LEGO gained ownership and control of the Kladno facilities in 
the Czech Republic in February 2008. In July of the same year, the fac-
tories in Sarvar and Nyíregyháza, Hungary, followed suit. Eventually, at 
the beginning of 2009, the production in Juárez, Mexico, was closed in 
favour of using a brand new, fully LEGO-owned and operated produc-
tion facility in Monterrey, Mexico. The factories in Billund, Denmark, 
were maintained with roughly 1,100 employees. Thus, although some of 
the minor outsourcing collaborations were still kept after phasing out 
Flextronics – such as Greiner and Sonoco, primarily delivering packag-
ing solutions – the major implications of the recent developments in-
dicated that LEGO’s production network went from being dominantly 
offshore outsourced to become a largely captive offshored network. A 
considerable expansion of LEGO’s global footprint was therefore one 
of the results.
What remained remarkable after phasing out Flextronics, however, 
was how the so-called ‘failed’ sourcing collaboration had fundamen-
tally altered the way in which the LEGO Group perceived its own or-
ganisation and carried out its operations. For instance, as already men-
tioned, this was linked to how it could standardise and document work 
processes. Having experienced the level of complexity and challenges 
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arising from dispersing the production network on an international 
scale, a LEGO supply chain manager rationalised that ‘production in 
another country – even within the same company – requires ten times 
more documentation than in the company it is moved from’. In a sim-
ilar vein, the LEGO Group had learned the value of transparency in its 
processes. A LEGO vice president explained:
We have reached a point where we went from a situation 
where we had a highly poor day-to-day transparency for our 
processes and where we were according to our plans, to pos-
sessing today a very high degree of transparency and control 
over our processes. And control is not, in my head, the same 
thing as never running into problems, but rather knowing 
when we have problems, where we are, and where to focus. 
Transparency is therefore just as important as having con-
trol.
Moreover, the vice president elaborated:
I won’t say that we had problems in with the quality. I think 
it was rather the question of integration. It was the whole 
planning phase that we simply could not implement, and we 
were not ready for it either. Although some issues of under-
standing our level, they [Flextronics] were fully able deliver 
the quality we asked for.
Through its collaboration with Flextronics, LEGO also successfully re-
duced the total number of component portfolios from approximately 
12,000 in 2004 to roughly half that number in 2008. This meant that 
it was to a much larger extend using the same components in differ-
ent products, and as a result, a more flexible and less burdened supply 
chain was allowed for.
In sum, through its interactions and encounters with Flextronics, LEGO 
had incrementally gained knowledge concerning how to optimise its 
own processes and organisation in order to manage the challenges of 
having an international network of production facilities. Specifically, it 
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learned the importance of controlling and being fully acquainted with 
how the system works, or put differently, it had learned the potential 
pitfalls of not being fully acquainted with its own system. LEGO there-
fore incrementally learned more about itself and its own processes and 
structures by engaging Flextronics in its production.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The intention of this chapter was to understand how firms respond 
to the hidden costs of offshoring, specifically situations in which the 
realised costs of offshoring exceed anticipated costs. While previous 
literature on the hidden costs of offshoring has concentrated on un-
derstanding the antecedents and the nature of these costs (Dibbern 
et al., 2008; Larsen et al., 2012; Stringfellow et al., 2008), we proposed 
an alternative perspective by addressing the consequences of these 
costs due to their ex ante unforeseen nature. Accordingly, we opera-
tionalised firms’ responses as ex post redesigns in the organisational 
architecture based on firms’ realisations of unexpected costs toward 
systems integration. This is facilitated through knowledge absorption 
gained from experiences with offshoring.
The case of LEGO and its sourcing adventure illustrates this thesis 
well: After having offshored a substantial portion of the production 
to Flextronics, LEGO realised that the sourcing collaboration did not 
fulfil the initial expectations, which eventually triggered an organisa-
tional redesign through the insourcing of activities. One can speculate 
about whether the sudden financial crisis drove LEGO to offshore its 
production without devoting enough resources into understanding 
how to design the new offshoring organisation, thus avoiding hidden 
costs. Important for our illustration, however, is that LEGO incurred 
hidden costs. The organisational redesign that was initiated to over-
come these costs thus support the initial proposition of this book 
chapter, namely that the empirical assessment of hidden costs of off-
shoring only becomes fertile after the costs have revealed themselves 
(considering that hidden costs are defined as the deviation between 
realised costs and expected costs).
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In response to the complex and ineffective supply chain, LEGO expand-
ed its global dispersion by allocating much of the production control 
and ownership to Flextronics. By targeting low-cost countries and mar-
ket proximity, the LEGO management expected that a higher degree 
of global dispersion would, in essence, decrease the inefficiencies and 
complexity of its production network. This development is in line with 
a definition of offshoring as the process by which a firm disaggregates 
the value chain into smaller components, devises appropriate interfac-
es between these, and then relocates selected components to another 
country, either internally in the company hierarchy (captive offshor-
ing) or to an external partner (offshore outsourcing) (Contractor et al., 
2010; Tanriverdi et al., 2007). While LEGO had offshored some produc-
tion capacity prior to Flextronics, the scale-up in offshore outsourcing 
made it necessary for the company to disaggregate and identify which 
production tasks and activities that were going to be relocated to Flex-
tronics. It was therefore of paramount importance that the interfaces 
and interdependences between the organisational offshored and in-
house tasks and activities were identified and defined to create and 
maintain a coherent organisational system. Obviously, the interactions 
and interdependences between the firm’s tasks and activities must be 
defined under all organisational settings, offshoring or not (Thompson, 
1967; Ven & Delbecq, 1976). However, the exercise of offshoring presents 
firms with new challenges given the context-dependent differences be-
tween the spatially separated units, such as cultures, political systems 
and geographical distances and differences (Kumar et al., 2009).
After some years of collaborating with Flextronics, LEGO realised that 
the sourcing agreement was in fact more costly than originally antici-
pated. The high pace of transition, as well as the challenges of aligning 
the two business models had created an inflexible and unconducive 
platform for collaboration and growth, and had thus presented LEGO 
with substantial hidden costs. Following Dibbern et al. (2008), LEGO’s 
hidden costs can be related to control (LEGO could not foresee what 
Flextronics what doing), coordination (challenges of aligning the two 
significantly different business models), knowledge transfer (a too high 
pace of transition hindered the necessary knowledge to be transferred) 
and specification/design (difficulties of specifying the required output 
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according to market demands). LEGO’s main response to these costs 
was to regain the ownership of the offshored activities (i.e. from off-
shore outsourcing to captive offshoring). Accordingly, LEGO’s hidden 
costs can be interpreted as the failure to create an integrated organisa-
tional system which sparked a new round of organisational redesign. 
The failure of LEGO in controlling and coordinating the different ac-
tors and components in the organisational system – hence lack of in-
tegration – caused a number of unexpected costs and challenges that 
eventually forced the LEGO management to rethink the production 
network. The change in ownership in the globally dispersed network 
of production facilities can therefore be understood as a strategic re-
sponse to the newly realised hidden costs with the purpose of further-
ing the integration of the organisational system. LEGO integrated its 
network of production facilities by standardising and documenting 
the interfaces between the value chain components. Arguably, this led 
to a reduction of the interdependences between the different units 
and tasks which could facilitate the more manageable coordination 
of the network of spatially differentiated activities. LEGO’s approach 
to system integration can hence be seen as an organisational modular 
approach (Baldwin & Clark, 1997; Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Sanchez 
& Mahoney, 1996). Sturgeon (2002) argues that modular value chains or 
production networks consists of lead firms which concentrate higher 
value-adding activities such as R&D and marketing, while manufac-
turing and lower value-adding activities such as manufacturing are 
outsourced to globally operating turn-key suppliers. What further 
characterises the network is the ‘codified inter-firm links and the ge-
neric manufacturing capacity residing in turn-key suppliers to reduce 
transaction costs, build large external economies of scale and reduce 
risk for network actors’ (Sturgeon, 2002, p. 451). In this sense, organisa-
tional modularity with its emphasis on standardised and minimised 
interfaces and interdependences — a loosely coupled system (Orton & 
Weick, 1990) — becomes one measure for system integration (Brusoni 
et al., 2001) that seems to characterise LEGO’s approach well. 
Obviously, there are other ways of integrating an organisational sys-
tem comprising globally dispersed and disaggregated value-chain 
activities. For instance, the surge of information technology has pro-
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vided ground for integrating and coordinating the virtual organisa-
tion whose members and subunits are globally apart (Boudreau, Loch, 
Robey, & Straud, 1998; Wiesenfeld, Raghuram, & Garud, 1999). Moreover, 
Ernst and Kim (2002) describe the prevalence of global production net-
works in which ‘network flagship’ (lead firms) integrate the different 
activities through their higher network status. The essence, however, is 
that LEGO’s key mechanism for responding to hidden costs of offshor-
ing was to create organisational system integration. Therefore, system 
integration seems to be at the central to the successful management of 
hidden costs of offshoring. The emergence of hidden costs can be un-
derstood as the failure of firms to achieve systems integration, i.e., the 
less able the offshoring firm is to integrate the globally dispersed and 
disaggregated activities into an orchestrated organisation, the more 
likely it is to encounter hidden costs. 
The case illustrates the moderating role of organisational learning in 
achieving systems integration. The case story comprises three differ-
ent states or ‘snapshots’ of LEGO in regards to its offshoring adventure. 
In the first round, the company learned the value of documenting and 
standardising its processes and interfaces in the pursuit of system in-
tegration to achieve a flexible supply chain. However, as new hidden 
costs emerged as a result of globally dispersing the production net-
work through the engagement with Flextronics, LEGO decided to al-
ter the ownership structure of the global production network towards 
captive offshoring; yet, keeping and valuing the modular architectural 
design to achieve system integration as means for alleviating unex-
pected costs. Evidently, LEGO’s organisational learning spurred these 
new rounds of reconfiguration with an ultimate goal of systems inte-
gration. Moreover, the prevalence and realisation of the hidden costs 
of offshoring suggest an offshoring failure; i.e. the firm encountered 
more costs than it expected and calculated for. This knowledge pushed 
LEGO to search for new and better means of managing hidden costs, 
and therefore spark a process of organisational redesign. This suggests 
that LEGO’s response to the hidden costs of offshoring was grounded 
in an incremental absorption of knowledge from failure. The organisa-
tional redesign was driven by LEGO’s failure to successfully carry out 
a sourcing collaboration with Flextronics. 
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In conclusion, this chapter has investigated how firms manage hidden 
costs of offshoring. Drawing on literature on organisational design, 
we first suggested that the inquiry into the hidden costs of offshoring 
should be directed at the ex post consequences of their realisation. As 
the definition of hidden costs itself suggests, the exercise of empiri-
cally identifying the antecedents and the very nature of these costs 
becomes obscured by in that these costs can include ‘everything’. Ac-
cordingly, we have looked at the strategic responses to manage these 
costs as a proxy to operationalise this concept. In this respect, we ar-
gue that a major response to hidden costs is to identify and utilise an 
organisational design mechanism that can facilitate the system inte-
gration of a globally dispersed and disaggregated organisation. Next, 
the process whereby firms realise the need and mechanisms for this 
is best characterised as an organisational learning process in which it 
makes qualitative sense to disaggregate between learning by success 
and learning by failure. The realisation of hidden costs of offshoring 
motivates the firm and its employees to challenge existing knowledge 
and search for new knowledge concerning how to successfully manage 
the offshoring organisation.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Managing Increasing Technological 
Complexity: Delivering Large 
System Products
 
Mikko Mattila, Aalto University, Finland 
ABSTRACT
In order to be competitive, companies that produce large system prod-
ucts need to find an efficient way to operate with a global supply chain. 
As the variety of the products increases and technology evolves, prod-
ucts tend to become more complex, leading to challenges in, for example, 
managing the deliveries, manufacturing, order handling and decision 
making. Companies have created ways to manage complexity using a 
product structure design that facilitates the process throughout the 
lifecycle of a product. These approaches include grouping of compo-
nents into subsystems, modular product architecture and product plat-
forms. KONE is a Finnish elevator company that produces and delivers 
large system products that can be considered very complex. This chap-
ter presents ways to manage the complexity by product structure and 
architecture design, and explains the example of the KONE Group. 
Keywords: Complexity, large system, modularity, technological complex-
ity, case study
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INTRODUCTION
Most large Nordic companies today operate in broad global markets. 
These markets are growing and demanding a continuous stream of 
new products. Furthermore, companies often try to meet the require-
ments of smaller and smaller customer segments to be competitive 
with all the global competitors. This requires products that can be pro-
duced efficiently, renewed and introduced effectively and can also be 
delivered to customers located anywhere in the world. Often, segmen-
tation leads to situations where new products have volumes which are 
too low for mass production processes. As the technology has evolved 
rapidly over the past few decades, today’s large system products have 
become more complex, implementing dozens of different functions. 
Products must be designed and structured in a way that they allow for 
a high number of product variants and simultaneously support effi-
cient supply chain performance (Kaski & Heikkilä, 2002). 
To implement a high number of functions, products include many dif-
ferent components which may involve very different manufacturing 
technologies. High-tech products can include varying elements, from 
complex high-tech electronic components to low-complexity metal 
components. The supplier base for products of this kind can be wide 
and vary from local small enterprises to large-scale, global enterprises. 
As the markets can be global, so can the supply network. The compo-
nents must be supplied efficiently from all around the world to the 
next node in the network. 
When operating globally, it has become necessary for Nordic manu-
facturing companies to utilise the benefits of high value adding pro-
duction in their products (Eloranta, Ranta, Salmi, & Ylä-Anttila, 2010). 
Moreover, companies must simultaneously be competitive in terms of 
costs. Companies need to find a solution as to how to efficiently han-
dle the supply chain which incorporates components manufactured 
in low-cost countries with components manufactured in Nordic coun-
tries into a product that gives the customer the most value and is sold 
at a low price. This kind of decentralised production dramatically in-
creases the complexity of the supply chain. This complexity can be de-
creased or made less apparent with proper product design.
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The technological complexity of a product is increased by many fac-
tors, for example, advanced technologies, global markets, a global sup-
plier network, larger products, a wider product portfolio, a variety of 
products and a larger number of different components. This kind of 
increasing complexity, if not properly managed, involves challenges 
for the performance of the company; lead times, decision making, cost 
modelling, forecasting and global operational efficiency are areas in 
which challenges arise when complexity increases.
In order to manage the complexity of the product, companies have 
created technologies, methods and strategies to hide and manage the 
complexity more efficiently. One very common method is creating a 
modular product architecture. In order to manage the product, process 
and supply chain concurrently Fine (2000) suggests a three-dimen-
sional engineering process that combines the design of these three di-
mensions. The product itself is designed along with the design of the 
processes and the supply chain. This approach drives the companies to 
take management of complexity into account at the product structure 
design phase. Product platforms, product modularisation and group-
ing to subsystems can be considered as tools for the efficient manage-
ment of complex systems.
Figure 1. Three-dimensional concurrent engineering. Overlapping 
responsibilities across product, process, and supply chain develop-
ment activities (Fine, 2000)
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Companies supplying large system products need to operate different-
ly from those selling normal commodity products. A large system de-
livery is a concept of products that consist of many systems operating 
somewhat separately, are large in size and typically cannot be manu-
factured through the normal manufacturing processes. As such, large 
system products cannot be fully compared with the production of, e.g. 
cars, mobile phones or personal computer devices. It is usually difficult 
or even impossible for large products to be completely manufactured 
in a factory because of, e.g. physical size or the benefits of decentral-
ised production. The products are usually delivered to the customer in 
pieces and then installed at the customer’s premises. The installation 
work done at the customer site can be considered relatively expensive 
in comparison with the work done at the factory. Thus, it is reasona-
ble to minimise the work load at the installation site. Such a supply 
network needs to be optimised in order to minimise the costs at the 
installation site, but without increasing complexity.
This chapter presents a case study of complexity management relat-
ed to customised large system products in a global supply chain at a 
Finnish elevator company, KONE. KONE’s elevators are an example of 
products that need to be customised for thousands of different needs, 
delivered and installed in different component groups at different 
phases and produced globally. The complete product includes compo-
nents varying from high-tech electronic components to low-complex-
ity metal parts. KONE provides an excellent example of a successful 
response to the challenge.
KONE looks for the best way of operating globally, with a large varie-
ty of large system products that are delivered and installed efficiently 
for customers who may be located anywhere in the world. To manage 
complexity, KONE has created a product structure that combines op-
erative subsystems, product platforms and modular product architec-
ture. This improves the global operational efficiency, decreases lead 
times, reduces the number of different components and facilitates 
forecasting, cost modelling and decision making.
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The present chapter gives a short introduction to the present theo-
ries on product platforms and product modularisation. It emphasises 
these themes in terms of their relevance to the supply chain of large 
system deliveries.
PRODUCT MODULARITY
Product modularity is a concept that has proven useful in dealing with 
complex systems. It makes complex product architectures appear sim-
pler and easier to handle. Two subsidiary ideas comprise the general 
concept of a modular product structure (Baldwin & Clark, 2000):
 · The idea of interdependence within and independence across 
the modules;
 · Abstraction. 
There are many definitions of the term module. The most commonly 
used is McClelland’s definition, where a module is a unit whose struc-
tural elements are powerfully connected among themselves and rela-
tively weakly connected to elements in other units (McClelland & Ru-
melhart, 1995). In other words, modules are structurally independent 
chunks in a larger system where they work together with the rest of 
the system through well-defined interfaces. A product consisting of 
functional modules has a modular product architecture. Furthermore, 
Ulrich (1993) defines modular architecture to include chunks that im-
plement one or very few of the functional elements of the product. 
Modular architecture is the opposite of integral architecture where, in 
turn, the functional elements are implemented using more than one 
chunk. Examples of an integral and a modular trailer are presented in 
Figure 2 (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2008).
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Product modularity is usually considered a product development and 
design approach to efficient mass customisation that enables the sup-
ply chain processes to produce products that meet the needs of almost 
every customer at a price close to the traditional mass-produced prod-
uct. The mass customisation process aims to combine economies of 
scale and economies of scope by efficient product differentiation (Pine, 
1999). Products with a well-designed modular architecture can allow 
several differentiating products based on a few differentiating compo-
nents with a relatively flexible and efficient production process (Kaski 
&Heikkilä, 2002).
Feitzinger and Lee (1997) describe three basic building blocks of an ef-
fective mass-customisation program. The first of these are highly re-
lated to the product modularisation and the latter to modularity and 
supply network design (Feitzinger & Lee, 1997):
 · A product should be designed so that it consists of indepen-
dent modules that can be assembled into different forms of the 
product easily and inexpensively;
 · Manufacturing processes should be designed so that they, too, 
consist of independent modules that can be moved or rear-
ranged easily to support different distribution network designs.
Figure 2. Trailers with an integral (left) and modular (right) architec-
ture (Ulrich, 1993)
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 · The supply chain network – the positioning of inventory and 
the location, number and architecture of manufacturing and 
distribution facilities – should be designed to provide two ca-
pabilities. First, it should be able to supply the basic product to 
the facilities performing the customisation in a cost-effective 
manner. Second, it must have flexibility and responsiveness to 
take an individual customer’s orders and deliver the finished, 
customised goods quickly.
Ulrich and Eppinger (2008) and Feitzinger and Lee (1997) both list de-
layed differentiation as one of the advantages of a supply chain which 
is enabled by an effective mass customisation program involving a 
modular product structure. When a firm offers several variants of a 
product, the product architecture is a key determinant of the perfor-
mance of the supply chain. Postponing the differentiation of a product 
until late in the supply chain is called delayed differentiation. Delayed 
differentiation can be seen as moving the order penetration point 
Figure 3. Mass production combined with the independent modules 
at the order penetration point (Adapted from Feitzinger & Lee, 1997; 
Olhager, 2003; Sako & Murray, 1999; Ulrich & Eppinger, 2008)
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(OPP) to a latter phase. The ideas of mass customisation and the OPP 
are introduced in Figure 3. Standard parts of the product are produced 
efficiently with a mass production process, and then the independ-
ent modules are produced by separate production lines. The modules 
should be combined with small and simple series of incorporating 
tasks at the OPP in the supply network (Olhager, 2003; Sako & Murray, 
1999). This can be done only if the product and its architecture are de-
signed for efficient mass customisation (Feitzinger & Lee, 1997; Ulrich 
& Eppinger, 2008).
The disadvantage of modularity can be poor performance characteris-
tics in the product. A product with a modular architecture is usually 
larger in size and does not perform the same functions as the inte-
gral product (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2008). From the operations and supply 
chain perspective, however, modularity hides the technological com-
plexity of the product. It can offer global operations advantages like 
reduced lead times, a reduced number of different components and 
better production planning and control.
There are established methods for the creation of a modular product 
architecture. One of these methods, modular function deployment 
(MFD) is applicable to already existing product structures. The MFD 
method is created to reinforce the design for excellence (DfX) methods, 
which aim for a product design optimisation over a complete product 
lifecycle (Erixon, 1999).
PRODUCT PLATFORM
A platform-based product is another model of business operation that 
can be associated with modularity. A well-functioning platform enables 
the assembly of product instances via the means of systematic prod-
uct variation from the ready-made modules on the platform, following 
an existing product architecture (Lehtonen, 2007). Product platforms 
are widely discussed in product development literature as well as prod-
uct strategy literature. There are dozens of definitions for the product 
platform, ranging from a narrow to broad. Some of the widely adopted 
definitions are as follows (adapted from Huang, Simpson, & Pine, 2005):
151
 · A set of subsystems and interfaces that form a common struc-
ture from which a stream of derivative products can be effi-
ciently developed and produced (Meyer & Lehnerd, 1997);
 · A collection of the common elements, especially the underlying 
core technology, implemented across a range of products (Mc-
Grath, 2001);
 · The collection of assets (i.e. components, processes, knowledge, 
people and relationships) that are shared by a set of products 
(Robertson & Ulrich, 1998).
Product platforms simplify the product variability for a company. This 
facilitates supply chain processes as well as product design and devel-
opment processes. Figure 4 illustrates the product releases of prod-
ucts based on the same technological platforms. A product platform 
approach dramatically reduces manufacturing costs and provides sig-
nificant economies in the procurement of components and materials, 
because so many of these are shared among individual products (Mey-
er & Lehnerd, 1997).
Figure 4. Product releases from the same technological platform ele-
ments (adapted from McGrath, 2001; Meyer & Lehnerd, 1997; Ulrich & 
Eppinger, 2008,)
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A product platform is primarily a definition for planning, decision 
making and strategic thinking. McGrath has listed some benefits of 
a product platform strategy. The benefits which McGrath (2001) men-
tions are as follows: 
 · A platform strategy focuses management on key decisions at 
the right time;
 · It enables products to be deployed rapidly and consistently;
 · A platform approach encourages a longer-term view of product 
strategy;
 · A platform strategy can leverage significant operational effi-
ciencies;
 · Product platform principles help management to anticipate 
replacement of a major product platform.
Heikkilä, Karjalainen, Martio and Niininen (2002) have summarised 
the benefits of product platforms in automobile industry from various 
sources. These are as follows (Brylawski, 1999; Muffato, 1999; Wilhelm, 
1997, adapted from Heikkilä et al., 2002):
 · Decreased costs via higher production/purchase volumes of 
shared components;
 · Decreased costs via concentration of development work to 
unique parts on a new model;
 · Potential to offer greater product variety with increased speed 
and lower costs and risks;
 · Reduced number of separate components, which simplifies in-
ventory and tracking and encourages supplier consolidation;
 · Higher quality through already tested and hardened compo-
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nents or applications, and focus on innovation in selected tech-
nologies.
According to Muffato (1999), in general terms, the potential benefits of 
the platform approach are reduced development and manufacturing 
costs, reduced development time, reduced systemic complexity, bet-
ter learning across projects and improved ability to update products. 
Muffato has studied the product platform strategies of the automobile 
industry. According to him, the platform also offers advantages in glob-
al operations. A platform permits (Muffato, 1999):
 · Greater flexibility between plants (the possibility of transfer-
ring production from one plant to another due to standardisa-
tion);
 · Cost reduction achieved through using resources on a global 
scale;
 · Increased use of plants (higher productivity due to reduction in 
the number of differences);
 · Reduction of the number of platforms as a result of their locali-
sation on a world-wide basis.
MANAGING COMPLEXITY AT THE CASE COMPANY 
Large system deliveries at KONE
KONE has found that for cost efficiency reasons, manufacturing of the 
elevators should as much as possible be done at subsystem factories, 
reducing the amount of work at the installation site. At KONE, this is 
carried out by dividing the product into subsystems that are manufac-
tured at KONE’s own factories or purchased as a complete subsystem 
from a supplier. A typical subsystem fulfils these requirements, i.e. it 
can be supplied by one supplier and delivered efficiently to the instal-
lation site, where it can be efficiently installed.
The subsystems are managed at the case company by cross-functional 
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organisations that optimise the subsystems to comply with the supply 
chain from end to end. The interfaces of the subsystems need to be 
managed, since the subsystems must function seamlessly with each 
other. The idea of dividing the product into subsystems is presented in 
Figure 5. Requirements from case company’s delivery operations to the 
product structure are presented on the left.
The introduced example is not only applicable to elevators, but also 
to many large system products, for instance telecom network stations, 
earthmovers, cranes or air ventilation systems. 
These subsystems are basically a medium for communication and 
management. In a global supply chain, effective communication is es-
sential. The supplier needs to know what to deliver within one sub-
system, and the installation functions need to know what they are 
getting when ordering a subsystem. It is necessary to limit the impact 
of product customisation to subsystems and maintain standard proce-
Figure 5. Delivery operations–based inputs divide the product into 
subsystems. The larger box represents the product and the smaller 
boxes represent the subsystems
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dures to deliver the product accurately for the expensive installation 
phase. The complexity of the product is easier to manage with a limit-
ed number of subsystems, where organisations can focus only on their 
subsystems.
Modularity and product platforms at KONE
KONE’s elevators have thousands of different requirements from the 
customer. These can be categorised into visual requirements, dimen-
sional requirements, drive properties, safety requirements and var-
iability of regulations. The variety can be effectively managed only 
through a modular product architecture.
The benefits of modularity are usually sought, besides through prod-
uct design and development, from the supply operations. The manu-
facturing process can be considered to end at the termination of the 
installation phase of the product. Thus, the modularity on a large sys-
tem product is very challenging to create. The product cannot be cus-
tomised with the selection of subsystems, but a modular architecture 
needs to be established within each subsystem. The subsystems are 
manufactured at a factory and are capable of providing the benefits 
that modular architectures usually do in, for example, the automobile 
industry or consumer electronics industry.
In the creation of modularity, the natures of the project business and 
the large system products have to be considered. The MFD method 
needs to be adapted to projects where the product is not manufactured 
at the factory. The installation phase and the potential for delayed dif-
ferentiation must be emphasised in the creation of the modular prod-
uct architecture in large system product deliveries. The installation 
phase and the delivery are the most expensive phases of the manufac-
turing and delivery process.
Both of these processes are also almost unique, since they take place 
at construction sites across the globe. The delivered subsystems have 
modular structures to make the customisation process more efficient. 
More efficient customisation aims at improved variation, production 
156
control, product development, quality, after sales, delivery and instal-
lation. The aims differ in different groups. The common aim for all the 
groups is decreasing lead times and making the delivery more accurate 
through better production control. The concept of forming KONE’s 
modular product structure with subsystems and modularity within 
them is presented in Figure 6.
 
The modules consist of parts that are usually customised to the cus-
tomer or need to be separated from the other systems for supply chain 
efficiency reasons. The handrail in the elevator car, for example, is 
usually customised for the customer (based on visual and dimension-
al characteristics and regulations), and can be efficiently produced as 
a separate module and then incorporated easily with the rest of the 
product. This can only be done if the handrail and its interface to the 
elevator are designed for such operations.
Figure 6. Thousands of requirements for products’ properties from 
the customer (left above, presented with colours) combined with 
subsystems (left below, presented with lines) form a product struc-
ture that is modular and serves the delivery of the large system 
product
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This kind of division of the product structure hides the complexity 
of the product for efficient delivery, making order handling, logistics, 
sourcing, manufacturing and installation clearer. It decreases the lead 
times and number of different components and makes the delivery of 
each subsystem more accurate.
As the subsystems can be considered products that are manufactured 
in factories, the product platforms can be designed for each subsys-
tem. The platforms serve as the base for the modular product struc-
ture within the subsystems. The platforms, including the core technol-
ogy, leverage the global operations. At the case company, there is a need 
for two kinds of platforms:
 · Platforms which are compatible with all the products. The 
products throughout the product portfolio use the same tech-
nological solutions;
 · Platforms which form the product families. Products through-
out the product family use the same technological solutions.
Both platform types are presented in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Core technology platforms and shared component plat-
forms form the product families that share common technology and 
address related market applications 
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Product technologies are the most important assets of the product 
platform, components and subassemblies in particular. Product plat-
forms reduce the technological complexity, as there is a reduced num-
ber of different components and a clear strategy for product platforms 
that are globally harmonised. Furthermore, there are no overlapping 
local products. In other words, the product structures are global even 
though there are some local product variations.
The creation of product platforms is done according to the subsystem 
division. The platforms can be the base for a whole subsystem or just 
for a part of it. These platforms are then the base for a modular prod-
uct structure. In the creation of platforms and modularity, all instanc-
es that the product structure has an impact on should be involved. The 
creation of modularity for large system products can be done as with 
products generally, for example, according to the MFD method. With 
elevators, the differences from this model are as follows: 
 · The base of modularity creation is a subsystem, not the whole 
product;
 · In identifying the potential modules, the nature of large system 
deliveries is emphasised.
CONCLUSIONS
At KONE, decreasing the complexity of the product with product plat-
forms, modularity and standardisation enable the postponement of 
the OPP, which in turn enables an efficient supply chain incorporating 
low-cost and high value adding production.
The modularity-based separation and decentralisation of manufactur-
ing can create a good overall result. It can save costs if the company 
can utilise both the low-cost and high value adding production prop-
erly. This can be done only if the complexity of the product is properly 
managed through design, where modularity and platforms hide the 
technological complexity. Through concurrent product architecture, 
process, and supply chain design, the benefits of a global operations 
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network can be utilised. Platforms must be managed, modules and 
their interfaces must be managed and in large system products, group-
ing to subsystems must be carried out in order to serve the full chain 
profitability.
Product variants and mass customisation can be handled with modu-
larity and product platforms in such a way that they do not increase 
the complexity of the supply chain. Modularity, when properly man-
aged, enables the postponement of the OPP.
The manufacturing companies in Finland cannot focus on products 
that involve low cost manufacturing, as could be done in low-cost 
countries. Instead, the production in a high-cost country like Finland 
or other Nordic countries should focus on products that bring custom-
ers the most value (Eloranta et al., 2010).
Tentatively, in the case of large system products, production can also 
focus on system components that bring the most value to the custom-
er. Thus, the separation of large system product manufacturing into 
separate module or subsystem manufacturing could ultimately lead to 
a process where the mass-produced standard subsystems are manu-
factured in the lower-cost countries, and are combined at some part 
of the supply network through simple and small incorporating tasks 
with the independent, high added value modules which involve com-
plex manufacturing processes or the need of proximity to the custom-
ers or engineering.
Nordic companies can utilise the concepts of first product, best prod-
uct and agile production (Eloranta et al. 2010) with large system prod-
ucts by decentralising the production of high value adding subsys-
tems and low-cost, mass-produced subsystems. Modularity enables 
postponement of the OPP, which in turn enables the efficiency of the 
supply chain, incorporating components made in low-cost countries 
with those made in Nordic countries. By manufacturing low-cost com-
ponents, the company can utilise the mass production mode as well.
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Managing Sustainability: 
Capabilities For Sustainable 
Operations
 
 
Johanna K. Jaskari, Aalto University, Finland
ABSTRACT
This paper explores how two emerging sustainability issues – carbon 
neutrality and low-energy use for operations networks – may transform 
industrial firms’ processes in different industrial contexts. Based on in-
terviews with individuals from global Finnish manufacturing firms, 
the following issues are analysed: the effects of carbon neutrality and 
low-energy use on operations, firms and industries; the relationships of 
changes, uncertainties, competition and value and costs to carbon neu-
tral and low-energy requirements; and the planning and control of car-
bon neutral and low-energy-use operations networks. These issues are 
analysed in terms of dynamic and ordinary capabilities; scope and pace 
of change; effects and contents of processes; uncertainties and compe-
tition; and causal logic of firms’ actions in different industries. These 
results provide insights into how managers can create and maintain 
sustainable carbon neutral and low-energy-use operations in future in-
dustrial contexts. 
Keywords: Sustainability, sustainable operations, dynamic and ordi-
nary capabilities, case studies
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INTRODUCTION
Today, knowledge of operations management is well known and wide-
ly diffused (Teece, 2007). Firms may make a living by their global op-
erations (Helfat et al., 2007; Winter, 2003), but few firms earn superior 
rents from their operations (Teece, 2007). Sustainability issues, in turn, 
might be considered to provide ‘something new’ for global operations. 
Yet, how are global operations and sustainability related? This chapter 
examines how carbon neutrality and low energy use influence firms’ 
operations. A firm’s manufacturing processes are ordinary and dynam-
ic capabilities that adapt or change industrial contexts in order for the 
firm to achieve competitive advantages (e.g. Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; 
Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Teece, 2007). Potential regulations, especially on 
carbon neutrality and low energy use, may change industry structures 
and manufacturing processes. However, new forms of global opera-
tions or manufacturing processes are a result of what managers think 
about how their firms should act in their industrial contexts.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a perspective on how two 
emerging sustainability issues – carbon neutrality and low energy use 
for operations networks – may transform industrial firms’ processes 
in different industrial contexts. Specifically, this study explores how 
ordinary and dynamic capabilities are needed to change manufactur-
ing processes; how the scope and pace of industrial contexts are affect-
ed; how the effects and contents of processes are value driven or cost 
driven; how uncertainties and competition affect future networks; and 
how the causal logic of managerial cognition affects their firms’ action 
in different industries. As a result, this chapter provides insights into 
how managers can create and maintain sustainable manufacturing 
processes in future industrial contexts.
The context in this study is Finnish manufacturing firms’ global op-
erations. The study is based on surveys and interviews administered 
in the fall of 2010. The participating firms in this study are Efore Oyj, 
Fiskars Oyj, Halton Oy, Helkama Bica Oy, Kone Oyj, Marimekko Oyj, 
Note Hyvinkää Oy, Teleste Oyj and Vaisala Oyj.
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MANAGING SUSTAINABILITY: CAPABILITIES FOR SUSTAIN-
ABLE OPERATIONS
A firm’s strategy, including its manufacturing processes, is a conse-
quence industry’s influence on how managers make sense of and act 
within their environments (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Yet, external eco-
nomic characteristics of industries do exist independently of manag-
ers’ beliefs about them (Johnson & Hoopes, 2003). Given that a firm’s 
operations network is required to be carbon neutral and highly energy 
efficient, how should firms’ processes be transformed in different in-
dustrial contexts?
Operations networks are networks whose members are strategically, 
operationally and technologically integrated (Hult, Ketchen, & Nich-
ols, 2002). In operations networks, separate, but interdependent firms 
transform raw materials into finished products (e.g. Hult et al., 2002; 
Hult, Ketchen, & Slater, 2004). Although firms’ operations have im-
proved significantly in the last decades, operations management is to-
day well known and widely diffused. Many manufacturing processes 
can be implemented relatively easily within any firm and many manu-
facturing processes can be outsourced (Teece, 2007).
A dynamic capability is a firm’s ability to integrate, build and recon-
figure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing 
environments (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Thus, dynamic capabili-
ties aim at effecting change by helping the firm to adapt or change 
its environment (e.g. Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007; Teece et 
al., 1997; Zott, 2003). A firm develops dynamic capabilities to create, ex-
tend or modify its ordinary capabilities (Teece, 2007). A firm’s ordinary 
capabilities (such as routine manufacturing processes) are repetitious, 
patterned and learned actions performed to achieve specific objectives 
(Winter, 2003). Dynamic capabilities concern the firm’s evolutionary 
fitness (Teece, 2007), that is, how well the firm’s ordinary capabilities 
enable the firm to make a living (Helfat et al., 2007). Ordinary capabil-
ities are defined by technical fitness in terms of how well functions 
are performed. A firm’s ordinary capabilities permit the firm to make a 
living in the short term (Helfat et al. 2007; Winter, 2003). If a firm lacks 
dynamic capabilities, it cannot earn rents in the long term. However, 
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there is a balance between the costs of a capability and its actual use 
(Teece, 2007).
Dynamic capabilities are firm specific. Specifically, a firm’s dynamic ca-
pabilities reside with its management, as dynamic capabilities require 
knowledge both of the firm and the firm’s competitive context (Teece, 
2007). Hence, dynamic capabilities cannot be outsourced. Further, it 
matters when firms change. Intra-industry firm-performance differ-
ences arise between firms due to both the costs and timing of dynamic 
capabilities (Zott, 2003). Specifically, future rent appropriation is often 
shaped when new capabilities are developed, well before any value is 
actually created (Coff, 2010). In a dynamic context, ordinary capabilities 
negatively affect rent creation and dynamic capabilities positively af-
fect rent creation (Drnevich & Kriauciunas, 2010).
Change is characterised by (continuous or episodic) pace and by (con-
vergent or radical) scope. First, when pace is continuous and scope is 
convergent, change is emergent and local. The firm encounters minor 
instabilities, improves or learns and makes small adaptations that 
occur within existing frames. External positive feedback encourages 
deviations and adaptations. Second, when pace is episodic and scope 
is convergent, change is intended and local. Change is driven by mi-
nor inertia within existing frames. Negative feedback from the system 
highlights the need for minor local replacements. Third, when pace is 
continuous and scope is radical, change is emergent and system wide. 
The firm and its environment encounter a major instability and make 
frame-bending adaptations. Positive and negative feedback pulls the 
system into two directions, that is, towards instability. Fourth, when 
pace is episodic and scope is radical, change is intended and system 
wide. Change is driven by major inertia. Negative feedback highlights 
the need for major radical, system-wide and frame-bending replace-
ments (e.g. Plowman et al., 2007).
The process effects of change (e.g. costs associated with reconfiguring 
resources within operations, learning new routines and building new 
relations with exchange partners) are expected to be negative. The con-
tent effect of change (e.g. the impact of adjusting to fit environmental 
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demands) may be positive or negative depending on the luck and skill 
of the firms’ managers (Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001). Given the con-
tents and process of change, the creation of new ordinary and dynamic 
manufacturing capabilities may lead to failure or success.
Industry structures define the degree to which firms’ environments 
are predictable or uncertain. In high-velocity industries, rapid and 
unpredictable changes in product and process technologies and com-
petitors’ actions make it difficult for managers to develop clear un-
derstandings of their environments. In contrast, the stability of low 
velocity industries allows managers to gradually build and improve 
their understanding of the environment (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; 
Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). In high-velocity industries, firms respond more 
quickly to changes concerning competitors, suppliers and customers, 
which directly affect the firm in their task sectors; in contrast, firms in 
low-velocity industries respond more quickly to social, demographic, 
economic and political events in their general sector (Nadkarni & Barr, 
2008). Hence, the natures of distinct industries pose different cognitive 
challenges for managers.
The creation of new operations strategies for the future requires a 
firm’s management to develop (operations) strategies in response to an 
external environment or to proactively construct their environments 
(Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Wiltbank, Dew, Read, & Sarasvathy, 2006). If an 
external environment is predictable, managers can plan for the future. 
If the external environment is unpredictable, managers can shorten 
their planning horizons and invest in flexible strategies that respond 
to environmental changes. In a controllable constructed environment, 
managers can assume that the environment is predictable and shape 
the environment to achieve desired outcomes. For nonpredictive con-
trol in a constructed environment, managers can transform the envi-
ronment by constructing with others largely yet non-existent environ-
ments (Wiltbank et al., 2006).
Recognising opportunities (such as the creation of new manufacturing 
processes) involves both the objective reality and subjective interpre-
tations of one’s context (Grégoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010). Managers’ 
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subjective cognitive interpretations of their contexts, rather than the 
objective nature of the contexts themselves, determine which external 
events, as well as which causal logics between the external environ-
ment and the firm, are noticed and responded to. Managers focus their 
attention on those issues that they deem to be most relevant, while 
selectively ignoring others (Daft & Weick, 1984; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).
Structural alignment explains how people make sense of new infor-
mation. Structural relationships are either one-to-one functional re-
lationships between superficial features or relationships-between-re-
lationships (such as causal chains, goal statements, and conditional 
rules). Whereas superficial features align initial reasoning about new 
information, structural relationships affect the recognition of opportu-
nities. For example, opportunities might be overvalued because strong 
perceived superficial similarities may not prove to be important or less 
obvious opportunities might be undervalued because strong relation-
ships are not perceived. In contrast, persons with advanced knowledge 
recognise opportunities with strong structural relationships in the ab-
sence of superficial similarities (Grégoire et al., 2010).
Regulations affect firms’ strategies by creating new competitive con-
texts (Delmas, Russo, & Montes-Sancho, 2007). For example, attending 
to environmental aspects does improve firms’ processes and reduce 
firms’ risks (e.g. Sharfman & Fernando, 2008). However, regulatory re-
gimes vary greatly, and a general theory of the consequences of regu-
lations cannot be developed. Regulatory changes can trigger novel se-
lection pressures that alter rewards and sanctions for firms’ actions. In 
terms of regulatory contents, firms must identify how the regulations 
affect the firms’ processes and make appropriate actions in regard to 
new competitive contexts. The actions must also be properly timed 
and sequenced (Haveman et al., 2001). However, this implies that firms 
can develop and maintain new context-specific rent-creating capabili-
ties in their industries.
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CARBON NEUTRALITY AND LOW ENERGY USE IN OPERA-
TIONS NETWORKS
In this section, the issues of how carbon neutrality and low energy us-
age might transform operation networks are analysed. In the first part 
of this section, I will analyse how carbon neutrality and low energy 
use affect operations, firms and industries; how changes, uncertainties 
and competition are related to carbon neutral and low-energy require-
ments; how carbon neutral and low-energy-use operations networks 
are planned and controlled and whether changes caused by require-
ments related to carbon neutrality and low energy use are value driven 
and cost driven. In discussing each issue, I first present replies from 
the interviews on carbon neutrality and low energy usage.
In the second part of this section, I analyse the interviewees’ responses 
in terms of capabilities, scope and pace of change, effects and contents 
of processes, uncertainties and competition and the causal logic of 
firms’ actions in different industries. These issues will affect the trans-
formation of future operations networks.
Issues
Carbon neutrality and low-energy-use effects on operations. The re-
quirements concerning carbon neutrality affect the firms’ operations. 
During the interviews, questions arose on the origin of emissions and 
firms can produce goods without energy. The sources of energy need 
to be considered. Although it is impossible to reach carbon neutrality 
in terms of heating, electricity use, transports and the use of raw ma-
terials, emissions can still be reduced. Production processes and prod-
ucts need to be improved. However, for some firms, the investments are 
too large to be profitable because the price of products would become 
too high. An alternative to buying products would cause even higher 
carbon emissions due to transports. For some firms, the daily routines 
would be changed, whereas for other firms, the daily routines would 
not be greatly affected, but plant locations would have to be recon-
sidered. Some firms with few direct emissions are affected by indirect 
emissions due to product lifecycles and emissions from transports.
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The requirements for low energy use in operations affect the firms’ 
operations. The same conditions for low energy use and carbon neu-
trality overlap to a high degree. New technologies for products and 
production would need to be developed. Firms are bound to current, 
available production equipment. Huge investments would be needed 
for energy technologies that transform materials in production. Signif-
icant quality improvements would reduce energy use. Yet, many firms 
already implement energy-efficient practices. For firms and industries 
that use less energy, the changes would not be that great; the choice 
of electricity type for equipment and plant heating would mainly be 
affected. Yet, as one firm asked, how is low energy defined?
At the operations level, carbon neutrality and low energy use affect – 
although in varying degrees – the firms’ ordinary and dynamic capabil-
ities. Firms can make minor changes to reduce carbon emissions and 
to improve energy use, but major changes would need to be industry 
wide. Specifically, the firms agree that for radical changes, new tech-
nologies are needed. Although the firms in general agree on the issues, 
they also question the definitions of carbon neutrality and low energy 
use.
The effects of carbon neutrality and low energy use on firms. For some 
firms, the requirement of carbon neutrality has a large impact, as pro-
duction in compliance with the requirements would not be profitable. 
Plants would need to be relocated or several smaller carbon-neutral 
plants would need to be constructed. The use of electricity, heating and 
transports would need to be reconsidered. Known issues would have 
to be considered even sooner and implemented in practice, starting 
with measurements. For some firms, production processes would have 
to be renewed, but the investments would be too great to be profitable 
as the prices of products would become too high. Further, if products 
were bought and transported, the carbon emissions would be even 
higher, as the same production technologies would be used by others. 
For one firm, some conflicts of interests exist in the choice between 
manufacturing in low-cost countries and emissions generated through 
transports. One firm would need to find new competitive advantag-
es, as its industry in Europe would be affected, but its non-European 
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competitors would not be. Yet, one firm might be affected positively in 
comparison to its competitors due to its location.
The same conditions for the requirements of carbon neutrality and 
low energy use largely overlap. Such requirements would significant-
ly affect a firm’s operations. For some firms, huge investments would 
be needed for new technologies or significant quality improvements 
to reduce energy usage. Today, many firms are improving their energy 
efficiency. However, for one firm, the change would have to be radical 
enough to have a global effect.
At the firm level, carbon neutrality and low energy use mainly affect 
profitability. New dynamic capabilities and new system wide changes 
are called for. Yet, firms can specify what future actions – such as new 
production technologies – would have large positive impacts on their 
operations.
The effects of carbon neutrality and low energy use on industries. Re-
garding the requirement of carbon neutrality for operations, many 
firms reported that all firms in their respective industries are in the 
same situation. Today, the same production technologies are used 
in the same industries and significant technological development of 
products and processes would be required. One firm would need to 
find new competitive advantages, as its industry in Europe would be 
affected, but its non-European competitors would not be. For one val-
ue-driven firm, the firm’s business model and different types of com-
petitors would be affected. If required by customers, one firm consid-
ered that all firms would need to be able to implement the necessary 
changes. In one firm, the issue has not been thought of.
Respecting the requirement of low energy use for operations, many of 
the firms reported that all firms in their respective industries would 
be affected in the same way. New technologies would need to be devel-
oped and some industries would become more near-localised. Those 
firms that could continue to be energy efficient would not be greatly 
affected.
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At the industry level, the firms seem to be in the same situation as the 
others in their respective industries. Again, production technologies 
can make frame-breaking, industry-wide changes. The responses dif-
fered more in terms of carbon neutrality, where new dynamic capabili-
ties are called for in terms of competition and business models. 
Changes related to carbon neutrality and low energy requirements. For 
most of the firms, the changes related to carbon neutral requirements 
would be radical in nature. Production would have to be stopped due 
to emissions from transports, zero-energy plants would need to be con-
structed and electricity would have to be changed from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy. Those firms whose own production was not great-
ly affected would be indirectly influenced by their suppliers’ supply 
and the prices of raw materials. Yet, for one firm, these developments 
were already occurring due to continuous improvements for energy 
efficiency. In general, the firms considered energy to be the source of 
carbon dioxide.
For most of the firms, the changes related to low energy requirements 
were less radical than those related to carbon neutrality. Today, the 
firms are committed to continuous improvements in energy efficiency. 
Moreover, for many firms, the same technologies are used by all firms 
in the industry. Many firms related the changes more to the industry 
level. Specifically, the changes must be radical if they are to have an ef-
fect. New product and production methods would radically affect both 
industries and firms, but significant investments would also be needed.
Changes related to carbon neutrality would affect both dynamic and 
ordinary capabilities. They would be both local and industry wide. The 
changes caused by low-energy requirements would more continuous 
and local; the more radical changes would be system wide. Curiously, 
the firms consider changes caused by low energy use to be less radical 
than changes caused by carbon neutrality, even though the firms per-
ceive energy to be as the source of carbon dioxide.
Uncertainties related to carbon neutrality and low-energy-use oper-
ations. In terms of the requirement of managing carbon-neutral op-
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erations networks, the main uncertainties related to operations were 
concerned with energy sources and transports. The firms recognised 
that carbon dioxide stems from energy, but the availability of energy 
and the real costs of carbon dioxide raised questions. The respond-
ents asked how the firms would get raw materials and energy to the 
zero level. Yet, one firm would become surprisingly energy neutral by 
changing energy sources. Another firm might not itself be affected, but 
its suppliers might be affected, which in turn might affect the availabil-
ity and prices of raw materials. For one firm, new production technolo-
gies would need to be developed.
One firm stated that the question was too difficult, as products would 
have to be thought of anew. In terms of the requirement of manag-
ing low-energy operations networks, the main uncertainties related 
to operations were concerned with the development of new technolo-
gies and transports. The growth of costs, specifically for raw materials 
and transports, required new solutions for new materials, efficiency 
and quality. Yet, for some firms whose energy costs are proportional-
ly low, the effect on operations would be small. One firm considered 
that improvements are possible to a certain point, but then something 
new would probably be required. For one firm, the management of a 
low-energy supply chain was considered to be even more challenging.
Uncertainties related to carbon neutrality and low energy use are di-
rectly affected by energy sources and transports and indirectly affect-
ed by production technologies. The changes are both local and system 
wide. The system-wide changes required new dynamic capabilities. 
Yet, some of the firms related the uncertainties to costs, that is, to pro-
cess rather than content changes. The firms’ future operations were 
rather related to the construction of new environments of predictable 
and unpredictable control than to changes that could be planned in 
given contexts.
Effects of carbon neutral and low energy on competition between net-
works. In relation to how carbon-neutral operations affect competi-
tion between networks; for many firms, the same situation applies to 
all firms in their respective industries. Yet, the causes differ between 
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the firms. For example, for one firm, if all firms were affected in the 
same way, there would be no changes to that specific firm; one firm 
would need to develop new business models; one firm’s industry would 
collapse; one firm’s competitors in India, China and the US would not 
be affected; the effect might be positive for one specific firm; the de-
pendency on suppliers would be uncertain; some firms near large mar-
kets would have advantages; competition would be affected through 
customer requirements; and investments would be needed to reduce 
carbon emissions.
In terms of how low-energy operations would affect competition be-
tween networks, for many of the firms, the same situation applied to 
all firms in their respective industries. For example, if changes related 
to energy use were value driven, some firms would need new ways to 
manage operations, but if changes related to energy use were cost driv-
en, there would not be extensive changes for the firms; if large compet-
itors were able to invest in new production technology development, 
others would follow; one firm’s competition would be affected, but 
this might provide the firm with a competitive advantage; the man-
agement of the supply chain and information from the supply chain 
(specifically about suppliers’ suppliers) would become even more chal-
lenging for one firm; one firm’s customers may make low energy usage 
a requirement; location would matter for some firms; and for one firm, 
low energy use had already been put in place to reduce energy costs.
Hence, although the firms agreed that the same situation applies in 
their respective industries, the causes differed in terms of the effect of 
carbon neutrality and low energy use on the firms. Yet, the contents of 
change might be positive. The changes discussed were mainly system 
wide, and new ordinary and dynamic capabilities were needed. 
Planning and control of carbon neutral and low-energy-use operations 
networks. For carbon-neutral networks, some firms would very like-
ly continue their operations as of today with minor changes, whereas 
others would have to find new ways to control their operations. Yet, 
both types of firms are location dependent on different energy types, 
and new solutions to transports would need to be developed. Inter-
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estingly, the firms considered that the same situation applies for their 
entire industries.
For low-energy operations networks, for some firms, it would be pos-
sible to continue production as of today, whereas for some firms, pro-
duction could not be continued as of today. Energy would have to be 
renewable and new production technologies would need to be found. 
For one firm, this also implied technological leadership. Some firms 
considered that the changes would affect entire industries and socie-
ties. The changes would have different impacts on different levels; for 
one firm (only), the heating of the plant would require reconsideration, 
whereas all of Finland would be affected if radical changes were put 
in place. For one firm, the requirement of a low-energy operations net-
work would provide it with a competitive advantage. 
In terms of planning and controlling, the pace of change is episodic in 
carbon-neutral operations. The energy used in production or in trans-
ports affects the scope of change for carbon neutrality. A low-energy 
operation network would have more impacts on the firms. The chang-
es would, or should, be system wide, although the firms might not be 
affected that greatly. In general, new ordinary and dynamic capabili-
ties would be needed. Due to the contents of change (that is, the use 
of energy), one currently low-energy firm would gain a competitive 
advantage.
Value-driven and cost-driven changes caused by requirements for car-
bon neutrality and low energy use. Changes caused by the requirement 
for carbon neutrality were mainly regarded as value driven. Over time, 
however, changes would become cost-driven. Some of the reasons for 
value-driven changes could be customer requirements, that energy 
would be used more efficiently in the industry and issues related to 
the firm’s image.
Changes caused by low-energy-use requirements were regarded as val-
ue driven and cost driven. Some of the firms consider the value-driv-
en changes to be changes that would need to affect whole societies 
or industries. Other value-driven reasons concerned customer re-
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quirements and the whole supply chain. Cost-driven reasons related 
to firm-specific changes or those changes that would be international 
in nature. Interestingly, for radically new production technologies, one 
firm considered significant investments in production technologies to 
be value driven, but another firm considered significantly reduced pro-
duction costs due to new production technologies to be cost driven.
For value-driven changes, the scope of change was radical, with sys-
tem-wide, frame-bending changes. Cost-driven changes were perceived 
to be more related to the firm level. Yet, the reasons for changes caused 
by requirements for carbon neutrality and low energy use differ. Fur-
ther, the reasons sometimes contradicted one another. The firms did 
not consider the implementation of the issues to be impossible.
Recommendations
In this second part of this section, I analyse the interviewees’ replies 
in terms of the capabilities, scope and pace of change, effects and con-
tents of processes, uncertainties and competition, and the causal logic 
of firms’ actions in different industries. These issues will affect future 
operations networks.
Dynamic capabilities are used in regard to carbon neutrality and low 
energy use at the operation, firm and industry level. At the operations 
level, the firms can make local, minor changes to reduce carbon emis-
sions and to improve energy use with their ordinary capabilities. At 
the firm level, new dynamic capabilities and new system wide chang-
es concerning carbon neutrality and low energy use would affect the 
firms’ profitability. At the industry level, the same situation applies in 
general to all firms in the respective industries, but new dynamic capa-
bilities could be used for competition and new business models. New 
radical technologies are needed to generate novel ordinary capabili-
ties at the operations level, to improve firm profitability and to make 
frame-breaking, industry-wide changes.
In general, even though the firms identified energy as the source of 
carbon dioxide, they considered changes caused by low energy usage 
to be less radical than changes caused by carbon neutrality. Changes 
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related to carbon neutrality affect both dynamic and ordinary capabil-
ities, and would be both local and industry wide. Changes related to 
low-energy use are more continuous and local; the more radical chang-
es should be industry wide. However, the firms had different explana-
tions for how carbon neutrality and low-energy use affect their firms 
at the industry level.
Most interestingly, uncertainties related to carbon neutrality and low 
energy use are affected by energy sources and production technolo-
gies. For these uncertainties, the firms’ future operations are rather 
related to the construction of new environments of predictable and 
unpredictable control than to changes that can be planned in given 
contexts. Both industry wide and local changes require new dynamic 
and ordinary capabilities, yet the firms did not consider the implemen-
tation of carbon neutrality and low-energy-use operations networks 
to be impossible.
The firms’ reasons for changes caused by requirements related to car-
bon neutrality and low energy use differed from and even contradicted 
one another. Although some of the firms relate the uncertainties to 
costs, that is, to process changes, the industry-wide contents of change 
might be positive for some other firms. Energy efficient operations are 
implemented today as ordinary capabilities, and are thus less radical. 
Carbon-neutral operations are considered to be more value driven, as 
industry-wide changes would need to take place first.
The pace and scope of change differs between firms and industries and 
between carbon neutrality and low energy use. In carbon neutral oper-
ations, the pace of change is episodic and the scope of change is radical 
due to the energy used in production or in transports. In low-energy 
operations, frame-breaking changes should be industry wide, as many 
firms have already implemented energy efficiency.
From the above considerations, it is clear that carbon-neutral opera-
tions are less familiar than low-energy-use ones. Thus, carbon-neutral 
operations are more uncertain. The understanding of uncertainty it-
self will probably be the differentiating factor for firm performance in 
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the future. Specifically, what are the causes that explain the firms’ per-
formance in carbon-neutral and low-energy-use operation networks? 
Firms need to understand what carbon-neutral and low-energy opera-
tions networks really are; what the new dynamic and ordinary capabil-
ities are; whether causes actually differ between operations networks 
and between industries; and how the causes explain competition. It is 
noteworthy that many of the firms did consider themselves to have the 
managerial capabilities to handle new, and in part unknown, dynamic 
and ordinary capabilities in new, radical, frame-breaking industries.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This explorative article studied only two aspects of sustainability: 
carbon neutrality and low energy use in operation networks. Future 
research may use different research methods to analyse how car-
bon-neutrality and low-energy requirements affect firms’ operations 
networks.
A limitation of this study is that it used a small sample of only nine 
firms. Yet, in practice, some of the firms have very advanced data on 
carbon measurements and energy usage. This study fulfils its cause 
as an explorative study by providing insights into further research on 
future sustainable operations networks.
CONCLUSION
This chapter explored how two emerging sustainability issues, carbon 
neutrality and low energy usage for operations networks, may trans-
form industrial firms’ processes in different industrial contexts. The 
main insight was that when uncertainties can be found, firms may 
create rent-creating opportunities with dynamic and ordinary capa-
bilities. The uncertainties are mainly due to what is really (the yet 
unknown) underlying logic between a firm’s actions and performance 
in carbon-neutral and low-energy-use operations networks. Further, 
the firms do have different opinions on whether some issues are val-
ue driven or cost driven. Surprisingly, the firms consider that carbon 
neutral operations are more radical and uncertain than low-energy 
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use operations, although energy is classified as the source of carbons. 
For firms to develop new capabilities, especially for low-energy-use 
operations, the changes would need to be industry wide (that is, rad-
ically new technologies would have to be developed). Carbon-neutral 
operations will probably initiate new episodes within the firms and in-
dustries, whereas low energy usage will be more continuous in nature 
(that is, until radically new technologies have been developed). Further, 
the definitions of carbon neutrality and low energy use for operations 
raise concerns, and yet the managers do not doubt their managerial 
abilities to handle (un)predictable, but controllable operations net-
works.
The results of this study provide insights into how and why manag-
ers can create and maintain sustainable carbon-neutral and low-ener-
gy-use operations in future industrial contexts. 
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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on servitisation, i.e. the refocusing of firms from 
running fabrication and assembly processes to developing integrated 
product solutions with a large service component. The phenomenon 
has been recognised in the literature (e.g. Baines, Lightfoot, Benedetti-
ni, & Kay, 2009; Neely, 2008; Schmenner, 2009), and is perceived by many 
traditional manufacturers as a strategy for survival. Based on multi-
ple cases of Danish companies, this paper discusses the main reasons 
and strategic implications of servitisation. Furthermore, it outlines the 
strategies for how traditional manufacturers can recoup the desired 
level of return from the developments associated with servitisation. 
Keywords: Servitisation, global operations networks, manufacturing 
firms, case studies
INTRODUCTION
Manufacturing companies from the traditional industrial ‘triad’ of 
North America, Western Europe and Japan are increasingly participat-
ing in highly elaborate cross-border and interorganisational arrange-
ments. In other words, they organise their operations in global opera-
tions networks replacing traditional vertically integrated value chain. 
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This shift represents one of the most identifiable trends in the manu-
facturing industry (Hayes, Pisano, Upton, & Wheelwright, 2005; Shi & 
Gregory, 2005). There is evidence to suggest that with this trend, pro-
duction activities are transferred to low-cost locations and manufac-
turing capabilities are gradually degrading in focal companies from de-
veloped economies (Kotabe, Mol, & Ketkar, 2008; Slepniov, Waehrens, & 
Jørgensen, 2010). As a result of this, these companies have been forced 
to search for new activities and ways to reassert themselves. 
To replace degrading production competencies, many manufacturing 
companies in developed economies choose to refocus their attention 
from running fabrication and assembly processes to developing inte-
grated product solutions with a large service component. The extent 
of the phenomenon varies; while some traditional manufacturers still 
cling to production, others redefine their business in such a way that 
the physical products simply become the vehicle for the revenues gen-
erating service provision. In academic literature, this trend of blur-
ring the boundaries between traditional manufacturing and service is 
broadly defined as servitisation (Baines, Lightfoot, Benedettini, & Kay, 
2009; Neely, 2008; Schmenner, 2009; Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988). 
The idea of combining products and services is not new. According to 
Davies, Brady and Hobday (2006), the introduction of ‘systems selling’ 
strategies can be traced back to the 1960s. What makes the current 
wave of servitisation rather unique is its magnitude and that in the 
current climate of intensifying global competition, it is perceived by 
many traditional manufacturers as a strategy for survival. For exam-
ple, Peter Loscher, CEO of Siemens, argues that ‘Europe’s future edge 
will depend on industrial companies pushing into services’ (Financial 
Times, 2010). Accepting this premise means that in today’s business en-
vironment, in addition to being producers, traditional manufacturers 
have to become innovators, supply chain managers and service provid-
ers, or in other words, they must become global servi-manufacturers. 
Although management literature is almost unanimous in recognising 
the importance of servitisation for product manufacturers (e.g. Baines 
et al., 2009; Neely, 2008; Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003), it offers little or no an-
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swers regarding the drivers and strategic implications of servitisation 
at the firm level. Therefore, this paper aims to explore these drivers 
and implications and derive propositions relating servitisation with 
the longer-term business sustainability of the firm. 
The paper is based on multiple cases of Danish manufacturing com-
panies. It may be argued that the reasons for servitisation, as well as 
its implications at the firm level, may depend on the respective com-
pany’s product, manufacturing strategy or industry, to mention just 
a few factors. Therefore, in order to find a more consolidated view of 
servitisation practices used by manufacturing companies in developed 
economies, for this study, we choose five cases representing four differ-
ent industries. The cases are investigated from the perspective of focal 
companies in Denmark. All five face a dilemma related to how to find a 
strategically viable balance between in-house production and in-house 
service activities.  
The paper has three parts. The following section introduces the the-
oretical background of the study. We then proceed with the methods 
and the case studies used in the paper. The third section presents the 
analysis and discussion, before we conclude with major findings and 
limitations of the study.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In defining servitisation, we adopt the definition by Baines et al. (2009), 
who describe it as ‘the innovation of an organisation’s capabilities and 
processes to shift from selling products to selling integrated products 
and services that deliver value in use’. This definition shares basic prin-
ciples with the work on product-service systems (PSS) (e.g. Pawar, Belt-
agui, & Riedel, 2009) and is broadly in agreement with how the term 
was first used by Vandermerwe and Rada (1988). 
Drawing on a broad array of examples, Pawar et al. (2009) find that 
actual manufacturing operations now account for a smaller share of 
profits in many traditional manufacturing firms. The provision of ser-
vices is increasingly taking over fabrication processes. In discussing 
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the origins and rationale for servitisation, the literature commonly 
puts forward three sets of factors: financial/economic (services pro-
vide new stable source of revenues), competitive advantage (services 
are more difficult to imitate, thus providing a strategic source of com-
petitive advantage), and marketing/demand (customers are demand-
ing more services) (e.g. Baines et al., 2009; Gebauer & Friedli, 2005; Oliva 
& Kallenberg, 2003; Schmenner, 2009). 
The phenomenon of servitisation has recently received a new impetus. 
Currently, many manufacturing companies from developed economies 
are actively pursuing the transition from offering products to offering 
combined product-service offerings, and this is not necessarily driven 
by only one of the factors mentioned above. Rather, they are active-
ly pursuing the transition from products to services in the attempt to 
develop new higher-value activities that would substitute their man-
ufacturing operations, which are increasingly being offshored or out-
sourced. To the best of our knowledge, this ‘supply’ driven servitisation 
is largely overlooked in the existing literature, and thus constitutes the 
focus point of the current paper.  
In the face of increased competition, manufacturers from developed 
economies are turning their attention to high value added activities 
(Davis, 2004; Mudambi, 2008). Discussing the global disaggregation 
of the value chain, Mudambi (2008) positions three functional areas, 
specifically research and development (R&D; input), manufacturing 
(processing) and marketing (output), along the curved value chain, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The curved shape of the chain is determined 
by differences in the value-added potential of various functional are-
as. According to Mudambi (2008), processing is the least value added, 
while the input and output ends of the chain are intensive in their ap-
plication of knowledge and creativity, and thus offer a higher potential 
for added value. Increasing fragmentation in the value chain allows 
the focal company to amplify its focus on activities associated with the 
highest value added, while outsourcing or offshoring the processing 
part.  
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In the context of global manufacturing, a very broad spectrum of dy-
namic and quite distinct offshoring and outsourcing strategies can be 
divided into two broad categories: 1) captive offshoring and 2) offshore 
outsourcing (e.g., Aron & Singh, 2005; Hayes et al., 2005; McIvor, 2005; 
Mudambi, 2008). The category of captive offshoring refers to the pro-
cess of relocating a company’s activities overseas without giving up 
ownership and direct control. In other words, captive offshoring oc-
curs on an in-house or ‘intrafirm’ basis. Offshore outsourcing, on the 
other hand, can be viewed as a complete or partial discontinuation of 
in-house domestic or in-house international activities, and thus refers 
to externally supplied or ‘outsourced’ activities. However, regardless of 
which of the two basic offshoring strategies is chosen, the implications 
for the focal lead firm are likely to be similar and include focal compa-
nies moving downstream in the supply chain (Slepniov et al., 2010). The 
implications of this transition are illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 1. Globalisation and disaggregation of the value chain
Figure 2. Transition from traditional manufacturer to servi-manu-
facturer
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This transition should not be seen as a straightforward, linear pro-
cess. Davis (2004) argues that it is important not to confuse this move 
downstream with simply moving into services. Rather, the transition 
involves the development and provision of innovative combinations 
of products and services based on combined manufacturing, sourcing 
and service capabilities that allow global servi-manufacturers to occu-
py a new base centred on ‘systems integration’. As Figure 2 illustrates, 
the transition from traditional manufacturer to servi-manufacturer 
leads to changing relationships and the emergence of new actors. Due 
to the use of internal and external sources of supply by servi-manufac-
turer, transactions which previously involved two parties, i.e. the cus-
tomer and manufacturer, now also involve sourcing partners. Accord-
ing to Baines et al. (2009), one of key features of servitisation is strong 
customer centricity; therefore, the role and involvement of customers 
also changing and the links with them intensify.
The transition process presented in Figure 2 is an abstraction based 
on the literature study and observations from practice. However, it is 
important to stress that it by no means represents the full complexity 
and practical challenges of managing servitisation. The existing liter-
ature on the subject comes short in developing a more refined under-
standing of position servi-manufacturers find themselves in and what 
enables them to remain competitive in their new role.
Another important aspect of servitisation is its degree. The literature 
measures it along the so-called ‘product-service continuum’ (Oliva & 
Kallenberg, 2003). The continuum is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The product-service continuum
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Baines et al. (2009) envision the continuum to be a dynamic area, ‘with 
companies redefining their position over time and moving towards in-
creasing service dominance’. However, the questions of how far com-
panies should go and why remain unanswered. 
Drawing on multiple cases of international Danish companies, in the 
rest of the paper we address the questions outlined in the previous 
sections. 
METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDIES 
The empirical part of the study is based on five case studies of Dan-
ish industrial companies from four industries, including maritime, tel-
ecommunications, textile and furniture. They are currently engaged 
in a number of initiatives which stretch their operations on a global 
scale. To remain competitive, the companies are also forced to recon-
sider their product offerings, which are increasingly based on the inte-
gration of products and services. 
The multiple-case study strategy, one of several strategies of quali-
tative enquiry, has been chosen for this investigation for several rea-
sons. First, case studies can describe, enlighten and explain real-life 
phenomena which are too complex for other approaches requiring 
tightly structured designs or prespecified datasets (Voss, 2009; Yin, 
2009). Second, the case study strategy is well equipped instrumentally 
for furthering understanding of particular issues or concepts which 
have not been deeply investigated so far (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin, 2009). 
Third, the choice of the case study strategy is based on the fit between 
case research and operations management (OM) (Voss, 2009), which is 
acknowledged but underexplored in the literature. Last but not least, 
multiple cases have been used in order to avoid vulnerability of sin-
gle-case designs to misjudging the representativeness of a single event. 
In addition to enhancing external validity, the analytical benefits of 
having multiple cases are significant (Voss, 2009).       
Despite exhibiting many advantages, case study research also has sev-
eral pitfalls and poses significant challenges (e.g. Meredith, 1998). First, 
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there is the problem of the observer’s perceptual and cognitive limita-
tion. Second, a high probability of overlooking some key events also 
constitutes a threat to the quality of case studies research. Third, case 
studies are exposed to the challenge of generalisability. Fourth, the ac-
curacy of some inferences can be undermined by the reliance on intu-
ition and subjective interpretation of an investigator. 
To address these challenges and formulate a research design of high 
validity and reliability, we followed practical guidelines and steps 
discussed in qualitative methodology literature (e.g. Voss, 2009; Yin, 
2009). The current research relied on extensive use of triangulation 
and research protocol. Multiple sources of evidence (semistructured 
interviews, documents and on-site observations), as well as the trian-
gulation of multiple data points within each source of evidence (e.g. 
multiple respondents at the top and middle management levels), were 
used. These data, combined with secondary material (annual reports, 
media material, presentation material to customers and stakeholders), 
were used to build the cases database presented below in Table 1. All 
the cases were followed intensely by the authors in December 2009–
May 2010. Some events relevant to the study also were captured in ret-
rospect. 
The number of cases deemed sufficient for the study was decided 
through a discretionary judgmental process. According to Yin (2009), 
because sampling logic is irrelevant to the multiple-case study design, 
the typical criteria regarding sample size do not apply either. Instead, 
this matter was approached as a reflection of the number of case rep-
lications that would satisfy the desired level of theoretical saturation 
of the study. Achieving a higher degree of certainty about the propo-
sitions of the study also played a role in deciding the number of cases. 
The cases overview is provided in Table 1.
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
There are several servitisation-related drivers we can distil from the 
cases presented above. First of all, as the price competition increased, 
companies faced the challenge of how to reorient the domestic in-
house resource and competencies base to higher value adding activ-
ities. Some reorientation happened as a result of offshoring and off-
shore outsourcing of manufacturing operations activities. Resources 
that could be utilised for high-value activities were freed up. Referring 
to the smiley of the value chain introduced in Figure 1, these higher-val-
Table 1. Overview of case companies used in the study
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ue activities are likely to be found in the input and output parts of the 
chain, where the service element of the business is also more likely to 
occur. Therefore, the manufacturing offshoring and outsourcing trend 
encapsulates one important servitisation driver we observed in all the 
cases. Its origins are illustrated in Figure 4, where the thickness of the 
line and dark areas represent focus areas of focal organisations in the 
cases and how they change over time.
 
Although there is also some evidence to suggest that the offshoring 
and outsourcing trend affected higher value added activities, the pro-
pensity to offshore these activities remained lower than the propensi-
ty to offshore manufacturing activities. 
One significant challenge faced by the case companies was related 
to the manufacturing operations, which remained at the home base. 
These activities left in-house domestically were commonly related to 
the core business processes; nevertheless, over time, they were increas-
ingly marginalised, and therefore received less management attention, 
fewer investments and less development effort. This marginalisation 
was partly driven by the loss of operations-based significance within 
the internal manufacturing network, and partly by the loss of signifi-
cance vis-à-vis emerging strategic agendas within the company. In this 
situation, the companies found themselves in a position where they 
became more oriented towards context knowledge (facilitating pro-
cesses, identifying and managing sourcing partners) and less oriented 
towards production content knowledge (knowledge about what actu-
Figure 4. Offshoring and offshore outsourcing trend in the cases
d
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ally goes on in production). This was particularly prominent in organ-
isations where the fitness of the operations function had traditionally 
been placed in the hands of corporate functions (e.g. the Satellite case) 
or where top management represents a nontechnical perspective on 
the business (e.g. the Chairs case), both of which had little regard for 
the strategic impact of manufacturing operations. 
The cross-case analysis also showed that servi-manufacturers can 
have very different approaches to developing and managing service 
component of their business. All case companies found themselves on 
a journey from the pure manufacturing–oriented company to a com-
pany: 1) with services to support the product (service as a cost centre); 
2) with services to extend the product (service as a strategic focus area); 
and 3) with full-service operations where service outweighed the prod-
uct and the product role was reduced to its order qualifying properties 
(Figure 5).
Although the case companies can be positioned at different points 
along this continuum, there is strong support to suggest that all of 
the cases have gravitated towards the service orientation. This finding 
supports Olivia and Kallenberg (2003) findings that moving along the 
product–process continuum is a dynamic process, ‘with companies 
redefining their position over time and moving towards increasing 
service dominance’. Our study also shows that the companies which 
retained a strong manufacturing base in-house or sought competitive 
advantages through operations, and thus maintain strong operations 
capabilities, generally found it more difficult to integrate products 
and services beyond seeing services as an extension to the product. 
Figure 5. Servi-manufacturers’ profile continuum
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The roles of management profile and mind set were also found to be 
strong factors determining the position of the company, as well as its 
developmental trajectory. Management resources are scarce in most 
organisations, and the engagement with a running operations system 
consumes attention and focuses it on the efficiency of the existing ap-
paratus. On this basis, we find strong support for the argument that 
the effective management of servi-manufacturers demands attention 
to the interlinked issues of mind set and organisational identity (Pratt 
& Foreman, 2000; van Rekom et al., 2008; Voss et al., 2006). The pro-
files of global servi-manufacturing cases seemed to include multiple 
organisational identities, which were associated with both the mind 
set of a traditional manufacturer as well as the mind set of a service 
organisation. However, while the service mind set was continuously 
strengthened at the home base, the manufacturing mind set – along 
with manufacturing capabilities – was pushed offshore, generating a 
number of conceptual and operational conflicts between these differ-
ent foci. 
For companies which had retracted themselves from upholding a 
strong manufacturing capability in-house (e.g. the Proftex and En-
gines cases), the service provision and ‘systems selling’ strategy became 
a natural choice. In other words, for them, servitisation emerged as the 
new strategic agenda, and with this, management attention naturally 
drifted towards seeing the product as one of many components in the 
total offering. Providing additional services to accompany the sale of 
products was increasingly central to the strategies of the companies, 
and this was reflected in a growth in importance of services and a gen-
eral trend away from a ‘pure product’ orientation towards an integrat-
ed offering. 
According to Schmenner (2009), the bundling of manufactured goods 
to downstream-available services is led by companies with relatively 
new products but with no great manufacturing capabilities. Servitisa-
tion provides them with an opportunity to develop unique offerings 
without committing to an extensive in-house operations base; on the 
other hand, companies with significant manufacturing capabilities 
are quite slow and defensive, and struggle to achieve a complete in-
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tegration of manufacturing and service. Our study shows that this 
compensation strategy is also at work within companies with a strong 
manufacturing base, which have relocated manufacturing activities to 
offshore destinations due to competitive pressures. This happens as 
managerial resources and attention are freed-up and can be reasserted 
in relation to new activities. Here it is obvious that companies turn to 
marketing the capability that their products bring. Thus, for example, 
the engine manufacturer markets a stable and reliable supply of power 
to denote its ability to sell propulsion capability rather than an engine 
itself. However, this transformation requires a capability set which is 
not that distant from the historical manufacturing capabilities. Slack, 
Lewis and Bates (2004) argue that ‘the ability to do this requires the 
co-ordination of manufacturing systems, maintenance systems, spare 
parts supply systems, logistics systems, and so on. These individual op-
erations processes need to be integrated in the same way as the physi-
cal systems that make up its products have been integrated. Again, the 
underlying technical knowledge on which products themselves have 
been developed over the years has become significantly relevant in the 
development of the operations processes that enable them to be de-
livered into the market. But, this depends on the application of these 
ideas into a practical business context’. Now the companies were left 
with the challenge of sourcing these capabilities and knowledge from 
a network of globally dispersed activities, some of which remained in-
house while others were externalised. This adds another relational lay-
er to traditional supply chain thinking which has evolved around the 
flow of goods and services.
In spite of clear strategic intents supporting this transition, the ap-
proach tends to be incremental, and to a large extent building, compa-
nies are the operational bridge as they walk on it. While a whole series 
of incremental decisions, may make economic sense taken individual-
ly, they may collectively represent the surrender of the company’s ca-
pability to compete in new markets, as they largely compete based on 
historical operations-based capabilities. This can, for example, be ob-
served in the case companies through their capability to contract and 
manage relationships with suppliers to meet order qualifying stand-
ards, but also in their capability to meet specific order winning market 
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demands. In spite of the emerging service orientations, it remains true 
that all case companies relied on the companies’ capability to supply 
world-class product solutions as a condition for the service provision 
itself, as well as a source of strategic legitimacy in the market.
The position of the company on the continuum in Figure 4 can also be 
linked with the nature of services being offered. In cases where servic-
es just support the product, we could see trends to offer products ac-
companied with a one-off service (e.g. design and configuring products 
to customer demands), while in the cases seeing services as a strategic 
focus area or having a strong service orientation service ‘through-life’ 
was offered (e.g. in some contracts in maritime boilers and engines). 
To illustrate, in the Boilers case, the company developed a strong ser-
vice orientation in the boiler segment. Being able to service their cus-
tomers in any major harbour around the world is an order winner for 
Boilers, which has been difficult to match by competitors: 
We have concentrated a lot of our resources on developing 
our after-sales business – we are very pleased with this to-
day, since we all know that the demand for new boilers will 
decrease and the demand for after-sale service will go up. We 
have a strong position on the after-sale business.
In the pursuit of growth, Boilers has increasingly focused its resources 
on the after-sale service division. This is not only due to the market 
conditions, where very few orders are received from shipping opera-
tors, but also to exert more direct control over the end customers. As a 
manager at Boilers noted: 
We base our delivery of new boilers on a good service pack-
age. We can do this on a large proportion of our deliveries, 
but there are parts of the service, e.g. exchange of a boiler 
tube, that are not unique enough for us to withhold a strong 
position. Or at least historically it has not been that way. We 
need to earn money on both things and look at them inde-
pendently. But of course we try to sell a service contract with 
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each of our deliveries, and with that a spare-part package 
and things like that.
For Sattelite services was also a predominant factor on the demand 
side of the company’s business: 
If the sufficient service is not provided, sales tumble. This 
element is build into the product and the way they are pro-
duced. The service department monitors and supports all 
service partners to ensure quality of services to customers. 
This example also demonstrates that in addition to the perspective on 
servitisation as ‘new manufacturing’, the cases also tended to use ser-
vices for differentiation purposes in competitive marketplaces and as 
a potential lead to additional demand for products. 
The Engines case operated primarily in two interrelated business are-
as: 1) sale of licenses and 2) services, including sales of repair parts and 
technical services. The firm has turned its focus from production of 
engines to servicing the customers:
Due to shifting conditions in the ship market, we are pro-
ducing fewer engines, and therefore expect that the service 
part will become more influential and that this business will 
count for 50% of total income.
One of the reasons for Engine’s high market share was its large service 
network. The competitors had difficulties in offering the ship owners 
the same global service agreement. The company had around 70 engi-
neers travelling the world and following up on new constructions, a 
capacity which competitors could not match. Furthermore, they pro-
vided the engineers in Denmark and the licensees with feedback on 
the issues at hand, thereby enabling optimisation of the product. This 
case illustrates the importance of new emerging relationships in the 
service-based environment, where in addition to the traditional manu-
facturer and customer, the system also included licensees.
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CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to provide empirical insights into the 
trend of servitisation and discuss the drivers and strategic implications 
of servitisation at the firm level. Based on multiple cases of Danish in-
ternational companies exposed to servitisation, the paper addressed 
issues related to the conceptual move from product-driven operations 
to service-driven operations, which has so far received limited atten-
tion in the OM literature. 
We specifically focused on ‘supply’-driven servitisation, the type of ser-
vitisation which is largely overlooked in the existing literature. This is 
concerned with traditional manufacturing companies from developed 
economies actively pursuing a transition from products to services in 
the attempt to develop new higher-value activities that would substi-
tute for their manufacturing operations, which are increasingly being 
offshored or outsourced. 
The paper provided conceptual and practical insights into how serviti-
sation is used by manufacturing firms and what the main drivers and 
impediments of this practice are. It also demonstrated how manage-
rial attention to servitisation can help to resolve some of the press-
ing challenges and dilemmas of contemporary manufacturing firms, 
namely, how a focus on integrated product-service solutions helps 
global servi-manufacturers to remain in tune with fabrication process-
es, even though these processes may be outside the boundaries of the 
company. The study also showed that the profile of a global servi-man-
ufacturing firm is associated with multiple organisational identities. 
These include both the mind set of a traditional manufacturer and the 
mind set of a service organisation. Such complexity and dynamism of 
the organisational identity of global servi-manufacturers have to be 
recognised and effectively managed if the potential synergies of this 
type of firms are to be realised. 
The study covered the broad contours of the role of servitisation, as 
well as its strategic implications. While the results are highly sugges-
tive, the significant limitations of the analysis should be noted. First, 
there are several methodological imperfections in this study. It is ex-
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posed to the usual limitations associated with the use of one method 
rather than a multi-method approach. The second obvious limitation 
of the study is in its geographic delineations. Because Denmark was 
chosen as the main empirical base of the investigation, not all results 
may be transferable to other countries. Although some generalisable 
parallels may exist, the best way to find out which findings are country 
specific is to replicate the study elsewhere. The same limitation applies 
to the industrial base of this study. Although the cases were drawn 
from several industries (i.e. maritime, textile, telecommunication, fur-
niture), future research should include studies from other industrial 
sectors.
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Designing an Operations Network
Aki Laiho‚ Aalto University, Finland  
Marja Blomqvist‚ Aalto University, Finland
ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the challenge of operations network design in 
a global operating environment. The design process is often related to 
a substantial change in business, specifically strategy change, restruc-
turing or expansion. Proper identification of the factors that need to 
be taken into account is critical for a successful process. The research 
is built around case research with five Finnish small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and a parallel literature review. We identify a set of 
factors through literature study and empirical case research, and intro-
duce a design framework with two categories of design factors: direct 
design factors and mediating design factors.
INTRODUCTION
Globalising companies cannot avoid facing a situation where the op-
erations network (manufacturing, distribution, sourcing) needs to be 
restructured or expanded in order to fit with new, global business en-
vironment and a related strategy. The need to (re)design an operations 
network is often related to substantial changes in business or in the 
operating environment. Typical examples of such changes are the fol-
lowing:
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 · A change in company strategy, organisation or leadership which 
sets a company in a new direction;
 · Rapid expansion of business, entry into new businesses or new 
market areas;
 · Need for rationalisation, e.g. after a merger or an acquisition;
 · Change in the business environment causing external pressure 
for a company, for example, the emergence of new competitors 
or a recession.
Design questions are typically discussed within the domain of man-
ufacturing strategy (e.g. Voss, 2005), international manufacturing net-
works (Ferdows, 1997) or as a question of supply chain design (Childer-
house & Towill, 2000). The design process includes several long-term 
strategic decisions, e.g. location decisions, make or buy analysis and 
decisions, plant focus and plant role decisions and technology, as well 
as planning and control system definitions. 
In general, the network design process targets a good fit between the 
business requirements and the capabilities of the operations. In order 
to achieve the fit, it is mandatory to identify and articulate the busi-
ness requirements, i.e. input factors for the network design, in an ex-
plicit and consistent way. However, companies struggle with finding 
a structured approach for the design of their operations networks. 
The critical question is what factors to include in the decision process. 
Identification of the factors and capturing of consistent input data is 
thus a crucial early step in the design process. 
This chapter is built on recent case research with five Finnish small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which are all facing a need to re-
structure their operations networks. The design situations of the case 
companies can be categorised into three logical categories: 1) improve-
ment of competitiveness through improved utilisation of the global 
network and global resources; 2) improved competitiveness through 
more focused, differentiated resource combinations (improved fit); and 
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3) international expansion to reach new markets, customer groups or 
geographical areas.
In the results, we identify the main drivers to consider and mediating 
factors in the design process. Furthermore, we present a model for op-
erations network design. It assumes that operations network design 
is conducted as a stepwise conscious action, and consists of a set of 
design criteria as well as a set of moderating factors for the design. As 
a conclusion, we introduce a framework which can be used to capture 
the design drivers for operations networks. 
BACKGROUND: PERSPECTIVES ON OPERATIONS NET-
WORK DESIGN
In this section, we will look into three different domains: manufactur-
ing and operations strategy, plant roles in factory networks and supply 
chain management. We will discuss each domain in relation to key de-
cisions of the operations network and the main factors affecting the 
operations network design.
The significance of manufacturing and operations within the overall 
context of corporate strategy was recognised and brought to wide at-
tention by Skinner (1969, 1974; Riis et al., 2007). It was clearly recognised 
that within manufacturing, some key decisions and tradeoffs such as 
plant location and make-or-buy decisions impact the company’s overall 
success, and these should be aligned with the corporate strategy (Hill, 
1993; Skinner 1969, 1974). It was argued further that not only should the 
operations strategy support the corporate strategy, but competitive 
advantage could also be achieved through manufacturing (Hayes & 
Wheelwright, 1984). Voss (2005) discussed different paradigms within 
operations strategy, concluding that there are three such paradigms, 
which are complimentary: competing through manufacturing, strate-
gic choices in manufacturing and best practices in manufacturing. 
Several manufacturing decision areas with individual decisions that 
are strategic in nature were already recognised in the early work of 
Skinner (1969): plant and equipment (decisions like make or buy, plant 
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size, plant location); production planning and control (inventory size 
and control, quality control and use of standards); labour and staff-
ing (job specialisation, supervision and wage system); and product de-
sign/engineering (size of product line and design stability). Hill (1985) 
further grouped the decisions into process and infrastructure choic-
es and added aspects such as organisational structure and capacity 
timing. These decisions can yield indefinitely different combinations 
of factory setups. A more ‘overall’ decision thus becomes a decision 
about factory focus. The underlying idea presented by Skinner (1974) is 
that a factory which focuses on a narrow product mix for a particular 
market niche will outperform the conventional plant, which attempts 
a broader mission. Focused factories can thus be seen as a link be-
tween the manufacturing facilities and the competitive approach, en-
abling companies to gain greater control of their competitive position 
(Hill 1985). Skinner recognises five key characteristics of focused facto-
ries: process technologies, market demands, product volumes, quality 
levels and manufacturing tools. Moreover, Hill (1985) identifies three 
different focus possibilities: based on products/markets (marketing 
view), based on processes and based on different order winners. The 
focus of a factory may change during the lifecycle of a product, and 
the factories may also have lifecycles themselves (Hill, 1985; Schmen-
ner, 1983). 
In Skinner’s work (1969), the starting points for the strategic decisions 
in manufacturing were corporate strategy and competitive situation in 
the market, as well as the available skills, resources, etc. in the compa-
ny. Hill (1985) adds a strong emphasis on the customer by introducing 
the concepts of order qualifiers (aspects of the product or service that 
need to be at an acceptable level in order to qualify for purchase) and 
order winners (the aspects of the product that ‘win’ the purchase). Sev-
eral order qualifier or winner criteria, such as delivery time and quality, 
can be influenced by the operations. The customer view has also been 
discussed through the different methods of competing; for example, 
Treacy and Wiersema (1993) classified three value disciplines, i.e. ways 
to compete, which all require a different operational setup: customer 
intimacy, product leadership and operational excellence. 
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Manufacturing decisions are also driven by the relationship between 
a product and a process. The framework of Hayes and Wheelwright 
(1979) combined the volume and variance of the products produced 
into a matrix classifying different production process types. Although 
this model has been criticised to be more of a descriptive model than 
a strategy (Schmenner & Swink, 1998), it has been widely recognised to 
represent the process choice relevant to operations strategy. Schmen-
ner and Swink (1998) further enhance the matrix by adapting the axes 
to more generally incorporate demand variability (timing, quantities 
or customisation requirements) and speed of flow, which as variables 
would affect the choice of production process. 
PLANT ROLES IN FACTORY NETWORKS
The background for different factory roles in a network is the increas-
ing globalisation of production, which is driven by both new markets 
and new lucrative opportunities for production and sourcing (Ferdows 
1989, 1997; Riis et al. 2007). A starting point for the discussion of factory 
roles is Ferdows’ work (1989) on international factory networks and fac-
tory roles. Ferdows (1989) recognised three major reasons for setting up 
a factory at a specific location: proximity to the market, access to low 
cost production input factors and use of local technological resources. 
Combining the reasons for the existence of a factory with the activi-
ties and competences of a site, he suggested six different roles for in-
ternational factories. Later, Johansen and Riis (Johansen & Riis, 2005; 
Riis et al., 2007) contributed to the discussion by both identifying fur-
ther different roles of manufacturing units and also recognising dif-
ferent approaches to networking by a company. The communication 
aspect within the factory network has been emphasised by Vereecke 
et al. (2006), whose role typology is based on the knowledge transfer 
between factories and headquarters. 
The different sets of factory roles in the models can also be seen as 
descriptive models. However, implicit decisions are also involved, espe-
cially if the roles are a result of conscious actions rather than natural 
evolution. Ferdows (1997) emphasises the development of roles with a 
tendency of the roles with less significance to develop towards a lead 
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factory role. Riis et al. (2005, 2007) also discuss the structure of the net-
work as a set of different role combinations, yielding to the different 
roles the whole company with its operations network can take in the 
supply chain. Vereecke et al. (2006) note that in order to form a balanced 
network, different roles are needed, and that the feasible location of a 
plant is influenced by the role it plays: Plants with lower information 
exchange intensity are usually sustainable only in low-cost countries 
whereas the high-intensity roles typically are located in proximity of 
corporate headquarters.
ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY CHAIN TYPES
Supply chain management as a concept captures a broad range of ac-
tivities: planning and management of all activities involved in sourc-
ing and procurement, conversion, demand creation and fulfilment and 
all logistics activities. Discussion of the differences between different 
supply chains and their fit to the requirements was initiated by Fish-
er (1997), who identified the problem of how to build the right supply 
chain for a particular business situation. Often, changes in supply 
chains are substantial in terms of time and money spent. Supply chain 
design is defined as choosing what capabilities along the value chain 
to invest in and develop internally, and which to allocate for develop-
ment by suppliers, can be seen as an ultimate core competency of an 
organisation (Fine, 2000).
Fisher (1997) classified products according to the nature of their de-
mand into two different categories: primarily functional and primar-
ily innovative. Fisher further argued that the supply chain should be 
matched with the characteristics of the product: functional products 
require efficient supply chains, and innovative products responsive 
supply chains (Fisher, 1997). Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (1997) add-
ed supply uncertainty as a factor for differentiated supply chains. 
Childerhouse, Aitken and Towill (2002) discuss the concept of focused 
factories applied on a supply chain level and propose five criteria for 
differentiation: demand variability, responsiveness of the order cycle, 
product variety, product annual demand volume and length of lifecy-
cle. Christopher et al (2006) instead proposed that three dimensions 
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are sufficient for pipeline selection: products (standard or specific), de-
mand (stable or volatile) and replenishment lead times (short or long). 
Further attributes appearing in the literature are, for example, product 
lifecycle, its expected duration and the phase the product is currently 
in (Aitken et al., 2005; Christopher & Towill, 2000); technology included 
in the product (Lee, 2004); characteristics of demand information, i.e. 
visibility, predictability and variability (Aitken et al., 2005; De Treville, 
Shapiro, & Hameri, 2004; Lee, 2004); and the company’s own strategy on 
the customisation of its offering (Lampel & Minzberg, 1996).
The design decisions leading to different supply chain configurations 
relate to the structure and control practises of the chain: number of 
echelons in the supply chain and their location, management practices 
of the material flow (Christopher et al., 2006), location of order pene-
tration point and value offering point (Holmström, Hoover, Louhiluo-
to, & Vasara, 1999; Olhager, 2003), approach to flexibility, lead time and 
postponement (De Treville et al., 2004; Lee, 2004; Naylor et al., 1999) and 
supplier selection and relationship management (Gelderman & van 
Weele, 2005; Lee, 2004). Furthermore, many of the decisions already 
recognised in operations strategy such as make or buy and facility lo-
cation are also relevant to the intended supply chain type. 
Table 1 summarises the input factors for comprehensive operations 
network design that can be identified in the literature. The grouping 
of the factors emerged during the empirical study and has been devel-
oped iteratively based on the approaches used in the case companies. 
The concept of strategic fit has served for a long time in the strategic 
literature. Fit, however, has several definitions. Venkatraman (1989), for 
instance, identifies six distinct perspectives of fit as a function of spec-
ificity as well as whether the specification is criterion specific or crite-
rion free. Following the definitions, we consider fit to potentially take 
place between multiple antecedent and consequent variables (design 
factors, factors of competitiveness) and the overall setting being poten-
tially affected by significant intervening mechanisms.
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How to design an operations network: Lessons from five Finnish 
manufacturing companies
For Scandinavian companies, the ability to design global operations 
networks, including both own and outsourced operations, is in most 
cases a mandatory precondition for growth. The domestic markets 
are small; growth, access to larger customer bases and access to the 
resources and competencies of global supply market often require ex-
pansion of operations across different regions. We conducted an in-
depth analysis of five recent industrial cases where companies, facing 
Group Detail Source
Strategic
Corporate strategy: how company competes Skinner 1974, Treacy & 
Wiersema 1993
factors Decision about markets company decides to compete in Skinner 1974, Hill 1985
Expected growth Hill 1985
Competitive Competitors (number and location of the plants) Skinner 1969, 1974
situation Speed of change in the market Hill 1985
Differentiation of market requirements Skinner 1974, Hill 1985
Industry related factors (such as barriers to entry, rate of technological 
change, location of know-how etc). Hill 1985, Ferdows 1989
Product Product uniqueness / variability (standard or customized) Hayes & Wheelwright 1979
Way to create variance (postponement/modularity approach; level of 
standardization)
Naylor et al 1999, de Treville et 
al 2004
Duration of product life cycle Fisher 1997, Aitken et al 2005
Stage of product life cycle Jüttner et at 2006, Christopher et 
al 2000
Speed of NPI / new product ramp-up Fine 2000
Quality Skinner 1974, Hill 1985
Demand Demand volume Hayes & Wheelwright 1979
Demand variability Schmenner & Swink 1998
Demand timing Schmenner & Swink 1998
Need for flexibility in volumes Hill 1985
Predictability of demand De Treville et al 2004
Visibility to demand De Treville et al 2004
Markets Delivery speed Hill 1985
requirements Reliability of delivery Hill 1985
for delivery Flexibility (of volumes, lead t imes etc.) Christopher et al 2006
Quality Hayes & Wheelwright 1979
Location of the market Ferdows 1989, 1997
Other special logistics requirements Christopher et al 2006
Supply Location of suppliers Christopher et al 2006
Supply lead times Christopher et al 2006
Supply uncertainty Lee et al 1997
Current Current core competences Skinner 1974
capabilities of 
the company
Competence gap to capabilities required by strategy Skinner 1974, Treacy & 
Wiersema 1993
Current Number of plants Skinner 1969, 1974, Hill 1985
resources Number of echelons in the supply chain Christopher et al 2006
 (setup of the Locations Skinner 1969, 1974, Hill 1985
network / Roles of the plants in the network Ferdows 1989, Riis et al 2007
supply chain )
Combination of the roles in the network
Riis et al 2007, Vereecke 2006
Integration & communication between the plants Vereecke 2006
Financial Market price Hill 1985
aspects Manufacturing cost Ferdows 1989
Total supply chain cost (other than manufacturing) Christopher et al 2006
Expected margin Hill 1985
Investment requirements Hill 1985
Table 1: Literature review: Factors for design of an operations net-
work
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such situations, were designing their global operations networks. The 
companies (all pseudonyms) and industries included are CommTech 
Inc. (electronics), Design Inc. (branded consumer goods), Wired Inc. 
(components for the marine industry), Measure Inc. (electronics) and 
FreshAir Inc. (components for buildings). 
Common to all five case companies is the need to systematically design 
their global operations network. All the case companies are mid-sized, 
globally operating manufacturing companies with their own products. 
CommTech Inc. 
The overall motivation for CommTech Inc. to reconsider its operations 
network is improvement of global competitiveness. The company op-
erates at several locations, mainly in Europe and Asia, and during its 
50 years of history it has grown and expanded to a globally operating 
manufacturer and a technology leader within its own niche segment. 
The globalising business environment affects CommTech in two ways: 
Its main competitors are global, and are typically significantly larger. 
At CommTech, the design centres on a balance between maximising 
agility and customer service, which are considered strategic advan-
tages, and cost efficiency through the utilisation of global resources. 
Proximity and integration can be identified as central themes in de-
sign from the following perspectives: 
 · Proximity to customers to maintain agility and short lead 
times;
 · Proximity between research and development (R&D) and man-
ufacturing to speed up product tailoring and new product in-
troduction;
 · Proximity with supplier base (in China);
 · Integration of the overall supply chain to improve effectiveness 
and minimise end-to-end lead times.
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Design Inc.
The Design Inc. operations network design initiative is driven by the 
growth and internationalisation targets which the new ownership of 
the company has set. The company has operated on a rather domestic 
basis, with three own factories supported by rather extensive interna-
tional sourcing activity. The international growth prospects affect the 
company in several ways:  
 · The distribution network of the company is challenged with 
requirements from new markets and customer segments;
 · The new product segments generated need to review sourcing 
approaches and supplier network structure and management;
 · The rapidly increasing complexity of product and customer 
portfolios drive towards rationalisation and streamlining both 
internally as well in the operations network structure and man-
agement.
Wired Inc.
Wired Inc. faces a very typical question for an internationalising com-
pany: How can a new plant be properly accommodated into the oper-
ations network? Originally, the new plant was established to serve the 
marine industry in Asia. However, as a natural question, Wired Inc. is 
also reconsidering its overall network, looking for ways to utilise the 
new manufacturing capability for global purposes. The identified driv-
ers affecting the network design are as follows:
 · Location of both the customer and supplier base. The heavy 
products and raw materials make transportation cost and time 
a significant factor;
 · The competitive strategy includes high flexibility and high level 
of service – this emphasises the proximity to customers as a 
key criterion;
 · The share of labour cost is relatively low, but transportation 
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cost and equipment investments are important cost factors, 
leading directly to consideration between globally centralised 
and decentralised manufacturing capacity as a design driver.
Measure Inc.
With Measure Inc., the driver for reconsideration is very strategic. The 
way in which the company is structured business-wise has recently 
changed, and consequently, it has started to differentiate its operations 
network according to customer-oriented business segments. Structur-
ally, the company is moving from a monolithic operations network to 
multiple, segmented and differentiated subnetworks. Consequently, 
the main factors affecting the design are customer and demand ori-
ented, as follows:
 · Nature of the business, whether the product business, project 
or solution business form the main logic;
 · A broad range of customer values requirements, ranging from 
exact requirements like delivery lead time to added-value ser-
vices like VMI and overall characteristics of a relationship;
 · Volume, nature and predictability of demand, affecting the op-
portunities to utilise e.g. offshoring locations.
FreshAir Inc.
The business driver for FreshAir Inc. for an operations network design 
comes from the need to enter a new market area. Consequently, the 
main factors affecting the design are relatively close to the other cases, 
oriented around customer and market requirements and preferences. 
However, with FreshAir Inc., the importance of competences and risk 
management set the limits for possible solutions in a visible way, as 
follows:
 · Strategy and common customer requirements are the main 
factor affecting the design;
 · Demand characteristics are not too well known – this fact, to-
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gether with the emerging market and market-making activities, 
drives towards solutions where the demand must be considered 
as unpredictable and strongly fluctuating;
 · The limited in-house competences of global operations together 
with unknown competitiveness in the new market are guiding 
towards operations network structures where risk is limited, 
scalability can be achieved and external (supplier) competences 
can be utilised.
The case companies’ characteristics are summarised in Table 2 below. 
 
The design situations of the case companies can be divided into three 
broad categories. The first category, utilisation of global resources, is 
represented by CommTech Inc. and Wired Inc. The second category, 
improved competitiveness through more focused, differentiated re-
source combinations (improved fit) is best illustrated with Measure 
Inc., even if a similar perspective is also valid in the case of CommTech 
Table 2: Summary of the cases
Case company Basic data Operating model Design Situation
CommTech Inc. European-centric international electronics 
manufacturing, installation and service 
company. Publicly listed, three 
manufacturing locations, revenue 
approximately 100MEUR (2009), 1200 
employees.
The case company is operating in three different business 
segments. 1) electronics component manufacturing, supplying self-
developed high technology components to different installations of 
telecommunications infrastructure 2) system /project deliveries, 
consisting of demanding infrastructure solutions 3) supplementary 
3rd party products used in particular as components in installation 
projects and spare parts in maintenance 
In order to improve the competitiveness globally, the case 
company is revisiting its strategy for global operations 
networks, including also locations, make/buy questions and 
network design. The company has two manufacturing 
locations (Europe, China), distribution centers and EMS 
partners. The key question is division of work between the 
operations network nodes.
Design Inc. European-centric, internationally operating 
design & branded consumer goods 
company. Publicly listed, three own 
manufacturing locations, global sourcing & 
contract manufacturing for major part of 
the company product portfolio (branded). 
Revenue approximately 73MEUR (2009), 
370 employees.
The case company is a company with well-known consumer 
brand. The traditional core production takes place at three own 
factories. A large part of the product portfolio is sourced from 
suppliers and contract manufacturers across the globe, all 
however is branded with the company brand.
The company has set itself aggressive targets for profitable 
growth internationalization targets. This requires 
reconsideration and restructuring of operations, in particular 
enhancements of efficiency, effectiveness and coordination.
Wired Inc Internationally operating manufacturing 
company, producing construction 
equipments of ships and other marine 
segment solutions. A part of a family-
owned group. Revenue approximately  
30MEUR (2009), 200 employees.
The case company operations take place at three own factories, 
two in Europe and one in China. The products are manufactured 
starting from raw materials (like copper), directly delivered to all 
major shipyards in Europe and Asia, and additionally distributed 
through professional distribution companies.
The subsidiary in China is relatively new. In order to utilize 
the new global network fully, and to accommodate the 
changes resulting from concentration of shipbuilding industry 
to Asia, the company is redesigning its operations network 
including location of its manufacturing capacity. 
Measure Inc A global leader in a high technology 
instruments and measurement devices. 
Publicly listed company with revenue 
approximately 240MEUR (2009), 1400 
employees
The company is operating in multiple business segments, and is 
delivering a large range of products ranging from low value, high 
volume standard measurement devices to multi-million EUR 
project deliveries of full measurement solutions. The company is 
having a global operations network, where the main 
manufacturing takes place in an own factory in Europe. 
Additionally, the company has production for high volume 
standard products in Asia.
The company has recently restructured its business 
operations to customer segments as a response to cope with 
the high complexity caused by different products/services, 
customer segments and market areas. The complexity of the 
business situation drives the need to move from one 
monolithic operations and Supply Chain model to a modular 
network of differentiated operations/supply chains. 
FreshAir Inc A globally operating, family owned group 
which is specialized in indoor climate and 
indoor environment products, services and 
solutions for buildings and ships. Revenue 
approximately 170MEUR, 1200 
employees
The company is organized around five business lines, and the 
group overall has operations in 23 countries across the globe. The 
system components are produced in own factories as well as by 
license manufacturers.  The actual solution engineering and sales 
is based on own knowledge-intensive R&D activities concentrated 
on three main operations locations in Europe and US.
The company has set itself a target to expand its sales to 
new geographical areas, in particular developing countries in 
Asia and eastern Europe. The operations network needs to 
be designed to support the new business competitively. The 
main challenge is to meet the market condition (like 
cost/price level, service and delivery expectations)
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Inc. The third category, international expansion to reach new markets/
customer groups or new geographical areas, is the central topic for De-
sign Inc. and FreshAir Inc. The operations design initiative comes from 
the growth and internationalisation targets which the ownership of 
the companies has set. 
 
In the following table, we present the main factors considered in the 
operations network design of the case companies. The factors are 
grouped using the same logical as criteria found in the literature in Ta-
ble 1, including a group of emerging factors such as risk management 
and sustainability, which are not recognised in the traditional litera-
ture of operations network design. We suggest that these new emerg-
ing factors should also be considered in the design process. 
Table 3: Factors affecting the design of and operations network
Group CommTech Inc. Design Inc. Wired Inc. Measure Inc. FreshAir Inc.
Strategic factors - Conscious decision to be faster 
and more agile to achieve 
customer intimacy supported by 
technology leadership
- Decision about focus countries 
based on prevailing technology
 - Differentiation through brand & 
design; strive for more global reach
- Striving for new market areas, 
imcreasingly international customer 
base
- Revenue and growth expectation
- Competing through customer 
intimacy
- Competing through technology 
leadership
- Competing through technology 
leadership
- Striving for a specific new market 
area
- Revenue and growth expectation
Competitive 
situation
- Main competitors significantly 
larger 
- In some product segments 
competitors with significantly 
shorter lead times
- New requirements from new sales 
channels and/or new geographical 
areas
- Increasing competition from low-
cost providers
- Strong differences in product 
business vs solution business
- Increasing competition from low-
cost providers
- Strong differences in product 
business vs solution business
- Accepted price level significantly 
lower in the intended new market 
area
Product - Ability to customer/order-spefic 
customization
- Modularity
- Fast new product introdution and 
ramp-up
- Quality, technical stability
- Requirements from new product 
groups
- High and increasing number of 
product segments and individual 
items
- Combination of long and short 
product life cycles
- Quality, durability, appearance
- Broad product portfolio due to 
different customer requirements, 
national standards etc.
- High-end quality in the respective 
industry
- Ability to customer/order-spefic 
customization
- Modularity
- High-end quality in the respective 
industry
- Combination of standard products 
and customized projects
- Modularity
- Visual quality, quality of the 
system
Demand - In project business demand 
lumpy but with good visibility
- In other businesses short demand 
visibility combined to high number 
of variants
- In some categories unpredictable 
demand due to trends and 
consumer preferences
- In some categories fairly 
predictable demand but very high 
availability requirements
- Long visibility to overall market 
demand combined with 
unpredictable specification and 
schedule changes
- In some businesses fairly stable 
and predictable demand
- In project business long visibility 
to overall market demand 
combined with unpredictable 
specification and schedule 
changes
- In project business long visibility 
to overall market demand 
combined with unpredictable 
specification and schedule 
changes
Markets 
requirements for 
delivery
- Short lead time
- Flexibility for demand changes
- Continuous availability
- Consolidation of system deliveries
- Continuous availability of some 
products; accurate launch and 
delivery of seasonal products
- Increasing special logistics 
requirements from new channels
- Responsiveness to specification 
and schedule changes
- Consolidation of project deliveries
- Short lead time for some products
- Delivery accuracy
- Flexibility for demand changes for 
some products
- Responsiveness to specification 
and schedule changes
- Delivery accuracy
- Consolidation of project deliveries
Supply - Major part of the supplier base 
concentrated geographically to 
certain region of Asia
- Need to be close to the supplier 
base in order to achieve supply 
certainty
- Product category-specific 
concentrations of know-how 
(geographically)
- Increasing requirements for direct 
deliveries from suppliers to channel
- Availability of raw materials - Availability of standard 
component suppliers in the new 
market
Current 
capabilities of 
the company
- Clearly identified competences 
needed in-house for the chosen 
strategy 
- Need to support the in-house 
design capability through 
operations
- Shift of core capability from 
manufacturing to solution 
engineering
- Recognized competence gap for 
the new market
Current 
resources (setup 
of the network)
- Legacy of current network - Legacy of current network
- Location related to brand image
- Legacy of current network - Legacy of current network - Legacy of current network
- No current manufacturing 
locations close to the new market
Financial 
aspects
- Labor cost
- Logistics cost
- Profit margin
- Labor cost
- Logistics cost
- Profit margin
- Labor cost, material cost
- Logistics cost
- Investment requirements
- Labor cost
- Profit margin
- Investment requirements
Emerging issues - Availability risk
- Protection of IPR
- Co-location of manufacturing & 
R&D
- Co-location of manufacturing and 
sourcing
- Value-added product-related 
service (testing, tailoring)
- Availability risk
- Protection of IPR
- Sustainability and transparency of 
product sources
- Co-location of design & 
manufacturing of certain products
- Investment risk
- Co-location of manufacturing & 
R&D
- Value-added product-related 
service (testing, tailoring) and 
supply chain related services
- Protection of IPR
- Co-location of manufacturing & 
R&D
- Value-added product-related 
service (testing, tailoring) and 
supply chain related services
- Investment risk
- Co-location of system engineering 
with consolidation and delivery
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From the cases, we can identify a relatively consistent pattern of data 
collection and analysis activities, scenario building and modelling and 
related decision making. However, we can also recognise that not all 
influencing factors are considered equally. Some aspects, like customer 
lead-time expectations, are clear drivers which lead straightforwardly 
to a limited range of possible solutions. On the other hand, risk consid-
erations and product modularity, for example, heavily affect the result, 
but are seen rather as enabling or limiting factors. This consideration 
is consistent with the definition of fit as mediation (Venkatraman, 
1989), where the mediating factors may change the effects of the actual 
drivers, and enable or disable possible conclusions.
Direct drivers in operations networks design
In the cases investigated here, out of the influencing factors, operating 
environment including both customer base and supplier base, market 
requirements, demand profile, product architecture and financial as-
pects, in particular total cost comparison, are the direct drivers which 
together can lead to a range of alternative designs of operations net-
works.
Operating environment in the design of an operations network. Oper-
ating environment includes all the elements that surround the compa-
ny operations. The most important perspectives are the markets and 
customers of the company, as well as the overall supply base of the 
company. 
Markets and customers appear as the main drivers to be taken into 
account. The perspectives include, e.g. location, size and growth of the 
market the company wants to serve. Proximity to market can be con-
sidered many ways: It is not only both physical closeness to paying cus-
tomers, but also cultural proximity, and ability to develop relationships 
through personal contacts and meetings.
These findings related to the importance of the market in operations 
network design are consistent with those of several recent studies 
analysing the plant location decisions and reasons for offshoring/near 
shoring (sources): proximity to an existing market, access to new mar-
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kets and access to new customers often appear as the main reasons ex-
plaining investments in manufacturing footprint expansion, as well as 
in distribution centre networks. In certain cases, presence at a market 
is value as such: In the case of FreshAir Inc., the expansion to the new 
market is partly driven by need to show credible commitment towards 
a customer base by being visibly present with a factory in the same 
area; in the case of Design Inc., the manufacturing country (Finland) is 
a core part of brand image.  
Location of supplier base is also recognised as an important driver. 
Integration with the supplier base as such and ability to access the 
latest technologies and best suppliers needs to be considered in op-
erations network design. In certain industries, the latest technologi-
cal knowledge and supplier infrastructure are strongly clustered, and 
consequently, especially smaller firms need to co-locate to access the 
resources. This is highlighted especially in the case of CommTech: 
They recognise that a major part of their suppliers is concentrated to a 
region in Asia, leaving them no choice but to co-locate key purchasing 
activities, and consequently certain manufacturing activities, to the 
same region in order to be able to cooperate with the supplier base 
effectively.   
Recognition of market requirements and demand characteristics. In 
addition to straightforward presence or proximity, questions involving 
other types of market-driven requirements matter in the design con-
siderations. The most common of these relate to the availability of the 
products and services, lead-time considerations and responsiveness 
and flexibility of supply to cope with demand uncertainty.
All of the case companies are operating in market segments which 
value short lead times and high availability of products at the mar-
ket. Short lead times may, however, have different meanings: For Com-
mTech Inc., it is a requirement of being able to engineer, configure and 
deliver product variations within a few days to European customers. 
For Design Inc., it means continuous availability of certain products on 
the shop shelves, while for FreshAir Inc., it represents both delivery ac-
curacy and responsiveness to schedule changes in large projects. These 
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perspectives, however, form a major part of the competitive approach 
for all the companies, and are typical key competitive factors for, e.g. 
Finnish companies overall (see, e.g. chapter 10 in this volume by Elor-
anta, Blomqvist and Laiho). 
The requirement for short lead times drives the design towards em-
phasis on agility in manufacturing and logistics capacity, a network of 
distributed activities located close to market or at the market, and an 
emphasis on internal process integration to support fast cycle time, e.g. 
in the order fulfilment process.  
Product characteristics. Product modularity, standardisation and 
platformisation significantly affect operations network design work. 
There is a strong linkage between product architecture and operations 
network architecture. 
From structural perspective, product characteristics, in particular level 
of modularisation and standardisation, determine, e.g. the possibility 
of using shared capacity, specifically whether a centralised manufac-
turing capacity can serve several product lines, regions or market. In 
the same way, product architecture also significantly affects design 
from the point of view of postponement and use of, e.g. a mass custo-
misation approach and configuration centres close to market, followed 
by related steering principles. 
Financial considerations. Financial considerations, especially labour 
costs, indirect costs like the cost of facilities and energy and logistics 
costs are among the most visible drivers in operations network design. 
From the Scandinavian perspective, there often exists a tradeoff be-
tween maintaining the current operations in Scandinavia, and alter-
natively, establishing new activities in lower-cost countries. However, 
from the globalisation perspective, it is also worthwhile to understand 
the real cost impact, specifically the total landed cost to a marketplace. 
In addition, as discussed elsewhere in this book, activities currently 
located in low-cost countries may at the same time be in the middle of 
most lucrative emerging markets. 
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A different perspective from financial considerations is the optimisa-
tion of operations networks, particularly certain aspects like transfer 
pricing according to taxes, customs fees and other financial factors. 
Mediating factors: Mediating factors are factors which limit the num-
ber of possible solutions, e.g. making some solutions unrealistic or 
guiding the understanding and decisions, but not leading to a solution 
on their own. 
Through our cases, we can identify the following mediating factors 
which affect the operations network design:
 · Competition strategy, e.g. selection between customer intimacy, 
operating excellence and technological leadership;
 · Current resources and capabilities, e.g. availability of experi-
enced leaders for offshore operations or high change costs lim-
iting the ability to change existing operations; 
 · Risk management, e.g. risk of copying and loss of intellectual 
property, as well as risks related to the difficulty of establishing 
operations in certain countries;
 · Emerging factors like sustainability (corporate social respon-
sibility and environmental aspects), which increasingly affect 
supplier chains and operations.
The actual design factors and mediating factors are summarised in the 
framework below.
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CONCLUSIONS
The operations network design is particularly important for Scandi-
navian companies. The home market is small and well matured, and 
as has been discussed elsewhere in this book, for many companies, 
successful globalisation is a matter of survival. Utilisation of global re-
sources through a global network is a key success factor for numerous 
companies of Scandinavian origin. The same is true when it comes to 
the ability to competitively access the global market. At the same time, 
rational decisions regarding core competences and activities which 
can still be performed in Scandinavian factories are necessary. Put to-
gether, the operations network design process is constantly ongoing. 
This chapter has contributed to the challenge by deriving usable net-
work design criteria from case research and the literature into a model 
which can be used for more informed, balanced design decisions.
Figure 1: A framework for systematic operations network design
Operating environment:
- Markets and customers
- Supply base
Demand: 
-volume, variability, time and 
predictability
Market requirements: 
Market characteristics: 
market standards,  
requirements for delivery
Product: 
Volumes, variation, stability, 
modularity
Financials: 
Netw ork modeling and total 
cost analysis 
Management principles:
- Culture and key 
performance indicators
Operations network: 
-Activities and integration
-Location selections and 
location role decisions
-Make/buy decisions
-Supply chain processes
-Manufacturing processes 
-Infrastructure
- Corporate strategy; competitive situation and  
competitive approach
- Current capabilities: Available resources, 
structures and roles; history and legacy
- Risk management
- Emerging factors: Sustainability, service 
content
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From the perspective of theory, our results are consistent with the 
body of knowledge in the field. Forty years ago, Skinner ( 1969) iden-
tified most of the critical decisions valid today, and over 10 years ago, 
in his seminal work, Fisher ( 1997) added the supply chain perspective. 
Through the categorisation of design factors as direct and mediating 
factors, influential mechanisms and the relative importance of the 
different perspectives become clearer. This is particularly important 
when considering the role of, e.g. strategy and best practices in oper-
ations network design. In addition, proper consideration of mediating 
factors like available competencies and risk are of significance. The glo-
balising business environment also adds new, emerging perspectives 
to the decision-making process, including risk management, sustain-
ability aspects and the importance of proximity between functions. 
Scandinavian companies are often well aware of their importance, but 
at present, they are still mainly discussed as separate issues. We argue 
that they are an important part of operations network design, and pro-
pose that they should be a part of further research.
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Development in Emerging Markets
 
Peder Veng Søberg, Aalborg University, Denmark  
Brian Vejrum Wæhrens, Aalborg University, Denmark
ABSTRACT
The chapter investigates the problems related to the functional integra-
tion between manufacturing activities and research and development 
(R&D) activities in emerging markets within multinational companies. 
A framework to this end is developed and illustrated through four case 
studies from multinational companies, which have established R&D 
and manufacturing in China or India. The findings point to the impor-
tance of adopting cross-function co-location drivers and contingencies, 
such as clockspeed and technological complexity, as well as the extent 
to which local adaptation is needed as an integral part of corporate re-
location decisions.
INTRODUCTION
There are many reasons for multinational companies (MNCs) to in-
ternationalise their research and development (R&D). One of these 
reasons is to locate R&D alongside manufacturing activities which 
have already been offshored to emerging markets. As a result, R&D in-
ternationalisation may decrease the negative impact which physical 
distance is known to have on knowledge flows (Allen, 1977). Interna-
tionalisation of R&D thus makes it possible to take advantage of the 
proximity to well-established manufacturing units in order to reduce 
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administrative overhead, as well as to draw on existing links to the 
external environment in terms of access to labour, supply and tech-
nical and legislative conditions. However, these benefits are likely to 
differ across companies. Different implications for innovation perfor-
mance are likely to exist across companies in relation to whether or 
not foreign-invested R&D is co-located with manufacturing activities 
in emerging markets. 
Co-location is a well-recognised strategy for coordinating a complex 
task environment (Galbraith, 1994), and it is particularly beneficial as a 
means for coordinating activities, which should result in productivity 
growth and innovation (Porter, 2000). Previous research has primarily 
focused on the interface between R&D and marketing (e.g. Lu & Yang, 
2004), rather than R&D and manufacturing (Song et al., 1997). This 
chapter, therefore, sets out to explore differences in the innovation 
performance of foreign-invested R&D subsidiary locations in emerg-
ing markets as a factor of core technology – and more specifically, in-
terdependencies related to whether or not R&D and manufacturing is 
co-located. We are therefore pursuing the following research question: 
What determines the need for co-location of R&D and manufacturing 
in emerging markets?
In the following, this chapter will provide a framework relevant to un-
derstanding the dynamics related to functional interdependencies and 
resulting co-location needs of foreign-invested R&D and manufactur-
ing activities in emerging markets. Subsequently, this framework will 
be illustrated in the empirical findings and analysis sections, which 
also provide evidence of the specific advantages experienced by mul-
tinational companies co-locating R&D and manufacturing activities in 
emerging markets, before relevant conclusions are outlined. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The need to align choices about process, product and structural ar-
rangements is by no means new (Galbraith, 1994) and co-location is one 
key mechanism for this alignment. When manufacturing and R&D are 
located closely together and structurally tightly coupled, R&D person-
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nel may direct more attention to problems experienced by manufac-
turing personnel. Thus, a risk may exist that R&D personnel will be 
excessively exposed to existing short-term problems of the company 
rather than the unknown future problems of the company. In addi-
tion, one can speculate that when R&D activities are closely integrated 
with manufacturing activities, R&D personnel have a tendency to dis-
turb manufacturing somewhat, e.g. by conducting frequent test runs 
on manufacturing equipment. In other words, close integration and 
co-location of R&D activities and manufacturing activities may not al-
ways be beneficial. However, in the following, we will outline a couple 
of conditions under which it may indeed be advantageous. 
Local industrial resources 
Nobel and Birkinshaw (1998) outline a typology of roles for foreign-in-
vested R&D units comprising ‘local adaptors’, ‘international adaptors’ 
and ‘international creators’. Their findings indicate that for local adap-
tors and international adaptors alike, manufacturing units constitute 
the main communication partners within the company. However, 
whereas local adaptors primarily interact with local manufacturing, 
international adaptors primarily interact with an international net-
work of manufacturing units, with which they are most likely not able 
to be co-located. However, the interaction between local adaptor R&D 
units and the local manufacturing units they support is likely to ben-
efit from co-location. 
In emerging markets, locally available industrial resources are likely 
to differ from the industrial resources available in more mature and 
developed markets. As illustrated in Figure 1, this is liable to have im-
plications for the interface between local R&D and manufacturing, and 
whether this interface is needed. The market environment may differ, 
e.g. in terms of customer needs. Through adaptation to local needs, 
the competitive position of a product can be strengthened (Hill & Still, 
1984); however, the extent to which local adaptation is needed may dif-
fer substantially. Local manufacturing may need more R&D support 
than otherwise if much local adaptation is needed. It may be possi-
ble to source such R&D support from the local market. On the other 
hand, in emerging markets, this may be more difficult for the MNC to 
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do than in developed markets, e.g. it may be difficult to find knowledge 
suppliers who have the necessary level of competence or specific ex-
perience. In addition, the risk of negative knowledge spillover in the 
often weak intellectual property regimes present in emerging markets 
may make captive R&D offshoring the preferred solution to mitigate 
such risks in relation to knowledge-intensive activities such as R&D. 
Hence, different companies may find it more or less relevant to co-lo-
cate R&D and manufacturing in a certain location, depending on the 
local industrial resources. In particular, the need for local adaptation 
of products may be important. 
Clockspeed
Fast-paced clockspeed industrial settings are described as the fruit 
flies of competitive strategy. This is due to their fast pace of change 
with regards to underlying technologies, business models and supply 
chain relations, which are believed to illustrate a likely future for slow-
er paced industries (Fine, 2000). Fast technological development and 
the frequent introduction of new products in the market indicate high 
clockspeed. In industries characterized by high clockspeed , competi-
tive advantages are found in the capability related to designing and re-
designing value chain interfaces, and thus call for dynamic capabilities 
Figure 1: The interface between local manufacturing and local R&D 
in emerging markets.
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(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Demand volatility is higher upstream 
than downstream in the value chain; however, clockspeed is most of-
ten lower upstream than downstream (Fine, 2000). This indicates that 
position in the value chain matters for the design of functional interde-
pendencies, and potentially also for the need of functional co-location. 
Codification is ‘the process of conversion of knowledge into messag-
es that can be processed as information’ (Cowan & Foray, 1997, p. 596). 
The cost of codification, and thereby implicitly the anticipated ben-
efits related to codification of knowledge, may often depict whether 
knowledge gets codified or not. When clockspeed is high, little time is 
available to benefit from investments made in the codification of in-
novation-related knowledge. Thus, such investments will most likely 
be more risky than they would be when clockspeed is low. Hence, in-
novation-related knowledge may often be less codified than otherwise 
when clockspeed is high, i.e. because less time is available to benefit 
from codification investments. From previous studies, it has been well 
established that codified knowledge is more easily transferred than 
noncodified or tacit knowledge, and that weak ties between units 
in distributed organisations assist knowledge search, while it takes 
strong ties to transfer and absorb complex knowledge (Hansen, 1999). 
Socialisation and face-to-face interaction nurture the transfer and cre-
ation of tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Konno, 1998), e.g. in the interface 
between R&D and manufacturing activities in emerging markets. This 
interaction is thereby particularly likely to benefit from co-location 
when clockspeed is high. The opposite may be the case where clock-
speed is low and mature technologies may dominate. Mature technol-
ogies tend to be easier to transfer, since they are often more codified 
than emerging technologies (Kogut & Zander, 1993). Needed knowledge 
transfer between R&D and manufacturing is in that case likely to be 
possible from a distance, and the need for co-location may be smaller.
Technological complexity
Complex technologies make use of components, which are highly com-
plementary or co-specialised (Teece, 1986). Technological complexity 
characterises ‘applied systems whose components have multiple inter-
actions and constitute a non-decomposable whole’ (Singh, 1997, p. 340). 
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In relation to technological complexity, it can be beneficial to distin-
guish between product complexity and process complexity. According 
to Elmaraghy and Urbanic (2003), ‘Product complexity is a function 
of the material, design and special specification for each component 
within the product. Process complexity is a function of the product, 
the volume requirements, and the work environment’ (p. 363). 
Modularity and the general decomposability of the product architec-
ture affect boundary decisions within the firm, but also as we look be-
yond the firm and include the whole supply chain. It has been argued 
that a product’s architecture oscillates between modular and integral, 
while firms simultaneously contract and expand their boundaries, i.e. 
outsource and insource work (Fine, 1998). Modularisation is one way 
to control technological complexity. However, this is only feasible in 
decomposable systems where complexity can be confined to modules. 
As outlined above, multiple interactions, or multiple interfaces, are an 
indication of technological complexity. As component suppliers most 
often deal with one single interface, their technological complexity 
may often be lower than it is for system integrators. Integration is re-
quired for the successful development of high-complexity technolo-
gies (Singh, 1997). Co-location is a relevant way to nurture and facilitate 
such integration. 
In summary, the co-location of R&D and manufacturing activities is 
likely to be especially beneficial for companies manufacturing prod-
ucts which require a high degree of local adaptation. It is also likely 
to be especially beneficial for companies experiencing high clockspeed 
and high technological complexity, as illustrated in Figure 2.
METHODOLOGY
Extensive qualitative empirical material has been collected from four 
Scandinavian high-tech companies and reported in four exploratory 
case studies (Yin, 2003). It is believed that rich contextual information 
is pertinent to facilitating a deep understanding of the phenomenon, 
as we have quite extensive knowledge of drivers of global R&D, but 
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do not fully understand the process related to how it is operational-
ised. The abductive approach (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1994; Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002) forms the methodological strategy for this inquiry, where 
more than 50 in-depth interviews were conducted. These interviews 
lasted between 40 minutes and two hours, and they have been fully 
transcribed. The empirical findings triggered a search for theory and 
theory development through continuous interchange and pattern 
matching (Yin, 2003) between the empirical data and theory in order 
to find support for the theoretical framework. The interviewees were 
mainly employees within the R&D organisations of the case compa-
nies. Interviews were carried out in person and by telephone, both in 
Scandinavia and Asia, with employees at different management levels. 
Employees without management responsibility were also interviewed.
Figure 2: Characteristics affecting the importance of co-location of 
R&D and manufacturing in emerging markets.
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Med Tech 
This company develops and manufactures pharmaceutical products. 
It primarily provides medicine which makes it possible to live with 
conditions that most often cannot be fully cured. The company has 
R&D activities located in Beijing and manufacturing activities located 
in Tianjin, outside of Beijing. There is very little interaction within the 
company between these two business functions in China. The motiva-
tion behind the establishment of R&D in China was, on the one hand, 
to ease the further growth of the company in China by showing com-
mitment to the overall society in the country, i.e. in conducting R&D 
rather than merely selling products in China. Another reason was to 
get better access to the developing talent in China.
Local adaptation. So far, the company has not needed to adapt its 
products much to local markets around the world. For instance, the 
company does not make much use of pulmonary technologies. Since 
lung sizes, etc. can differ a bit in different parts of the world, the use of 
pulmonary technologies would probably instigate the need for higher 
local adaptation than is currently the case. The strict regulations and 
norms stipulated by institutions such as the US Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) make it expensive to make product modifications. This 
is one reason why the products are similar across the globe. 
Clockspeed. It takes a very long time to develop new products for the 
company, even as long as 12–13 years. This seems to slow down clock-
speed. In terms of technologies, the company has always focused on 
protein drugs and related technologies.
Technological complexity. Once the right recipes for a medicine de-
veloped by Med Tech has been found, the actual contents are simple 
compounds. Hence, there are not many different product components 
and interfaces to handle. Complexity is mainly found in the extreme 
demand for a stable and reliable manufacturing process, which entails 
high establishment and maintenance costs. The R&D centre in China 
carries out drug discovery, but so far not much large-scale manufactur-
ing process maturation. This, however, may change in the future.
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Wind Tech
This company is active within the wind turbine industry. Wind Tech 
has established an R&D unit in India in relative proximity to manu-
facturing activities the company already had established there before-
hand. However, due to the poor infrastructure, it can take two hours to 
drive between the R&D unit and the manufacturing unit in India. In 
spite of this, the engineers in the Indian R&D unit meet regularly with 
employees who work in the local manufacturing unit of the company. 
By meeting with people from the manufacturing unit, the R&D engi-
neers can better understand what challenges exist, when manufac-
turing the products of the company. In this way, they get inspiration 
concerning how to improve manufacturing processes of the company, 
such that new products can be manufactured faster and simpler. This 
has so far resulted in improved accuracy and quality in the manufac-
turing of the products of the company. The Indian engineers have also 
come up with a way to decrease emissions from the manufacturing 
process. Another benefit of having manufacturing activities nearby, 
experienced within the R&D unit, is that newly recruited engineers 
can obtain hands-on experience with the company products, in the 
manufacturing unit. Thus, the interaction between R&D and manu-
facturing in India is not intense, but it has still created some benefits 
for the company.
Local adaptation. There is not much need for local adaptation of the 
products of the company. Within the wind turbine industry, whether 
a wind turbine functions under onshore or offshore conditions is of 
course important, as well as whether it needs to work in the Arctic or 
other types of weather conditions. However, these differences normal-
ly do not lead to big, market-specific adaptations of products, and the 
case is no different in India. However, since the company’s products are 
large, it is relevant to carry out manufacturing near the market.
Clockspeed. The clockspeed is relatively high, i.e., it normally takes no 
more than two or three years to develop a new product. Many custom-
ers also manufacture their own blades, so supply chain relations can 
change rapidly.
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Technological complexity. The company manufactures blades for wind 
turbines. Hence, it can be considered a component supplier. Different 
skills are used; for instance, structural and aerodynamic calculations 
are very important, but there are not many different components and 
interfaces which the company needs to orchestrate in the develop-
ment and manufacturing of products.
Pack Tech
This company is active within the packaging industry. In China, the 
R&D centre is co-located with supply chain management organisation, 
which is responsible for procurement in relation to equipment and 
machines. Concerning these things, the company does not carry out 
manufacturing in-house. Much is sourced in China, but certain things 
can only be found outside of China. Pack Tech manufactures pack-
aging material in four different places in China, which is exclusively 
manufactured in house. The nearest of these facilities is located 100 
km away from the R&D centre. However, the packaging material plant, 
with which most interaction takes place in relation to test runs, etc., is 
located more than 1,000 km away. R&D employees developing equip-
ment are a bit annoyed with the supply chain management organisa-
tion, since they seem to favour lead time and cost rather than perfor-
mance. In addition, supply chain organisation management requires 
a lot of technical support, and this disrupts R&D employees’ focus on 
their own work. Moreover, according to R&D personnel, employees in 
the packaging material manufacturing plants are sometimes annoyed 
when they are disturbed by R&D employees who want to carry out test 
runs. Packaging material manufacturing employees are incentivised to 
minimise production stops, and test runs do not benefit their bonus. 
Otherwise, the interaction seems to run smoothly.
Local adaptation. In China, there are special requirements for down-
stream distribution equipment, which are not as evident elsewhere. 
This is largely related to the local need for secondary packaging, which 
comprises packaging that facilitates the easier and safer transport of 
smaller packages.
Clockspeed. There is relatively low clockspeed and slow technological 
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development in this company. It can take many years to develop new 
products. The technologies underlying the company’s products have 
largely been the same for many years. The focus on in-house manufac-
turing of packaging material is very stable.
Technological complexity. As a full system supplier, the company pro-
vides packaging material, as well as the full range of filling and pack-
aging machines needed. Complexity is found in solutions engineering, 
which draws on standardised manufacturing services.
Mechanic Tech
This company is a leader in the manufacture of automation equipment, 
and has established R&D activities in China near the manufacturing 
activities of the company. An important reason for the establishment 
of R&D is this it makes it possible to better support local manufac-
turing, e.g. when adapting existing products to the Asian market. The 
R&D establishment is part of the overall strategy of the company to 
increase its global footprint, which makes it easier to, e.g. carry out 
sourcing in low-cost countries. However, it was also a motivating fac-
tor to make use of Chinese engineers to develop new products. There 
is quite a bit of interaction with local manufacturing. All parts for the 
company’s products are manufactured by global suppliers. However, it 
can be difficult to find suppliers of the right quality in China. In order 
to secure on-time deliveries and lowest cost, the company strives for 
dual sourcing, thereby including local suppliers. 
Local adaptation. Customer requirements in China are less demanding 
in general than they are in Europe. Therefore, local customers demand 
cheaper solutions, and this brings about the need to adapt the prod-
ucts of the company to local needs.
Clockspeed. The technological development of this company can be 
considered fast. New products can typically be developed in less than 
two years, but when introducing new technologies, it takes longer. 
Technologies utilised in the products of the company evolve rapidly.
Technological complexity. The company assembles the different com-
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ponents, which are manufactured by suppliers. Hence, there are many 
interfaces for the company to manage. 
ANALYSIS
The interrelationships between R&D and manufacturing are clearly 
influenced by proximity; cognitive and physical distance matters to 
knowledge transfer and inter-unit communication. However, as seen 
within Med Tech, co-location and proximity does not always mean 
that intense interaction takes place. Wind Tech seems to benefit more 
from its relative co-location of R&D and manufacturing activities in 
India than Med Tech does. One benefit for Wind Tech is that R&D per-
sonnel receive input from manufacturing people in terms of how to 
improve the manufacturing processes of the company. To some extent, 
this points to the iterative nature of innovation, which may not always 
follow strict sequential stages. However, this also points to the need to 
differentiate between different forms of R&D and that, as a minimum, 
we need to distinguish between R&D activities, as they clearly exhibit 
different colocation needs with the manufacturing function. For ex-
ample, the interaction between Med Tech R&D China and the manu-
facturing activities of the company in China seems to be less apparent 
than that between R&D Scandinavia and manufacturing activities in 
China. A reason for this is that Med Tech R&D China works with early 
drug discovery, which is, most often, subsequently further matured in 
Scandinavia by Med Tech R&D Scandinavia. Ensuring good interaction 
between Med Tech R&D Scandinavia and the manufacturing activi-
ties of the company may therefore be more important than ensuring 
good interaction between Med Tech R&D China and the company’s 
manufacturing activities. Hence, one should not neglect the particu-
lar role of different units when optimising R&D, or the manufacturing 
footprints of companies, so that the two may be interlinked in bene-
ficial ways. Different kinds of manufacturing may also have different 
kinds of needs in terms of facilitating good interaction between R&D 
and manufacturing, as illustrated in particular by the Pack Tech case. 
The supply chain management organisation focusing on outsourced 
manufacturing of equipment and machines on the one side, and the 
packaging material manufacturing plants on the other, seem to have 
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different needs for co-location. In the Pack Tech case, outsourcing also 
seems to necessitate closer interaction among R&D and the supply 
chain organisation than between R&D and packaging material manu-
facturing. The supply chain organisation in charge of procurement in 
relation to machinery, equipment, etc. depends to a large extent on the 
technical competence available in the R&D organisation. 
In Figure 3, the four case companies are plotted into a polar diagram 
similar to that in Figure 2, which was initially presented as the theoret-
ical framework underlying the chapter. 
Figure 3: Characteristics affecting co-location of R&D and manufac-
turing in the case companies
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The analysis below motivate the evaluation illustrated in Figure 3. The 
guiding principle for understanding Figure 6 is that, the larger an area 
of the figure a company occupies, the more important co-location of 
R&D and manufacturing becomes, and vice versa. Hence, according to 
Figure 6, Med Tech has the lowest need for co-location, whereas Me-
chanic Tech has the highest. However, rather than simply using the 
mere intensity with which companies experience the three dimensions 
outlined in the framework (local adaptation, clockspeed and techno-
logical complexity) as a guideline for what to do, the specific combina-
tion of challenges faced by the individual companies is likely to have 
implications for location decisions within the company. For instance, it 
seems that Pack Tech, due to lower clockspeed in the industry, finds it 
less difficult to handle technological complexity than Mechanic Tech. 
Pack Tech essentially has more time to adapt to new technologies and 
faces less technological ambiguity as market standards are established 
early in the technology lifecycle. This may be one reason why we see 
less interaction between R&D and manufacturing within Pack Tech 
than within Mechanic Tech. Low clockspeed allows for more time to 
deal with the unanticipated events, which tend to take up most of the 
time related to knowledge transfer (Szulanski, 2000), and might make 
it more viable, e.g. to make use of traveling expert teams, rather than 
relying exclusively on the continuous local presence of R&D personnel. 
In Table 1 brief descriptions of the situations the companies face in 
relation to the three dimensions are outlined and the case companies 
are evaluated accordingly with numbers ranging from 0 to 9, where a 
score of 0 means low levels of the dimension in focus and a score of 9 
means high levels of the dimension in focus.
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Med Tech Wind Tech Pack Tech Mechanic Tech
Local adaptation
Identical products 
are sold around the 
world.
Very similar 
products are sold 
around the world, 
but the size of 
products calls for 
local manufactur-
ing.
The need for sec-
ondary packaging 
is higher than in 
other, more mature 
markets.
Simpler and 
cheaper solu-
tions are de-
manded in the 
local market 
whereby prod-
uct adaptations 
are needed.
Score: 2 Score: 3 Score: 7 Score: 8
Clockspeed
New product devel-
opment can take 13 
years.
Focus only on pro-
tein research since 
the company was 
established. 
Stable supply chain 
relationships.
New product de-
velopment takes 
at least 10 months 
(very rare), but nor-
mally two or three 
years.
Many customers 
also manufacture 
their own blades, 
hence the supply 
chain relations can 
change fast.
New product devel-
opment takes a min-
imum of four years, 
but more likely 6–7 
or 10 years.
Similar technolog-
ical base for many 
years. Stable focus 
on in-house manu-
facturing of packag-
ing material.
New product 
development 
normally takes 
less than two 
years.
Technologies 
utilised in the 
products of the 
company evolve 
rapidly.
Score: 2 Score: 8 Score: 3 Score: 9
Technological complexity
Simple compound 
products, but also 
extreme demands 
on a stable and 
reliable manufac-
turing process, 
which entails high 
establishment and 
high maintenance 
costs.
The company is a 
component sup-
plier. It does not 
deliver a complete 
wind turbine to its 
customers.
The company sup-
plies a full pack-
aging system of 
packaging material, 
filling machines, 
downstream equip-
ment, etc. There are 
many interfaces to 
handle.
The company 
enables automa-
tion processes in 
different sectors. 
This means the 
company has to 
integrate many 
different compo-
nents and inter-
actions among 
these.
Score: 5 Score: 3 Score: 8 Score: 8
Table 1: Brief description of the case companies
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Local adaptation. Wind Tech, and especially Med Tech, experience a 
lower need for local adaptation than Mechanic Tech and Pack Tech. 
When R&D and manufacturing is co-located, it is easier for R&D to car-
ry out and support local adaptation. Such adaptation is more impor-
tant for Pack Tech and especially Mechanic Tech than the other case 
companies. Both these industries rely on proprietary technologies and 
materials. Global market standards have not been established due to a 
multifaceted industrial scope and local demands. 
Clockspeed. The task characteristics have a strong bearing on the inter-
face between R&D and manufacturing. Tight relations are necessary 
for tasks with reciprocal interdependencies, due to the need for on-
going adjustments and mutual adaptation. Weaker relations are bet-
ter suited for sequential interdependencies, where the relationship is 
formalised and arm’s length. As we have seen across the cases, this is 
strongly related to the stability of the process, which may often be low-
er when the clockspeed is high. Where the technological clockspeed 
is fast, the need for tight relations is stronger due to the demand for 
continuous adaptations. This, however, is influenced by the level of 
standardisation of the process technology.
Med Tech and Pack Tech experience slower technical development and 
slower clockspeed than Wind Tech and Mechanic Tech do, e.g. the doc-
umentation and test requirements related to pharmaceutical research 
and development further slow down clockspeed. In a sense, it also nur-
tures codification of innovation-related knowledge, which can make it 
easier to transfer in the interface between R&D and manufacturing, us-
ing weak ties as a channel. Hence, there is less need for co-location. Med 
Tech and Pack Tech are also companies in more mature industries than 
the other case companies. It may be that as product structures change 
over time, as industries oscillate between integration and disintegra-
tion, opportunities for disintegration have increasingly evolved. This 
may thereby have decreased the need for co-location, especially for Med 
Tech. Pack Tech and Med Tech seem to have more stable supply chain 
relationships and they seem to experience higher stability in terms of 
the technologies utilised in the company products, than Wind Tech and 
Mechanic Tech.
241
Technological complexity. With regards to technological complexity, 
it is clear from the cases that the development of new process tech-
nology matters more to the relationship than product technology. We 
have to distinguish between process and product complexity, because 
although they are naturally related, product complexity is often de-
composable, whereas process complexity most often is not. Product 
complexity is thereby more prone to complexity-decreasing initiatives 
such as modularisation. Automation equipment inherently deals with 
processes, and it is clear that the need for integration between R&D 
and manufacturing is much higher within Mechanic Tech than, for in-
stance, within Med Tech. Whereas the complexity for Mechanic Tech 
largely concerns complexity in relation to the creation of new process-
es, the complexity for Med Tech comes from the high demands for sta-
bility and reliability of the manufacturing processes of the company. 
The high costs of establishing and maintaining the manufacturing 
processes can also increase complexity, as these things make it more 
important to forecast demanded volumes, which may be difficult. 
A well-functioning interaction between R&D and manufacturing also 
facilitates a company’s abilities to access, assess and engage with exter-
nal resources, which the company aims to appropriate. Mechanic Tech 
experiences problems with their suppliers in China. It is difficult to ob-
tain the necessary integration with the suppliers, which may be need-
ed in light of the technological complexity the company experiences. 
The local R&D presence seems to mitigate these problems somewhat.
Wind Tech and Med Tech experience lower levels of technological 
complexity than Pack Tech and Mechanic Tech. Unlike Pack Tech and 
Mechanic Tech, Wind Tech is a component supplier. A component sup-
plier may often experience less technological complexity than com-
panies like Pack Tech and Mechanic Tech, which assemble different 
components to a full system. A mix of skills is necessary for successful 
development of the products of Wind Tech. However, there are few in-
teractions for the company to deal with. Hence the technological com-
plexity can be considered somewhat low for Wind Tech, unlike Pack 
Tech and Mechanic Tech, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The investigated cases of R&D establishments in China and India can 
be described as captive R&D offshoring. One can speculate that in 
other types of business models, such as offshore R&D outsourcing to 
emerging markets, it is likely that alliance types with local companies 
may have important implications for whether R&D and manufactur-
ing need to be co-located. Further research may elucidate this topic.
As our theoretical framework contains three dichotomous dimensions, 
the framework sketches eight different scenarios, half of which have 
been explored and illustrated through the four cases in the chapter. 
We have illustrated two quite extreme scenarios (Med Tech and Me-
chanic Tech). Even though these cases can be considered somewhat 
extreme, it may be possible to find even more extreme cases. The chap-
ter has also illustrated two different relevant midrange scenarios (Pack 
Tech and Wind Tech). The four most relevant scenarios for the purpose 
of this chapter have thus been illustrated. However, it would be inter-
esting for further research to investigate different cases from the ones 
investigated in this chapter in order to see whether similar conceptual 
relationships can be found in such cases. 
CONCLUSION
Co-location of R&D activities and manufacturing activities in emerging 
markets is likely to be more important for companies whose products 
require a high degree of local adaptation, rather than a low degree of 
local adaptation. The upgrading of foreign sites from exploiting home 
base knowledge and technologies through standards set at headquar-
ters, to augmenting these global inputs to serve local market or resource 
needs increases demands on co-location, as the coordination required 
cannot be covered by occasional exchanges. This is further intensified 
when clockspeed is high as innovation-related knowledge is likely to 
be tacit, and its transfer between R&D and manufacturing activities 
thereby depends upon socialisation, which is nurtured by co-location, 
as this may facilitate the kind of learning that occurs from repeated in-
teraction between particular groups or functions. This type of learning 
is most important in situations where the critical knowledge is locat-
243
ed in the interface between groups or functions, and where interfaces 
have not been standardised. Under such conditions of high technolog-
ical complexity – particularly process-related complexity – integration 
is necessary and co-location of R&D and manufacturing is beneficial. 
On the other hand, when there is a low need for local adaptation, and 
when clockspeed and technological complexity are low, co-location of 
R&D and manufacturing in emerging markets may be less necessary, 
although it is likely to have some benefits in any case. 
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ABSTRACT
We introduce a model for designing and locating factories to support 
the primary corporate competitive strategy and the related production 
imperatives. These imperatives are linked with the overall business 
strategies by Treacy and Wiersema (1995). Our model has four layers, 
each of which focuses on a particular production imperative and the 
associated core capabilities: (1) the production of the first product, (2) 
the production of the best product, (3) agile production and (4) mass 
production. The perspective of this paper is that of a manufacturing 
company with production facilities in high-cost countries (HCCs), such 
as Finland and other Nordic countries. In this spirit, we have demon-
strated that the production of factories located in HCCs should focus 
on the imperatives (1) and (2) above, and partly also on (3). Mass pro-
duction in HCCs seldom seems justified. Our empirical sample supports 
this reasoning.
THE GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION 
Some long- and short-term trends
Global production is changing the traditional regime of manufactur-
ing. Manufacturing and related competences are flowing from the 
postwar manufacturing centre of the world, the US, to the developing 
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countries, indicating an alarming loss of knowledge, skilled people and 
supplier infrastructure. Accelerating outsourcing of manufacturing 
into low-cost countries (LCCs) in search of competitive advantage has 
reached the point where manufacturing industries have declined in 
the US – possibly irreversibly. Access to low-cost production resources, 
mainly labour, has been emphasised as a rational for producing abroad 
(Lewin & Peeters, 2006; Pisano & Shih, 2009).
Europe is not immune to this trend. The Western world has already 
lost the crown of world’s manufacturing centre to Asia, mainly China 
(see Figure 1). Overall, all high-cost countries (HCCs) seem to follow the 
same pattern, where manufacturing operations tend to be offshored to 
low-cost ones.
 
Figure 1. Distribution of industrial production 1750–2100 (Source: 
Bairoch, 1982)
 
Finnish manufacturing companies have also been in turbulence. In re-
cent years, the development has been alarming. The order intake in 
the technology industries has dropped dramatically (see, e.g. Figure 2) 
and the recovery has been slow. The value of the export has decreased, 
most dramatically in the electronics industry.
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Figure 2: Value of order books in technology industries in Finland 
(Source: Federation of Finnish Technology Industries, 2010)
The sharp decrease in order books was primarily caused by the global 
financial crisis. However, the future recovery will presumably not ac-
celerate the order intake to the level that existed prior to the recession. 
Globally operating companies have relocated their assembly factories 
and other core operations in close proximity to the growing markets, 
primarily in Asia. Accordingly, the supply base of raw materials, com-
ponents and subassemblies will also be relocated. This phenomenon 
explains the starvation of order flow for the prerecession suppliers lo-
cated in HCCs distant from the growing markets (Figure 2).
Such a trend can especially be observed in the consumer electronics 
industry, where the cost pressure has increased once the industry has 
become into mature state. As the original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) have located their assembly factories in the Far East, there is 
not much room for international subcontracting companies in high-
cost areas.
The underlying cost drivers of globalisation
Comparing the labour cost internationally in the current state, the 
future does not seem promising for Western Europe’s manufacturing 
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(Table 1). In terms of the differences in labour costs, ratios of 1:20 are 
customary if we compare the hourly labour cost level in LCCs to that 
in HCCs. Ratios over 1:30 also appear (Germany and Sweden compared 
to India and Ukraine). 
 
Table 1. Comparison of global hourly labour cost in the steel indus-
try (Source: Steelonthenet, 2009) 
 
US $/hour 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Australia 14,4 13,3 15,4 19,8 23,1 24,6
Brazil 3,5 3,0 2,6 2,7 3,0 3,2
Canada 16,5 16,2 16,7 19,4 21,4 23,7
China 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,1
Czech Republic 2,8 3,1 3,8 4,7 5,4 6,1
France 15,5 15,7 17,1 21,1 23,9 25,3
Germany 22,7 22,5 24,2 29,6 32,5 34,1
India 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,9
Italy 13,8 13,6 14,8 18,1 20,5 21,7
Japan 22,0 19,4 18,7 20,3 21,9 21,4
Kazakhstan 0,5 0,7 0,7 0,9 0,9 1,0
Korea 8,2 7,7 8,8 10,0 11,5 14,1
Mexico 2,2 2,5 2,6 2,5 2,5 2,5
Spain 10,7 10,8 11,9 15,0 17,1 17,6
Sweden 20,2 18,4 20,2 25,2 28,4 29,7
Taiwan 6,2 6,1 5,6 5,7 6,0 6,4
Ukraine 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,7 0,7 0,8
United Kingdom 16,7 16,8 18,3 21,2 24,7 26,0
United States 19,7 20,6 21,4 22,3 23,2 23,8
 
However, labour cost is only one explanation. First, hourly labour cost 
does not tell the whole truth about total cost. Energy and material 
prices contribute to the costs of goods sold. Distances from suppliers 
and markets with corresponding logistics costs add up to the total 
landed cost. 
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Besides cost, the operations management literature recognises mul-
tiple criteria for plant location. The fast-growing markets in the Far 
East, together with the low factor costs, amplify the basic trend to relo-
cate and grow manufacturing in LCCs. Currently, 50% of the economic 
growth on a global scale is explained by growth in China (Federation of 
Finnish Technology Industries, 2011).
Access to skills and knowledge may play a central role, especially in in-
dustries with demanding production tasks. Proximity of research and 
development (R&D) competence is essential with complicated prod-
ucts, in particular in their early phases of the lifecycle.
In some industries, the geographical concentration of manufacturing 
locations regarding the sources of supply is almost a norm (Cluster 
Competitiveness Group, 2002; Reichart & Holweg, 2008). Proximity to 
markets and the sources of supply affect not only transportation costs, 
but also reaction and delivery time to the customer. Distance to mar-
kets and the sources of supply also affect inventory levels. The location 
of competition may play a role when deciding on location.
The impact of trade politics in the forms of subsidies, tax barriers and 
local content requirements must not be underestimated. Besides these 
external and intrafunctional drivers, cross-functional dependencies 
within an organisation, such as the need for manufacturing to be lo-
cated close to R&D influence the location decision (see for example Ke-
tokivi, 2006), are also important.
Offshoring manufacturing to the Far East is a European and US phe-
nomenon, and both are struggling with the same issue: the outflow of 
manufacturing. A study initiated by the state of California compared 
the costs between Chinese and Californian manufacturing of products 
aimed for the US market. In a low-tech industry like apparel, the bare 
manufacturing cost difference was 50% in favour of China. Instead, 
the total landed cost level, covering not only the manufacturing and 
purchasing cost, but also logistics and quality costs plus the hidden 
cost related to for example product availability issues, reduced the cost 
difference drastically. In the apparel industry, the 50% cost difference 
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shrinks roughly by half, to 31%, as the total landed cost is calculated. 
For high-tech products, on the other hand, the cost difference is not 
that clear. The difference in the manufacturing cost is smaller (3% in 
favour of China) and logistics costs are negligible due to the high value 
per weight ratio. The ‘hidden costs’ reduce the gap into 1.8% (Bay Area 
Economic Forum, 2005; Eloranta, Ranta, Salmi, & Ylä-Anttila, 2010).
Similar results have also been obtained elsewhere. A comparative 
study looked at the consequences of locating the production of a small 
car in India rather than in Japan, for the Japanese target markets 
(Agrawal, Farrell, & Remes, 2003). The study showed that there is a re-
markable cost reduction potential of more than 20% if the vehicle is 
manufactured in India rather in Japan (Figure 3). It is noteworthy that 
the biggest saving potential is related to the relocation of the supply 
sources of purchased items. This is understandable, because the major 
share of manufacturing value added is based on the external resources 
of the manufacturing company. For example, in Finland, the value of 
purchased materials and services make up 65% of the revenue (Heik-
kilä, 2009).
 
Figure 3. The cost difference between producing a car in India vs. 
Japan for the Japanese market (Agrawal et al., 2003)
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All in all, costwise, the LCC manufacturing/sourcing cost advantage 
does have an impact on the location of manufacturing operations. 
The higher the relative labour content in the product costs, the more 
economical is the use LCC manufacturing/sourcing (Bay Area Forum, 
2005). This is counterintuitive in the thought models of many Western 
policymakers, who frequently emphasise that high value adding pro-
duction, often meaning at the same time high labour content, should 
be located at the home base, i.e. in a HCC. 
The rationale for offshoring versus onshoring
Most of the recently documented analysis (e.g. Agrawal et al. 2003; Bay 
Area Forum, 2005; Farrell, 2006) supports the current mega trend to re-
locate manufacturing in Far East, such as in India or China. However, 
there are also studies that question this imperative. The Bay Area Eco-
nomic Forum report used the concept of ‘hidden costs’, which under 
certain circumstances would outweigh the mere production and logis-
tics costs. The report launched the concept of ‘customer service capa-
bility’ to incorporate factors that should be considered in addition to 
the manufacturing and transportation costs, when the ultimate pro-
duction location decisions are to be made. ‘Customer service capability’ 
stands for capabilities such as short lead times, flexibility for demand 
changes and catering for short product lifecycle (Figure 4).
Figure 4 provides a decision-making model to locate production in a 
high cost vs. low cost area. The two criteria applied in production lo-
cation decision making in the Bay Area Forum (2005) report were cus-
tomer service capability (see above) and factor costs. If the factor costs 
are the dominating criteria in the customers’ purchasing decisions, it 
is reasonable to locate production where the factor costs are low (high 
offshore potential). In contrast, if the customer service factors domi-
nate as the purchasing criteria, production locations in the proximity 
of the customers are preferred (high onshore potential).
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The logic of Figure 4 holds when the geographical centre of gravity of 
the customer base is disjoint from the supply base, e.g. when the cus-
tomer base of an EU company is located in Europe (onshore) while the 
factor costs are the lowest in Asia (offshore). As mentioned above, most 
of the growth in the global economy is currently located Asia, exactly 
where the factor costs are the lowest. This implies that there is a huge 
global imbalance between high offshore potential and high onshore 
potential. In 2010, the economic output grew by 10.3% in China, while 
the growth in the Euro area was merely 1.8% (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011). This imbalance expected to continue in the future, which 
implies that a high percentage of jobs is at risk in high-cost areas, such 
as the Nordic countries.
The approach depicted in Figure 4 can be assumed to apply to other 
high-cost, high-competence geographical areas, such as Finland. A 
study by Heikkilä and Ketokivi (2005) compared Finnish, Japanese, 
Figure 4. The rationale of production in high-cost countries  
(Source: Bay Area Forum, 2005)
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Swedish, German and US factories, and provided at least some evi-
dence that the prerecession situation in industry supports the mod-
el of the Bay Area Forum (2005) report. With the US (68%), the share 
of the innovative products was the highest in the Finnish factories 
(64%), followed by Germany and Sweden (59%) and finally Japan (48%). 
The required volume flexibility was the highest in the Japanese (36%) 
and the Finnish factories (32%), compared to US (27%), Sweden (21%) 
and Germany (17%). The repetitiveness of production was the lowest 
in Germany (3.7), Finland (3.8) and Sweden (3.9), compared to US (4.4) 
and Germany (4.6). Even though there are many sources of variance 
and error in the data by Heikkilä and Ketokivi (2005), there is at least 
some weak evidence that small HCCs such as Finland have built their 
manufacturing competences on customer service factors. The study by 
Ketokivi and Heikkilä (2005) also provides some explicit evidence that 
the cost factors are not dominating in the operations strategy of the 
Finnish factories.
Scandinavia will most likely keep on generating products for local 
and global markets, where cost is a secondary factor in the custom-
ers’ purchasing decision (e.g. high-value niche products like Genelec 
loudspeakers and B&O consumer electronics), or where the total cost 
is equally low or even lower when the products are produced in Scan-
dinavia. Similarly, products where the customer service capability re-
quirements are high will be most likely produced for the local markets 
(e.g. fresh food).
In a recent study about Finnish factories (Turkulainen & Blomqvist, 
2010; see also chapter 2 of this book), it was discovered that Finnish fac-
tories typically have a high competence level and correspondingly ver-
satile responsibilities. For location, proximity to the market turned out 
to be an important factor. However, the Finnish factories typically do 
not deliver products in high volumes to the global markets, but rather 
serve the local, domestic markets. This means that the Finnish facto-
ries are well prepared to serve customers located in Finland, a market 
that, unfortunately, is small and growing only slowly. Moreover, for 
most of the global markets, factory location in Finland is a logistical 
disadvantage.
Figure 4. The rationale of production in high-cost countries  
(Source: Bay Area Forum, 2005)
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In the following sections, we will discuss the required factory capa-
bilities in the course of the product lifecycle within a manufacturing 
network in order to better understand what kind of factories would 
have a successful future in Finland, or more generally, in some other, 
similar HCCs.
THE EVOLUTION OF MANUFACTURING IN FINLAND IN THE 
LAST DECADES
Manufacturing industries have declined in HCCs. The root causes of 
this are connected to the uneven distribution of resource costs and 
economic growth in the world economy. However, it would be too sim-
plistic to state that product manufacturing will vanish in HCCs.
In this chapter, we shall introduce a model to describe and explain the 
transitions of the locations of manufacturing plants. The perspective 
adopted relates to the company and value chain levels. The model will 
provide not only a description, but also a prescription for the charac-
teristics of manufacturing that will be viable in HCCs in the years to 
come. The model is constructed based on research work carried out in 
the Finnish context (Eloranta et al., 2010).
In a nutshell, the evolution of the Finnish manufacturing industries for 
the last 50 years has applied different recipes for success: After World 
War II, there was a long period of high fixed investments in heavy in-
dustries, in particular for pulp, board and paper machinery, but also 
for heavy mechanical engineering. The period ended with the collapse 
of one crucial customer, namely Soviet Union, towards the end of the 
1980s. In these turbulent connections, the long-lasting vicious circle of 
overinvestment, inflation and devaluation was broken down and re-
placed by the connection of the Finnish economy with the European 
monetary system. The economy was opened to favour industries de-
pendent on imported raw materials, such as electronics (Eloranta et al., 
2010). In terms of manufacturing capabilities, the dominance of invest-
ment in fixed assets such as machinery came to end.
The period from mid-1990s to 2008 was one of fast growth. Informa-
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tion and communication technology (ICT) industries, in particular 
telecommunications, reached the level of global excellence. Strong in-
vestments in soft assets, such as R&D, manufacturing engineering and 
supply chain capabilities turned out to be extremely profitable. The 
growth declined with the stagnation of telecommunications business 
and crashed with the global financial crises that hit the country during 
the second half of 2008.
What the recipe for the coming years will be remains to be seen. We ad-
vocate that the success of the Finnish industry after the financial crisis 
lies in an innovation-based strategy. High-cost and high-competence 
countries like Finland will likely not be successful providers of ‘unin-
telligent’ mass products, where the competition is easily lost to LCCs. 
Mass products should be replaced by ‘intelligent products’, where the 
customers’ purchasing criteria are based on perceived value. In order 
to achieve this, the key capability will be the ability to create and de-
liver new, value-based innovations. It should be noted that this inno-
vation ability does not relate to technical innovations only, but rather 
emphasises the customers and markets as a starting point, creating 
value-adding solutions (Eloranta et al., 2010).
COMPETITION STRATEGIES AS A BASIS FOR DIFFERENTI-
ATION IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
There are three different competitive strategies as described by Treacy 
and Wiersema (1995):
 · Product leadership;
 · Customer intimacy; and
 · Operational excellence.
Let us elaborate separately on these three competitive strategies from 
the perspective of manufacturing capabilities.
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Product leadership strategy
Product leadership strategy is built on the capability to serve the mar-
kets with the most advanced – or customers’ best preferred – products. 
This strategy relates not only to products, but also to services. For brev-
ity, we shall use here the term ‘product’ to mean both products and 
services.
This strategy is most appropriate when there is enough room to com-
pete with product attributes, whether tangible or intangible. This is 
most natural in the early phases of the lifecycle of a value domain. 
These are the stages of early adopters and enthusiasts, expressed in 
the lifecycle model by Moore (1991). The production capabilities associ-
ated with the product leadership strategy can be explored in terms of 
the production capability roles discussed by Johansen and Riis (2005):
 · Laboratory factory;
 · Prototype factory;
 · Ramp-up factory;
 · Benchmarking factory; and
 · Full-Scale factory.
A laboratory factory develops new manufacturing processes and new 
production configurations. A prototype factory assists the product de-
velopment function in developing and testing products. A ramp-up 
factory sets up the delivery of a new product or a customer-adapted 
version of an existing one. It may also serve as an integrator with prod-
uct development. A benchmarking factory provides knowledge about 
production possibilities and the costs associated with carrying out 
effective, small-scale production. The main volumes can be produced 
elsewhere. Finally, a full-scale factory provides fast, reliable delivery to 
customers at competitive prices. Such a facility may serve as the main 
source of supply for all the markets.
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Product leadership strategy can be divided into two stages according 
to the maturity of the value domain: first, the stage of the first prod-
uct, and later, the stage of the best product. In the very early phases of 
value creation for a new value domain, the key challenge is to bring the 
very first products to the market for the use of a potential customer 
community composed of early adopters, such as technology enthusi-
asts and visionaries. In the later stages, the potential customer base 
grows as the first pragmatists discover new offerings that could add 
value to their life. This segment is not inspired by newness as such, but 
by potential tangible value over costs. At this stage, the competition 
also starts, and the supplier with the best product will possess a com-
petitive advantage.
The first product strategy and related production capabilities
In the first stage, the challenge is to bring the first product to the po-
tential customers. Competition is negligible because the markets have 
not yet been established. The driver that leads to market behaviour is 
technological push. The factory roles needed in this phase, in terms 
of the model by Johansen and Riis (2005), are laboratories, prototype 
workshops and ramp-up factories. Costs are relatively less important 
provided that the sales price is affordable to the early adopters.
The core competences required in the company are customer driven 
R&D and capabilities to realise the visions, blueprints, mock-ups and 
prototypes, and ultimately functional products. Knowledge exchange 
capabilities between the company and its value chain partners, cus-
tomers and suppliers, are a must, so that the mutual understanding of 
needs and requirements could be materialised in the form of a tangible 
product. The related production capability is the ability to create the 
first ever fully functional products for the markets. The production 
mode requires capabilities for producing pilots, prototypes and ready 
products as one-off productions or in small batches. A subcontractor 
network with corresponding prototyping capabilities is needed, and 
this network should be located close to R&D in order to enable the fast 
realisation of the new product ideas.
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We refer to this as the ‘innovation reactor’ stage, and postulate that the 
innovation reactor is the most important entity that a manufacturing 
company located in an HCC would need for its long-term survival. If 
the innovation reactor of a large corporation fades away, the corpora-
tion will face serious trouble in the long run.
In order to nurture innovations towards larger-scale business, a thor-
ough understanding of the market and end users is needed. The inno-
vation reactor is the heart of an innovator company, but the products 
and services will need to move from the reactor level to other levels in 
order to create business.
The first product strategy and related production capabilities
After the first products have successfully been launched to the mar-
kets, it is more appropriate to talk about the best product strategy. If 
the customer experiences of the first products have been positive and 
the demand starts to grow, the other players also become interested in 
entering the market in terms of launching competing products. What 
comes to the production related capabilities, the customers, in particu-
lar the pragmatists, are less forgivable that the early adopters. Thereby 
the role of quality as the purchasing criterion grows. Moreover, costs 
are relevant as a purchasing criterion, because pragmatists tend to 
weight customer perceived value against costs.
With the best product strategy, the rules of the game are different 
from the first product strategy due to the larger scale. At this stage of 
the product or industry lifecycle, it is no longer enough to produce sin-
gle products or services for enthusiastic techies; rather, the products 
need to provide significant customer value for the target customers, 
and this has to make sense economically. From an R&D point of view, 
this means adding features and improving the quality and reliability 
of the product. From a production point of view, this means stabilising 
product structures and production processes and creating the capabil-
ity to increase production volumes with marginal cost.
The production role model by Johansen and Riis (2005) does not pro-
vide a perfectly applicable role for production when the competitive 
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corporate strategy is built on the best product approach. Nevertheless, 
the concept of a ‘full-scale factory’ can be considered fairly applicable 
for the best product–based corporate strategy, if a ‘full-scale factory’ is 
considered as scaling up a ‘ramp-up factory’ to a full-fledged factory 
for volume production. A high level of quality management processes 
and principles is an absolute must for the product leadership strategy. 
The suppliers should be hooked into the interorganisational business 
processes for quality and dependability.
The product leadership strategy is not sustainable unless the company 
is able to bring to the markets new products and services as a contin-
uous flow. This is why production should be located in the proximity 
of R&D. However, even though there is widespread understanding of 
the need to locate production close to R&D, when the intensity of new 
product development is high, there is not much research to support 
this intuitively obvious reasoning (Ketokivi, 2006).
Customer intimacy strategy
According to Brown and Hagel (2005), very few companies create sig-
nificant shareholder value through breakthrough product innova-
tions. Most economic wealth comes from more modest advances that 
accumulate over time. This counterintuitive observation is based on 
the idea that product leadership strategy is normally connected to the 
early stages of the lifecycle of a value domain, where sales volumes are 
still relatively low.
With the product leadership strategy, the location of production has 
little significance: The most important location factor is the proximity 
to R&D, the availability of a favourable business and supply infrastruc-
ture and access to competent resources. These preconditions change 
when the business moves towards a customer intimacy strategy. At 
this stage, similar products and services are offered by several actors, 
so managing the customer interface becomes the most important 
capability. The products still have small differences, but they are no 
longer significant. The winner is most likely the supplier whose prod-
ucts and customer services create the best combination for the cus-
tomer: Customisation of the offering, fast and reliable delivery and 
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important value-adding services such as vendor-managed inventories 
and after-market services. Thus, the proximity to customers – both ge-
ographically and mentally – becomes highly relevant. Fast and flexible 
production and delivery processes are essential. 
As a value domain matures, there are fewer and fewer opportuni-
ties for major differentiation through product characteristics. This is 
where the product-based competitive advantage is replaced by cus-
tomer intimacy–based advantage through process innovations (Ham-
mer, 2004). Process innovations are crucial for building competitive 
advantage and generating wealth. Wealth generation is justified, here, 
because the scale of the markets is high towards the end of the growth 
phase of the product lifecycle.
In her PhD thesis about the production capabilities over the lifecycle 
of a value domain, Vehtari (2006) discovered that operational innova-
tion plays biggest role when transferring from introduction to growth, 
or as Moore (1998) defines it, ‘entering the tornado’, and then in the ma-
turity phase when seeking for new growth opportunities in mature 
markets. Vehtari (2006) also observed the importance of the second 
transition phase from high growth to maturity. According to her, op-
erational innovation, when entering the growth phase, can be labelled 
as shaping the future, while readiness for change could be labelled as 
adapting to the future through flexibility.
Tushman and Nadler (1986) also support the idea that, first, there is 
a substantial amount of product innovations, which could even lead 
to a dominant design. In the next stage, product variation gives way 
to competition based on price, quality and segmentation, i.e. custom-
er-centric process innovations. This often requires distribution chan-
nels and suppliers which are different from those that serviced older 
product generations. An organisation may find at least some help in 
coping with the high uncertainties imposed by the environment by 
increasing manufacturing flexibility (Swamidass & Newell, 1987) and 
strengthening distribution channels. The customers would experience 
such efforts as increased agility and extraordinary value added by the 
supplier (see, e.g. Collin, Eloranta & Holmström, 2009).
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The preconditions for agile customer service are based on collabora-
tive business models (such as vendor managed inventory (VMI), shar-
ing of demand visibility and flexible technologies (Collin, Eloranta & 
Holmström, 2009). The location of the factories is not very critical, 
provided that the requested delivery times can be met. Proximity to 
the markets is preferred. In a global business, this means that there are 
supply sources, own or outsourced, in each market region – or at least 
distribution centres – for sufficiently fast deliveries. European markets 
may be supplied from European factories. This means that in the agil-
ity stage, some factories may also be located in HCCs such as Finland.
In terms of the factory taxonomy by Ferdows (1997), the category of 
the factories required in the agility phase is the contributor factory. 
The contributor factory serves a specific national or regional market. 
Due to the requirements for extensive customer service, capabilities 
for product and process development and supplier management are 
required. Obviously, the lead factories (Ferdows, 1997) can also serve the 
purpose in the agility stage, as the lead factories have the capabilities 
to create new processes, products and technologies, not only for a spe-
cific market region but also for the entire company.
Operational excellence strategy
According to Vehtari (2006) manufacturing has big impact from the 
competitive advantage point of view during the transition from 
growth to maturity (ready for sudden changes, leanness and control) 
when it is essential to slow down and control the whole supply chain 
and to adapt to the change (Courtney, Kirkland, & Vigurie, 1997; Ham-
mer, 2004). 
At the end of the growth stage, a company has to be prepared for 
changes in its competitive situation. To prepare for decline when there 
still is growth in the market requires a strategy for lean growth with a 
lean organisation. Fixed costs should be minimised. The target should 
be the next lower price point (Moore, 1998). Cost efficiency is the dom-
inating competitive asset. Therefore, production operations should 
be located to take the advantage of low factor costs. If own factories 
cannot provide sufficient scale, it is sensible to outsource production 
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to mass production contract manufacturers. The hunt for scale advan-
tage leads to centralised production facilities in offshore locations, if 
the head office is located in an HCC such as Finland. Manufacturing in 
LCCs should be supported by global sourcing, which takes advantage 
of the benefits of cost-efficient sources of supply without sacrificing 
high-quality specifications.
On the mass product level, the markets are global and saturating. The 
products have become the mainstream. The primary, and often the 
only competitive advantage is price. Production will most likely take 
place in mass production factories, owned either by contract manu-
facturers or the company itself, and positioned globally in locations 
where the production cost and the total landed cost is optimised, also 
taking into consideration the requirements for quality and delivery 
capability. The key supporting capability is sourcing. Raw materials, 
components, services and especially manufacturing services have to 
be sourced at competitive cost.
There are a few exceptions where competitive cost efficiency can be 
achieved in the mass production mode, yet maintaining most of the 
production in HCCs. According to Vehtari (2006), Nokia and Dell were 
able to expose the best cost efficiency in the market and yet have fac-
tories in HCCs. Both of the companies enjoyed market leadership, 
granting the highest market volumes in production and purchasing. 
As the share of manufacturing costs and overheads are negligible in 
the costs of goods sold in PC and mobile phone manufacturing, Nokia 
and Dell enjoyed the competitive advantage of the lowest cost produc-
er although they have factories on each continent. Conceptually, this 
is a situation where the imperatives for agility and mass production 
are temporarily coincident. Such a situation, unfortunately, is not sus-
tainable.
THE INNOVATION ENTERPRISE MODEL
As described in the previous section, a full portfolio of production 
characteristics that covers all the phases of the product and service li-
fecycle meets the challenges of four production capability imperatives:
265
 · Produce the first product;
 · Produce the best product;
 · Produce products in agile production, sourcing and distribution 
modes; and
 · Produce products in the mass production mode to compete in 
cost efficiency.
The four imperatives are disjointed in the sense that the capabilities 
required for each of them are different. Producing the first product is 
based on experimentation, close proximity with product development 
and deep technological collaboration with innovative suppliers. The 
production of the best product relies on systematic, quality-oriented 
processes and a highly skilled and disciplined labour force. There is not 
much room for experimentation with the inherent risk taking. Agility 
in production counts on strong operative collaboration with suppliers 
and customers, flexible manufacturing and assembly technologies, de-
mand visibility and expeditious operations. In mass production, con-
tinuous improvement in production and product engineering to save 
the last cent from the production and supply chain costs is a must.
It is possible for a small company to stick on one or two layers by fo-
cusing on the capabilities for the first product and/or the best prod-
uct. However, a small company cannot compete in scale against large, 
global players at the agility and mass production layers. Naturally, if a 
small company is capable of growth, e.g. due to being leveraged by its 
excellence in the product leadership strategy, the natural direction for 
growth is to proceed to the agility and mass production layers.
Although the most of the money is made in the mass production and 
agility layers, the survival of a large corporation is dependent on the 
vitality of its innovation reactor. Therefore, to become and stay vital, 
large companies should incorporate capabilities in every layer. Figure 5 
illustrates the four-layered model of an innovation company, originally 
published in Eloranta et al. (2010).
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Figure 5: The innovation furnace model
It is impossible to prove that a conceptual model of companies, such 
as the innovation furnace model above, is right or wrong. However, it 
should possible to demonstrate the existence of such a model through 
narratives or case studies. In this spirit, we shall describe briefly four 
case studies. Each of them has operations on at least one layer of the 
innovation furnace model.
The Dynaset case
One example of a small innovator company is Dynaset Ltd., a leading 
manufacturer of hydraulic generators, power washers and compres-
sors (for more details, see e.g. www.dynaset.com). The business idea of 
Dynaset Ltd. is to use hydraulics from the carrier machines to provide 
power to other equipment, too. Basically, everything Dynaset does is 
based on one of the three product lines – electricity, high pressure wa-
ter and pressured air, all under the descriptive company slogan ‘Pow-
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ered by hydraulics’. Dynaset’s innovation is derived from the daily work 
of the customers. An example is a small-scale excavator entrepreneur 
customer, working on a construction site as a subcontractor. There is 
seldom electricity available from the country-wide electrical networks 
at the early stages of the construction site project. However, hydraulics 
from the carrier machine, an excavator in this case, can be used as a 
source of power, e.g. for pumping water out of the pit, welding, or doing 
something else where the mainstream solution is based on the use of 
electricity, generated by an aggregator. The advantage of the hydraulic 
machinery is the small size in relation to the power, which enables the 
entrepreneur to keep the most important tools on board his carrier 
machine (excavator) and make use of the tools with the energy provid-
ed by the hydraulics. 
This is where Dynaset differs from the mainstream companies on the 
market, which apply the electrical energy available ‘from the socket’. 
Dynaset’s solutions are most appropriate for the nonmainstream cus-
tomer segments, i.e. the customers provided with hydraulics power of 
their carrier machinery in an environment where electricity ‘from the 
socket’ is unavailable. For such a segment, the solutions by Dynaset are 
superior to any other technologies. This segment is globally too small 
to attract big global players but big enough to justify the required in-
vestments for a niche company such as Dynaset.
Dynaset has grown from a modest one-man company to the market 
leader of the world in its dedicated branch of hydraulics applications. 
Thanks to high quality and innovativeness, the company has been able 
to successfully expand its business worldwide. The products are sold 
directly to more than 40 countries. About 90% of Dynaset’s products 
are exported, 70% directly and 20% through Finnish producers using 
Dynaset equipment as a component in their own export products.  
From the furnace model point of view, Dynaset occupies the inno-
vation reactor and the best product levels. The vitality of Dynaset is 
based on the capability for continuous, innovative engineering work 
towards new applications of hydraulic machinery. In this area, the im-
perative of the ‘first product’ is followed. As the product starts to sell, 
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the prototype stage is bypassed by progressing to the level of small 
series, full-scale production. Product designs are not tuned for techno-
logical details, but to fulfil particular customer needs.
The founder of the company, Mr Karppinen, has received many awards 
for his accomplishments as an entrepreneur and innovator. As part of 
the company’s 20-year festivities in June 2006, Mr Karppinen received 
‘The Golden Entrepreneur Cross’ medal from the Finnish Entrepre-
neurs’ Association. 
The Teleste case
Teleste is a Finnish company with almost 50 years of history in inno-
vation, currently providing broadband video technology solutions and 
services for operators, as well as digital transmission systems for sur-
veillance, monitoring and security. In 2009, the international US cable 
operator Liberty Global awarded Teleste with is Best Vendor award for 
Best Transport HFC. Liberty Global emphasised the award winners’ 
(Teleste and other laureates, including Cisco, Sun Microsystems, Am-
docs and Accenture) ability to create innovative solutions that fulfil 
the consumers’ needs. 
Teleste was founded in 1954. In the early stages, the company devel-
oped and manufactured radio and aerial components. It soon expand-
ed, in modern terms, from a component manufacturer into a systems 
provider, when it started delivering common antenna systems for 
apartment buildings. The R&D capabilities have been used actively 
to conquer new product segments such as language-teaching studios. 
More recently, the company business has evolved into technologies for 
cable television and video surveillance. 
Throughout its history, Teleste has reinvented its business, occupying 
the three topmost levels of the furnace model. The innovation reactor 
of Teleste has been the iconic landmark of the company. Teleste was 
the pioneer in cable television antenna systems. Teleste was a pioneer 
with the language laboratory systems, but divested the business be-
fore the market saturated. Currently, Teleste is active in two business 
areas: video and broadband solutions and network services. The video 
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and broadband solutions business segment emphasises product solu-
tions for broadband access networks, video head end platforms and 
video surveillance applications. Moreover, Teleste seeks expanding 
business opportunities in service business by providing comprehen-
sive network service solutions, mainly for cable networks. The service 
portfolio consists of network planning, network installation and up-
grade projects, as well as field services.
Teleste has systematically divested businesses when the products have 
evolved into commodities, at the mass product level of the furnace 
model. Today, Teleste’s manufacturing network contains factories in 
Finland and China. The Finnish factory is clearly a lead factory, but 
it also has a strong flavour of prototype and ramp-up factories. The 
Chinese factory could be classified as a source factory, and it has many 
more mass production characteristics than the Finnish one. 
Figure 6. The role of the Dynaset factory and the Teleste factories in 
the innovation furnace model
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Figure 6 illustrates the roles of the Teleste factories (China and Littoi-
nen, Finland) and Dynaset Ylöjärvi factory in relation to the innova-
tion furnace model.
The NOTE case
For any company, the location of production is dependent on many 
factors, such market proximity, labour costs, access to competent la-
bour force, and raw material cost and availability (e.g. Schmenner, 1982). 
One of the factors is related to the business ecosystem (Moore, 1996). 
From the perspective of innovation companies, the bottleneck is some-
times related to the suppliers capable of accomplishing tasks to realise 
ideas into tangible products. In the case of production, the business 
ecosystem should include manufacturing facilities – in-house or con-
tracted – that are capable of producing prototypes, 0-series and ramp 
ups of products composed of new technologies.
This case will present that of NOTE Hyvinkää Oy, a part of NOTE AB, a 
Swedish electronics contract manufacturer with manufacturing units 
in several European countries and China. NOTE is an example of man-
ufacturing companies which are part of a business ecosystem capable 
of launching new, innovative products. In its business ecosystem, the 
role of NOTE is to help the product companies by providing contract 
manufacturing services, from prototypes up to full-scale production 
series.
NOTE Hyvinkää Oy, the Finnish daughter of NOTE AB, has its roots 
in a company called Point Product Oy. During the fast rise of the elec-
tronics industry in Finland in the 1990s, Point Product specialised in 
professional electronics, which at that stage of the industry, typical-
ly had short product lifecycles and small production series. The first 
production facility of Point Product was located in Hyvinkää, Finland. 
Later, with increasing cost pressures, the company founded a factory 
in Pärnu, Estonia, close to the factory of an important customer, in or-
der to benefit from cost potential of the near-shore location. In 2004, 
the company was sold to NOTE AB.
Today, NOTE Hyvinkää Oy can offer three levels of manufacturing 
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services, first, prototypes and new products produced in Hyvinkää, 
Finland. The site is close to the R&D premises of a key Scandinavian 
customer, and especially close to the customer’s new product devel-
opment unit. This site is a prototype and ramp-up factory: ‘when the 
customer’s product development engineer visits us less than once in a 
month, it is time to move the product away from Finland’ (a comment 
of the managing director of NOTE Hyvinkää Oy). Products in the next 
stage of the lifecycle are produced in Pärnu, Estonia. Pärnu’s role as a 
production site is a source or even a regional lead factory. The third 
level, mass production for customers in Asia, can be offered through 
NOTE’s own factories or their partners’ factories in Far East. The roles 
of NOTE factories in relation to the customers’ production imperatives 
are illustrated in Figure 7.
 
 Figure 7. The factories of NOTE in their roles to support the custom-
ers’ production imperatives
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It is interesting that NOTE is not an innovator company as described 
in the furnace model, even though it provides the necessary manu-
facturing infrastructure services for the innovative companies in the 
business ecosystem at all the levels of the furnace model. It is notewor-
thy that the ‘first product’ and ‘best product’ imperatives are served 
by a factory located in a high-cost location (Hyvinkää, Finland), while 
‘agile production’ is provided by the factory in Pärnu, Estonia (a fairly 
low-cost location). The most cost-competitive production facilities are 
located in China, in both own and outsourced factories. In practice, the 
portfolio is not that black and white due to the transportation costs 
and delays. This implies that the Chinese factory is not necessarily the 
optimal location, even cost wise, for the European customers.
The KONE case
KONE is a large European-based company operating globally on three 
main continents. The company designs, produces, delivers and main-
tains elevators and escalators, i.e. investment goods used in construc-
tion projects. Both of the two major product groups are subject to tight 
legislative requirements. Both products are customised either through 
a modular structure or customer-specific engineering. In this case 
study, we shall focus on one of the two product lines. The corporation 
has four factories to manufacture this particular product line. Two of 
them are located in Europe, one in Asia and one in Latin America. The 
term ‘factory’ is here used to refer to a production site, which may con-
sist of several subfactories producing different products or modules. 
This implies that a production site may have multiple modes of opera-
tions, e.g. from the perspective of the innovation furnace models. The 
different modes of operations are typically applied in different subfac-
tories.
KONE has a long history and has been growing strongly, mainly through 
acquisitions but also organically. Although the growth through acqui-
sitions has brought the company a wide portfolio of manufacturing 
sites, in recent years, the company has been concentrating on building 
a truly global operations network with clear roles and responsibilities 
of the production sites. The current stance of the factory portfolio in 
respect to the innovation furnace model is illustrated in Figure 8.
273
The position of the whole portfolio of factories indicates that the cor-
poration is strongly prepared for the imperative of agile delivery. All 
four factories can serve the markets flexibly with relatively short no-
tice from the customers. It is interesting that in spite of its competi-
tion in the global marketplace, the ‘territory’ of the mass production is 
fairly weakly populated by the in-house factories of the corporation. 
This is a conscious choice in the production strategy. The commodity 
items are outsourced to contract manufacturers. Accordingly, the com-
pany leverages the benefits of the lowest cost production capabilities 
in the supply markets without in-house investments in assets subject-
ed to fierce competition.
Figure 8. The roles of the factories of one product group of KONE 
with respect to the innovation furnace model
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The factory site in Finland has the manufacturing role of the innova-
tion reactor in the corporation. Even though the R&D capabilities are 
dispersed worldwide, the Finnish factory has the most favourable loca-
tion in terms of the R&D capabilities and facilities. Overall, the Finnish 
factory has the strongest grip on the Treacy and Wiersema (1995) ‘prod-
uct leadership’ strategy in the corporation covering both the impera-
tives of the ‘first product’ and the ‘best product’.
The other European factory is positioned somewhat similarly to the 
factory in Finland, but with less orientation towards the ‘first prod-
uct ’ imperative. The factories in Asia and Latin America are primarily 
configured to fulfil the agility and mass production based competitive 
advantage over the global competitors.
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS
The empirical data to validate our model are not rich, and in nature 
more anecdotal than rigorous. We have positioned the production fa-
cilities of four companies in the spectrum spanned by our innovation 
furnace model. Three of these cases are product companies, designing, 
manufacturing and distributing products under their own brand. The 
role of the fourth case company is to serve as a contract manufacturer 
for product companies in their value chains. All four case companies 
are operating in international, partly global markets. Only a minor 
share of revenue is generated in the domestic markets. Three out of 
the four case companies have more than one factory, located in high-
cost and low-cost countries.
What is common to all the case companies is that the factory located 
in an HCC (Finland in all the four cases) is focusing on the product 
leadership strategy to support new product development (the first 
product) and to satisfy the demand of high-quality market segments 
(the best product). The empirical case sample of this research at least 
demonstrates the hypothesis that factories in HCCs should focus on 
innovation and product leadership–based business ideas. At the com-
pany level, the demonstrative evidence is equally clear. Irrespective of 
the size of the company, each of the four cases exhibits the importance 
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of the role of the innovation reactor in the economic sustainability of 
the company. Three of the companies are building their future on own 
product development and the supporting new product production ca-
pabilities in the proximity of R&D resource centres. The fourth case 
company serves a similar purpose, but by providing contract manufac-
turing capabilities to support the customers’ innovation processes in 
the proximity of the customer’s R&D resources.
Three of the four companies have at least one factory to fulfil the ag-
ile production imperative. The fourth one is small, with all the odds 
on the product leadership strategy. Each of the factories is located in 
the proximity of the particular markets, either in Europe, Asia or the 
Americas. However, there are also cross-continental material flows.
All the four case companies are relatively weakly prepared for the mass 
production imperative. The smallest of the cases (Dynaset) excludes 
mass markets completely. All the others leverage the mass production 
capabilities of their suppliers. Even the largest and the most global of 
the case companies relies on the strategy to focus on high value add-
ing, in-house production.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has discussed the challenges that manufacturing compa-
nies have encountered in the global economy. It has approached these 
challenges from the viewpoint of companies with their home base in 
the European HCCs. Specifically, the empirical research material fo-
cused on companies with their home bases in Finland and Sweden.
We introduced a model for designing factories to support their pri-
mary competitive imperative. These imperatives were linked with the 
overall business strategies by Treacy and Wiersema (1995), i.e. product 
leadership, customer intimacy and operational excellence. The prod-
uct leadership value discipline was further divided into two produc-
tion imperatives, ‘produce the first product’ and ‘produce the best 
product’. The former emphasises the capability of production to col-
laborate with new product development and realise the ideas of R&D 
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as tangible products at affordable costs and tolerable delivery times. 
The latter reflects the capability of manufacturing to produce goods 
and services in full-scale volumes, without sacrificing the quality spec-
ifications and expectations of the customers. In our model, the value 
discipline of customer intimacy was reflected as an agile production 
imperative, while the operational excellence discipline called for the 
mass production imperative.
Our model has four layers, each of which focuses on a particular pro-
duction imperative and the associated core capabilities: (1) the pro-
duction of the first product, (2) the production of the best product, 
(3) agile production and (4) mass production. The perspective of this 
paper is that of a manufacturing company with production facilities 
in HCCs such as Finland and other Nordic countries. In this spirit, we 
advocated and demonstrated that the production of factories located 
in HCCs should focus on the imperatives (1) and (2) above, and partly 
on (3). Mass production in HCCs seems seldom justified. Our empirical 
sample supports this reasoning.
What kinds of manufacturing capabilities are needed in different lay-
ers of an innovation company? The factories in the innovation reac-
tor are by nature laboratories and prototype factories up to the point 
where first products are out in the market. If the goal is rapid growth, 
it is advantageous if the manufacturability and the suitability of the 
new products for larger-scale production has been considered. After 
prototyping, production needs to be ramped up for commercial deliv-
eries. There are no general rules if the production capabilities at this 
stage require intermittent or continuous production processes. Some-
times, for investment goods, even a one-off production process will 
do, although generally at least some sort of repetitive, small lot size 
production is required to meet the quality and cost norms. At the best 
product layers, the production processes must be optimised, usually 
by tuning the production into small-series manufacturing. Thus, man-
ufacturing engineering capabilities are a must. In the agility layers, 
the factories should be designed for short lead times and flexibility. In 
HCCs, this requires flexible manufacturing and assembly technologies. 
In LCCs, there are more degrees of freedom to achieve flexibility tar-
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gets by low-cost manual work. In the mass production layer, the cost 
targets dominate over all the other objectives. Due to high volumes, 
flexibility is not that critical. However, mass production does not mean 
tradeoffs when it comes to quality norms. It is interesting that none 
of our case companies possessed strong capabilities in low-cost mass 
production. The required cost efficiency of the commodity items was 
achieved through outsourcing the production of commodity items 
from low-cost contract manufacturers.
It is also worthwhile to recognise the global operations’ skill and com-
petence requirements in the agility and mass production layers. As we 
have demonstrated, factories in the agility layer and especially in the 
mass production layer are located outside Finland and other HCCs, 
and are typically distributed to LCC countries in Asia or other emerg-
ing markets. Consequently, skills related to global operations manage-
ment, global sourcing and procurement, as well as technology transfer, 
become crucially important.
When it comes to the future of production facilities in Finland, it is like-
ly that manufacturing industries will employ fewer people in HCCs. 
Before the most recent financial sector–triggered economic turmoil, 
the manufacturing industries employed roughly half a million work-
ers in Finland. Perhaps 350,000–400,000 will be employed in future. 
The share of production-related jobs would exhibit a deeper decline, 
while the number of product development, product management, ex-
ports, sourcing, and other knowledge-intensive job positions would 
grow, at least relatively. We have suggested that at least the following 
capabilities will be of use for the future factories located in HCCs such 
as Finland (Eloranta et al., 2010):
 · Building and testing of new technologies;
 · Building of prototypes and first series of new products;
 · Building the first products in the market;
 · Ramping up the volume of production;
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 · Just-in-time and agile production;
 · Production of customised products and product variants;
 · Manufacturing of core components (even in the mass produc-
tion phase if feasible cost wise); and
 · Integration of products (for example, assembly and testing).
Based on our case research, we believe that the tasks outlined above 
contain the essence of future manufacturing in HCCs. 
FURTHER RESEARCH
This book chapter proposed a model to support the decision making to 
locate factories in relation to the business lifecycle of the value offer-
ing of the company under study. We suggest that factories to be located 
in HCCs should support and enhance the innovation processes of the 
company. The evidence supporting our ideas is somewhat anecdotal. 
Therefore, it would be natural to continue our research with rigorous 
validation of our ideas using more in-depth case studies and statisti-
cally relevant observations with larger samples.
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CASE 1 
 
Consequences and Opportunities of 
a Global Two-Factory Production 
Network
Anna Fredriksson, Linköping University, Sweden 
Patrik Jonsson, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden
INTRODUCTION
This is a case concerning the design and utilisation of a network of two 
factories (here called a two-factory production network). The two-fac-
tory production network consists of one factory in Sweden and one in 
China. It is a Swedish company that has outsourced part of its cast-
ing processes to Chinese suppliers. In connection with the outsourc-
ing of the casting processes, a Chinese company was established with 
the purpose of manufacturing similar final products as the Swedish 
company for the Chinese and South-East Asian market. This Chinese 
company machines and quality controls the outsourced casting goods 
before shipping them to Sweden. Casting goods are quite standardised 
and mature items, physically nonsensitive to transport and with a low 
value. However, casting goods put some very specific requirements on 
the supply chain depending on their physical characteristics and how 
they are produced. Casting goods are in most cases voluminous items 
and are normally transported by sea. Quality defects are sometimes 
only discovered after processing, and the scrap rates are often quite 
high compared to other items.
During the past decades, the conditions for the production industry 
have changed considerably; the external business environment has 
become more global as international trade has increased massively 
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(Kleinert, 2003, Feenstra, 1998; Kleinert, 2003). Globalisation has opened 
up new markets for companies to sell their products in and from 
which to identify new suppliers. Developments in information and 
communication technologies have facilitated the ability of organisa-
tions to globalise production and access new markets (McIvor, 2006). 
The globalisation of markets and improved communication technol-
ogies together increasingly bring about a redesign of the value add-
ing chain (Feldmann et al., 1996). It has become increasingly important 
to establish and manage one’s position within global production net-
works (Karlsson, 2003). Many Western companies today try to under-
stand how best to combine global low-cost country sourcing with local 
sourcing and in-house manufacturing to get the benefits from all of 
these practices. The question these companies need to answer is how 
to catch the opportunities of global production networks, including 
factories with very different conditions. This is also true for the Swed-
ish company presented here.
The case is presented below, and the question for the Swedish compa-
ny is how it can make the best of the situation and take advantage of 
its global production network. 
THE GLOBAL TWO-FACTORY NETWORK
This section presents the case study of a global two-factory production 
network in a supply chain of casting goods. The casting goods are a 
main component in the final product produced both in the Swedish 
and the Chinese factory, although at present, the factories are serving 
different markets with their final products. 
The supply chain
The Swedish manufacturer (EM) was founded in 1901, and since 1968, 
has belonged to an American corporation. EM has about 4,000 employ-
ees and produces between 100,000 and 110,000 final products in 20,000 
to 30,000 variants annually, with main markets in the US and Europe. 
The products are used in wet environments and are relatively heavy 
and large in size. Product lifecycles are long and the spare part commit-
ment is 15 years after the end of production. The head office, including 
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product development, is in Stockholm, Sweden, with the production in 
the south of Sweden and two central warehouses: one in France and 
one at the production site. EM’s production includes a foundry and 
five workshops where machining, assembly and tests are performed. 
The Chinese manufacturer (CM) is also a subsidiary within the Ameri-
can corporation, has about 200 employees and is situated in Shenyang. 
CM was established in the mid-1990s and makes a similar but smaller 
assortment of products to EM. The sales of finished products on the 
Asia-Pacific market comprise 84% of its turnover and 16% are supply 
of items, mainly to three European original equipment manufacturer 
(OEMs) in the American corporation. EM is its largest OEM customer. 
 
 
EM has the capability and capacity to manufacture all parts of the final 
product within its own facilities. The EM production includes a found-
ry and five workshops, with machining, assembly and testing. The five 
workshops focus on different sizes and materials of the final product. 
Three are supplied with castings from China. EM purchases about 300 
casting items and produces about 1,000 items in its own foundry. At 
present, about 50 casting items are sourced from China. EM manufac-
tures about 240 tons per week and receives about 10–11 tons of castings 
from the CM per week. The EM demand has historically been even, 
Figure 1: Organisation structure of the American corpora-
tion (AC)
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with only minor variation each year, although a few years ago there 
was a sudden increase in demand. This resulted in an increased supply 
from China in order to handle capacity problems in the EM produc-
tion. However, last year, there was a downturn in demand, and since 
then, EM has had problems filling its own capacity. 
One or two containers are sent each week from CM to EM by ship. The 
shipping time by sea from the Chinese port in Dahlian to the Swedish 
port in Åhus is about seven weeks. The transport between the facto-
ries and the ports are carried out by trailers. The shipping delivery pre-
cision is considered good by EM. EM has experienced some problems 
with the supply from China; for example, deliveries are sometimes de-
layed and contain too small quantities or unacceptable quality. One 
specific problem for EM is to know what will be delivered, since EM 
does not receive a list showing exactly what items and volumes are 
included in the shipment until the ship leaves port in China. 
What is sent from CM to EM is dependent on weekly updated orders 
based on forecasts. The forecast is a 15-week rolling forecast based 
on historical sales and moving average calculation. Orders are placed 
eight weeks in advance of estimated arrival at EM. In order to not miss 
deliveries to EM, CM produces casting items to a finished goods inven-
tory and delivers to EM from this inventory. The Swedish CEO of CM 
finds it frustrating that tied-up capital of CM is increased by the neces-
sity of having large inventories to meet EM demand on service level. 
One problem connected to CM being a distant supplier is the order 
cycle time. This depends on the shipping time of about seven weeks. 
The long lead times also create long ramp-up times for increases in de-
mand. It takes about two to three weeks before changed volumes are 
shipped from CM. The quality problems and the long lead times and 
order cycle times make it necessary to keep quite high safety stocks 
at EM for items sourced from China. This is frustrating for EM, as it 
increases the cost of sourcing from China, and the idea behind sourc-
ing from China is to decrease costs by utilising the low labour costs 
there. The estimated average lead times and inventory levels of EM are 
shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Transport and EM production characteristics 
 
Factor Case data
Transport from China 6–8 weeks
Lead time for foundry, machining and ad-
ministration, EM
1–3 weeks
Inventory safety stock, EM 2–7 days’ consumption
Inventory cycle stock, EM 2 weeks’ consumption
 
Casting items arriving from China to EM are preprocessed in China, 
and after goods reception and quality control at EM, delivered into the 
inventory of the workshop where it is to be used. Several items from 
China are used in more than one workshop, although each workshop 
at EM has a separate inventory. 
The CM plant has similar production resources to EM, except for the 
foundry and engine production processes. CM buys casting goods 
from Chinese suppliers. These are either used as incoming material 
in the production of CM’s own products or delivered to its OEM cus-
tomers. The main operations carried out by the suppliers are casting 
(foundry) and machining. Most foundries and machining subcontrac-
tors are located geographically close to the CM plant, often within one 
day of transportation. There are about 10 active suppliers of casting 
goods, but 80% of the volume is purchased from four major suppliers, 
located about four hours from CM. The roads from Shenyang to the 
coast are well-kept asphalted roads; however, some of the roads from 
Shenyang and inland to the suppliers are gravel roads, which can be 
very demanding to use. 
It is difficult for CM to find suppliers that can perform multiple op-
erations – as yet, it has been unable to identify any supplier able to 
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carry out all operations required. Although there are some suppliers 
with both foundry and machining capabilities, CM must use special 
foundry suppliers and special machining subcontractors. The machin-
ing subcontractors are in general underutilised, and therefore often 
accept orders with short notice. At present, washing, quality control 
and packaging are always carried out by CM in its own plant in order 
to catch defective goods. The different capabilities of the suppliers and 
the number of operations a supplier can perform create very differ-
ent supply chains within China for CM. Figure 2 describes two typical 
supply chains of casting goods for CM. Supply chain (a) represents the 
characteristics of the ‘short’ chain, where one supplier conducts both 
casting and machining. Supply chain (b) illustrates the ‘long’ chain, 
where casting and machining are carried out by different suppliers 
and casting goods fail quality control and must be returned to machin-
ery for rework and sometimes also to the foundry. 
 
Figure 2. Short (a) and long (b) supply chains of casting goods to CM. 
F=foundry, M=machining, W=washing and Q=quality control. A tri-
angle illustrates an inventory, a circle illustrates an operation and an 
arrow illustrates a material flow
The uncertainty in lengths of lead times and quality levels differs be-
tween the best- and worst-case supply chains in China (Figure 2; see 
also Table 2), although low product quality is a general problem among 
the suppliers, especially among foundries. Therefore, as the supply of 
castings from China began, there were major quality problems with 
the goods received by EM. However, over the years, the product quality 
of the items arriving from China has improved from poor to generally 
F M QW
China supplier CM EM China foundry
F
M
QW
China machining
CM EM
a) b)
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good; today, the quality is about the same as items from European cast-
ing suppliers or from the local foundry. This is because CM has become 
better at stopping defective goods in China, not because the quality has 
improved among the Chinese suppliers. At present, quality control is 
carried out both before leaving China and on arrival at EM. The improved 
quality level has made it possible for EM to consider decreasing the quan-
tity of quality controls on the goods arriving from China.   
Table 2. Characteristics of supply from CM  
 
Factor Short supply chain Long supply chain
Delivery times, Chinese 
foundry suppliers
N/A 2–7 weeks
Delivery times, Chinese 
machining
3–5 weeks (including 
foundry)
2–4 weeks
Inventory throughput 
time, CM
2–3 weeks 2–3 weeks
Washing and quality con-
trol lead time, CM
1–2 weeks 1–2 weeks
Total lead time, China 6–10 weeks 7–16 weeks
Product quality level 93% 90–97%
Note: Figures in Table 3 are estimates given by the CM CEO, purchas-
ing manager, quality manager and logistics manager. Monitored ac-
tual figures are used when available.
The existing strategy of combining supply of castings from EM and 
CM are based on different criteria. EM prefers to source items with 
large volumes from China. However, the decision is also based on price 
and transportation costs. A desire to order full packages of an item af-
fects the volumes of what is sourced from China. Some products are 
also sourced from China to increase purchasing volumes of items also 
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needed by CM. Another reason for sourcing in China on the EM side 
is when the EM foundry needs capacity support. The American corpo-
ration also has a percentage goal of sourcing a minimum proportion 
of the total purchase volume from China. To reach this goal, EM also 
needs to source nonvolume products from China. This is not popular 
within EM, as it increases inventories of low-volume goods. What prod-
ucts, and how large volumes, are sourced from China are dependent on 
all of the above criteria, which makes the decisions a bit random.
Consequences of low cost sourcing 
Consequences of low-cost sourcing on the supply chain can be de-
scribed via three categories of characteristics: the supply network 
structure, the supply network relationships and characteristics of low-
cost countries (Fredriksson & Jonsson, 2009). The main dimensions of 
the characteristics are outlined in Table 3. These are used below to de-
scribe the consequences of the two factory network used for supply 
chain of cast iron goods. 
 
Table 3. Summary of sourcing characteristics (Fredriksson & Jons-
son, 2009)
Category of sourcing characteristics Sourcing characteristics dimension
Supply network structures
Layering and tiering
Plant roles
Supply network relationships
Business relationships
Operative dependencies and trans-
action costs
Sourcing country characteristics
Infrastructure
Culture
Human capital
Policies and regulations
 
Layering and tiering. The supply chain is a network of long distances, 
covering several time zones. The supplier structure in China also var-
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ies due to a lack of suppliers that can offer multiple operations (see Fig-
ure 2). This creates considerable differences in lead times and product 
quality between the short and long supply chain in China (see Table 2). 
The long supply chain requires several suppliers to complete an item, 
and increasing lead times as a result. Due to the increased unreliability 
of the supply chain and product quality, it is also then necessary to 
increase inventory levels at CM to ensure the agreed service level to 
EM. In the short supply chain, these problems are reduced, as there 
are fewer echelons in the supply chain and the product quality is gen-
erally better. The long lead times in China and the shipping time to Eu-
rope of seven weeks increase the planning horizon for EM and make it 
necessary to base Chinese purchase orders on forecasts. EM must also 
manage all short-term demand changes through its internal capaci-
ty. This is not popular among EM production planners, as it leads to 
replanning. Because of the long delivery times by ship, it is also some-
times necessary to use more costly air freight, increasing the total price 
of the goods sourced from China. The long lead times in China also 
create long ramp-up times when demand increases. It takes about two 
to three weeks before changed volumes are shipped from CM, making 
it difficult to plan and make changes in items and orders. The quali-
ty problems and long lead times make it necessary to maintain safety 
stocks at EM for items sourced from China.
The role of plants. CM was originally established to serve the Chinese 
and Asian markets and to open up sourcing from China for EM. To 
ensure product quality and to ensure or reduce lead times to EM from 
China, i.e. to increase overall delivery dependability, it is necessary for 
CM to act as intermediary and handle quality control, communica-
tion and holding inventories. Using CM as an intermediary makes it 
possible for EM to obtain a low-cost supply of castings from China. 
It would have been very burdensome for EM to handle the product 
quality problems and communication from Europe with the Chinese 
suppliers. This would require a lot of travelling forth and back by the 
EM purchasers. In the early days of CM, CM needed EM’s demand to 
fully utilise its capacity; today, however, the deliveries to EM oblige CM 
to carry out operations when they lack space and time, creating order 
backlogs and increasing delivery times for other customers. According 
294
to the Swedish CEO of CM, CM would like to use its resources to focus 
on its own market supply, the Chinese and South-East Asian market. 
Such a focus would enable growth in this area. One positive effect of 
CM’s presence in China is that it opened up the Chinese and Asian 
markets and supply market for the whole AC, including EM.
Business relationships. Low product quality is a general problem 
among the current suppliers in China, especially the foundries, and 
there is a lack of knowledge transfer and communication about de-
livery and product quality requirements from CM to its suppliers. CM 
is also a relatively small customer to most suppliers, and this is one 
reason why it cannot convince suppliers to adjust to its requirements. 
Another effect of its weak position towards suppliers is that suppliers 
often prioritise deliveries to other customers when there are delivery 
problems, in spite of delivery agreements with CM. Since it is difficult 
to find trustworthy and reliable suppliers in China, CM has spent con-
siderable effort finding new suppliers or developing relationships with 
the best active suppliers to further improve the best supply chains. 
The EM–CM relationship is not trouble free. Within EM, there is some 
resistance to sourcing from China, which makes employees less coop-
erative. Several employees within EM question the point of sourcing 
from China when EM does not fully utilise its own resources, especial-
ly as the reason for sourcing from China stems from a decision made 
by the board of the AC, and therefore the practice was forced upon EM. 
The lack of cooperativeness is evident in communications, in among 
other things, a lack of explanation of drawings and instructions pro-
vided to CM. Some of the sourced items have also been too complex 
to produce at the right quality, which has further increased problems 
for CM. In addition, drawings and prototypes are not interpreted in 
exactly the same way, leading to extra administration, which also neg-
atively affect the planning processes. The resistance to CM at EM is 
sometimes shown by employees almost looking for errors in the items 
arriving from China. However, some of the problems experienced by 
EM with the supply from China, such as communication and coopera-
tion, product quality and supplier reliability, have been improved dur-
ing the years. To further integrate the two organisations, the respon-
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sible purchaser at EM visits CM in China five to six times a year for 
about two to three weeks, and a Swedish CEO has been hired for CM.
Operative dependencies and transaction costs. What is sent from CM 
to EM depends on weekly updated orders based on forecasts. The 
forecast is a 15-week rolling forecast, based on historical sales and a 
moving average calculation. Orders are placed eight weeks in advance 
of delivery. The unreliability of Chinese casting suppliers in terms of 
product quality, lead-time length and variability has in the past creat-
ed shortages at CM, resulting in delivery problems to EM. To be able to 
deliver to EM at the appropriate level, CM has been forced to make a 
larger proportion of its assortment to stock and maintain high safety 
stocks in the finished goods inventory. CM must also quality control 
all items received from Chinese suppliers. Thus, quality problems, long 
lead times and deficiencies in delivery precision – as well as the need 
to maintain the appropriate delivery quantities and qualities for EM 
– decrease CM’s ability to reduce tied-up capital and production costs 
and free resources to produce for its own markets. 
The low reliability of the Chinese item manufacturers further in-
creases the need to manage the volume and product mix flexibility in-
house, not only at CM but also at EM. EM feels that it cannot trust the 
supply chain from China, and does not know when and what will be 
delivered until the ship leaves port. Because of the overall lack of relia-
bility of supply, EM must manage flexibility in-house, which increases 
inventories at EM, too. It also compels EM to keep its in-house produc-
tion planning open for short-term changes in priorities, depending on 
what is sent from China. This relates to earlier studies showing that 
business processes such as demand forecasting and material planning 
are dependent on effective communication; however, effective commu-
nication is obstructed by different cultures, languages, practices and 
time zones (Brannemo, 2006; Levy, 1995; Mattsson, 2002; Meixell and 
Gargeya, 2005; Mol et al., 2005). Some items sourced in China have been 
too complicated for CM to produce, and this has resulted in product 
quality issues. Product quality has recently improved, however, with 
the result that EM is considering reducing the quality control of goods 
delivered from China. 
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Culture. The Chinese workforce is very mobile – the majority of cur-
rent factory workers are what are called the floating population, com-
ing from rural areas to the cities to look for work (Handfield & Mc-
Cormack, 2005), and Chinese workers have a tendency to change jobs 
frequently. At CM, employee turnover was about 10% per year, which 
is considered high. Cultural differences can also result in innovation 
barriers and different understandings of tolerances and specifications 
of products (Nellore et al., 2001; Smith, 1999). There have been a num-
ber of culture-related problems between CM and EM resulting from 
language difficulties and differences in thinking, especially between 
departments of the two companies that do not regularly meet. As a 
result of lack of common mind set, both sides consider the quality of 
communicated information to be low, leading to extra administration 
and a negative effect on planning processes. 
Human capital. There is high employee turnover in China, which can 
be a problem for manufacturers that rely on trained and skilled work-
ers, and in more developed regions of China there is a shortage of 
available labour (Handfield & McCormack, 2005). In CM’s experience, 
it has been difficult to find skilled personnel in China and difficult to 
keep them. The Swedish CEO expresses frustration over the fact that 
well-functioning employees have a tendency to move on to new jobs, 
especially as there are several Western companies established in the 
neighbourhood of the factory and these are looking for Chinese work-
ers experienced in working in Western companies. Knowledge of sup-
ply chain management among CM personnel and CM’s suppliers is not 
considered sufficiently high to optimise the supply chain as a whole 
rather than specific parts in isolation. CM argues that Chinese sup-
pliers lack understanding about the consequences for other parts of 
the supply chain of defects in product quality and low delivery relia-
bility. This creates problems of late deliveries and low product quality, 
and results in an environment already in China where deliveries and 
product quality cannot be trusted. Therefore, a great deal of effort has 
been spent on trying to identify new and further develop relationships 
with the best-performing current suppliers. For EM, one of the positive 
aspects of sourcing from China is the low-cost workforce, which is re-
flected in product prices. 
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Policies and regulations. Intellectual property rights protection and 
legal systems in some low-cost countries, including China, are less ma-
ture than in Western countries (Song et al., 2007). Countries with rapid 
social change increase the risk of participants nullifying or changing 
contracts (Schniederjans & Zuckweiler, 2004). There is also a risk of 
copying or suppliers using the companies’ products or drawings when 
supplying another customer with goods, which decreases sourcing 
companies’ willingness to share information (Handfield & McCormack, 
2005; Song et al., 2007). CM must deal with Chinese suppliers who do 
not adhere to what has been agreed upon. However, CM has little pow-
er over its suppliers, and suppliers sometimes prioritise other custom-
ers rather than the agreements made with CM. The result has been 
that Chinese suppliers cannot always be trusted, and dependability 
and service are considered low. One example of this is that if CM push-
es deliveries, some suppliers still deliver even if they do not have the 
necessary material, and even if they know the quality is substandard. 
The suppliers sometimes do not accept that they are responsible for 
a product quality problem; instead, they claim that the problem oc-
curred during transportation, handling or in the CM process during 
washing. 
Infrastructure. The transportation structure in China is at present be-
low European levels: There are bottlenecks and congestion not only 
due to capacity constraints and equipment performance, but also pol-
itics and a low level of logistics planning (Handfield & McCormack, 
2005). The telecommunications and transportation infrastructure in 
China differs between regions, and the more developed regions with 
functioning infrastructures also have higher labour costs (Song et al., 
2007). These more developed regions of China also have other prob-
lems: worsening pollution, overheated infrastructure and power bot-
tlenecks (Handfield & McCormack, 2005). Most foundries and machin-
ing subcontractors are located close to the CM plant, often within one 
day of transportation. Making infrastructure an issue not considered 
to result in any significant consequences. However, some suppliers are 
located in more rural areas, where poor road quality can sometimes be 
a problem.
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CONCLUDING MARKS AND DISCUSSION
This section summarises the case and discusses the opportunities of 
how the companies can utilise the two-factory production network. 
Above, a two-factory production network, and how it is utilised today, 
has been introduced. It can be seen that there are several positive and 
negative consequences of having a global production network with 
two factories in very different settings and with very different prereq-
uisites. Western companies sourcing from low-cost countries are usu-
ally driven by a wish to increase competitive advantage by decreas-
ing the labour costs through utilising the low wages in these areas 
(Markides & Berg, 1988). However, it is important not to assume that 
low cost country sourcing is simply low labour cost country sourcing, 
since all associated costs and risks of sourcing should be taken into 
account (Nelson & Sisk, 2005). How the production network is designed 
affects how the flow and storage of goods and information exchange 
should be managed. A production network including several organisa-
tions increases the amount of uncertainty that needs to be managed 
while at the same time decreasing management control over the flows 
in the network (Fawcett, 1992), because coordination becomes harder 
as it requires efforts and resources from more than one organisation. 
The company becomes more dependent on the performance of others; 
for example, manufacturers suffering from disturbances in inbound 
flows from suppliers may also have disturbances in outbound flows to 
customers (Svensson, 2001). It is necessary, when making design deci-
sions, to weigh possible cost reductions against changes in the ability 
to deliver on time and the flexibility to respond to changes in customer 
demands (Bengtsson & Dabhilkar, 2009). Therefore, it is not obvious 
what the effects of using both low-cost country and local supply are. 
It can be seen that both EM and CM are ambivalent regarding how 
the production network is organised today and how the production 
resources are utilised. It is not obvious for either of the companies how 
the production network should be utilised in the future. It can be seen 
that multinational companies organise themselves to best address the 
tradeoff of global integration and in-house responsiveness (Colotla et 
al., 2003). Sourcing from low-cost countries may be seen as a balancing 
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act between lower production costs in low-cost countries and lower 
transaction costs in-house (Mol et al., 2005). Outsourcing of production 
leaves two options for the structuring of the supply network: either 
complete outsourcing of an item or process, or combining external 
sourcing and in-house manufacturing. According to Ferdows (2008), a 
mix between a footloose and rooted production network is preferred 
by many companies, but the companies have to be careful and organ-
ise the production network in an appropriate way. Otherwise, there is 
a great risk that companies slide into footloose manufacturing which 
is almost impossible to turn around once discovered. Ferdows (2008) 
takes the example of Zara as a company which is able to combine a 
rooted production network for time sensitive and complicated prod-
ucts and a footloose production network for simple conventional 
products. About half of its demand is characterised as predictable and 
stable and is made to stock, and half is uncertain and made locally with 
very short lead times. Several other companies, especially in the fash-
ion industry, use similar strategies (Christopher & Towill, 2001).
Choosing strategy for how to combine global sourcing and in-house 
manufacturing, i.e. accomplish the right mix between footloose and 
rooted production networks, includes selection of what items to source 
where and in what volumes. Item selection for sourcing in low-cost 
countries should be made on the basis of what gives the most benefit, 
while restricting oneself to in-house manufacturing of those items or 
part volumes of the item demand which are most likely to manifest 
great obstacles (Smith, 1999). Complete outsourcing of an item can be a 
variant of the focused factory concept presented by Skinner (1974), al-
though then, the question is raised of what items should be produced 
in which factory. Further, depending on the reason for outsourcing and 
if it is to come closer to a market, one strategy is to divide the markets 
between the factories and let one factory supply one market. However, 
these strategies can be further developed into variants and there are 
perhaps other possible strategies. Consequently, there are several ways 
in which the factories in a two-factory network can be utilised to gain 
the most positive performance effects. Coming back to Ferdows’ (2008) 
warning – that companies has to be aware of how to combine a foot-
loose and rooted strategy – The danger is when a company slowly slips 
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into a footloose strategy when their products and demand are better 
suited for a rooted strategy. However, above it can be seen that there 
are several possibilities in terms of how to develop the combined strat-
egy; thus, what is important is that it is an aware strategy. EM and CM 
have not yet so far had an aware strategy of how to utilise their pro-
duction network, though by drawing the attention to the possibilities 
and the risks, they can develop a strategy that fits their prerequisites. 
By the means of simulation, two different strategies of how to utilise 
the production network of EM and CM were tested (Fredriksson et al., 
2010). A new combination strategy (strategy 2, base-surge strategy) of 
sourcing items with predictable and stable demand in China was com-
pared to the present strategy (strategy 1, random strategy), where items 
were selected on a random basis. 
1. Random strategy: The first strategy is as similar as possible to 
EM’s present strategy of combining in-house production of 
castings and sourcing from China. The present strategy is to 
source a percentage of the total needed casting volumes from 
China. What items and what volumes are sourced from China 
are randomly distributed within the total volume.  
2. Base-surge strategy: The second strategy is to source specific 
proportions of each item in China, a so-called base volume. The 
volumes produced in China should have predictable and stable 
demand, while the volumes made in-house in Europe could 
have uncertain demand. The predictable and stable demand 
will be modelled with a fixed percentage of the average demand 
in the simulation model. The fixed quantities will be ordered 
from CM, and EM will handle the balance.
The new combination strategy would allow CM to decrease its inven-
tories, since demand from EM would be more predictable and improve 
forecasting accuracy. To handle the uncertain demand in-house at 
EM would not be a change for EM, since they already handle flexi-
bility in-house due to the long lead times from China. However, EM 
would probably receive improved customer service from CM, which 
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would decrease the uncertainty and make it possible to decrease safe-
ty stocks at EM. The results of the simulations showed that sourcing 
predictable and stable demand in China while handling uncertain de-
mand in-house decreased inventory levels both in China and in-house 
at EM; the results were significant at the p<0.01 level (Fredriksson et 
al., 2010). The inventory at CM decreased by 23%, while the inventory 
level at EM decreased by 6%. This shows that the strategies of com-
bining in-house manufacturing and global low-cost supply chains by 
separating predictable and stable demand and uncertain demand used 
by, for example, fashion industry companies (Ferdows et al., 2004) are 
also applicable for other industries.
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ABSTRACT
This paper is based on a firm study of a Finnish bicycle manufacturer, 
which operates in a severe business environment. The firm has its own 
factory in Finland, but since 2005, it has also sourced end products from 
the Far East. In autumn 2008, the firm’s management decided to out-
source its production of one bicycle model to the Far East, and in spring 
2010, the firm made the decision of backshoring the production of these 
bicycles back to the firm’s own factory in Finland.As a research strategy, 
the authors used a single case study method, which was related to oper-
ations management and carried out in two phases, in 2007–2008 and in 
2010; the research included both qualitative and quantitative analyses. 
The required make-or-buy product costs were analysed by comparing 
the total manufacturing costs at the firm’s factory with the total landed 
costs of the sourced bicycles in the firm’s factory warehouse. In order to 
make this cost analysis, the authors constructed an accounting model 
by which the firm has continuously been reviewing its competitive sit-
uation and simulated the financial outcomes of different management 
decisions. Hence, this paper describes a firm’s need for responsiveness 
14  Received June 6, 2011, First draft August 31, 2010
15  Researcher at Aalto University during the first phase of the  
  study
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for immediate actions when operating in dynamic and global compe-
tition. The authors want to contribute to the research by presenting a 
practical firm study which explores how outsourcing and backshoring 
decisions were made in a severe business environment.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last 25 years of globalisation, a major part of production has 
moved to developing countries. Initially, the main driver was not to 
respond to the growing demand of these markets; rather, the trans-
fer of production was mainly driven by the lower cost basis of these 
countries. The economics of offshoring have been quite straightfor-
ward, where manufacturers have looked for lower cost alternatives in 
manufacturing products, and hence to fulfil the price demands of their 
customers, as well as to respond to the even fiercer price competition 
from offshore competitors (Ferreira & Prokopets, 2009).
In addition to this economic rationale, the offshoring trend has also 
been reinforced by companies’ desire to focus their activities on their 
core competences and outsource various organisational noncore func-
tions. By offshoring their production activities to low-cost countries, 
large multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been able to take com-
petitive advantage of the emerging division of global labour markets.
The importance of accurate costs estimates for offshoring decisions 
are paramount, as one of the two main drivers behind offshoring de-
cisions is purely economic. Many of the economic comparisons have 
relied too much on comparing the labour and other manufacturing 
costs between developed and developing countries, with the result 
that many of the offshoring and outsourcing decisions have not given 
the promised savings.
Previously, it was claimed that ‘backshoring activities of once off-
shored capacities from foreign locations back to the domestic location 
are quite common phenomena, which have only made public in the 
rarest cases and not captured statistically’ (Kinkel & Maloca, 2007; Kin-
kel et al., 2009). Hence, the authors of this paper want to contribute to 
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this research topic by presenting a practical firm study which explores 
how the firm made outsourcing and backshoring decisions in its se-
vere business environment.
The case company and its recent production location decisions 
This article is based on a case study of a Finnish bicycle company, Bike-
sCo (the name of the case was changed), which started its business op-
erations as a wholesaler and assembler in the early 1900s. The firm has 
been manufacturing bicycles in Finland since the 1950s. Today, its main 
business is designing, manufacturing and marketing bicycles. BikesCo 
has its own factory in Finland, but recently the firm has also started 
end-product sourcing from the Far East.
Manufacturing bicycles in Finland has become very challenging. The 
business environment is severe. The domestic demand is saturated 
and seasonal, and there is a fierce price competition from foreign com-
petitors. Bicycle manufacturers are also quite dependent on a few key 
component suppliers, which have long delivery times and inflexible 
supply chains.
At present, BikesCo is the only bicycle manufacturer at an industrial 
scale remaining in Finland. The firm’s competitors have a price advan-
tage over BikesCo due to their remarkably larger production capabili-
ties and lower labour and other manufacturing costs. Since mid-2005, 
BikesCo, on the lookout for cost competitiveness, has outsourced its 
production to the Far East as the result of a chain of consecutive de-
cisions.
In autumn 2008, BikesCo decided to outsource all its production of the 
‘JOPO’ bicycles to the Far East. JOPO is a well-known Finnish bicycle 
brand, which was launched in the market in 1965. As a bicycle brand, 
JOPO can be best described as a classic and basic bicycle model. The 
production of JOPOs ceased in 1975, but was returned to production 
as a retro bicycle model in 2000. Over the last few years, the demand 
for JOPOs has been increasing, and owning a JOPO has become a new 
trend.
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The decision to outsource the production of JOPOs in 2008 was strong-
ly favoured by the prevailing euro-against-dollar exchange ratio of 1.5, 
which furthered the cost advantage of imported bicycles. In addition, 
the firm’s supply chain for the sourced bicycles seemed to be more 
flexible than that of the firm’s own production. When considering out-
sourcing from a financial perspective, the inventories were lower, the 
capital turnover was faster and the capital was used more efficiently 
(Gylling, 2008, p.111). The firm’s own production was, in turn, dependent 
on some critical components whose delivery times were so long that 
these components had to be ordered on sales forecasts months before 
their delivery.
As a back-up, however, BikesCo’s operations management decided to 
maintain a minimum production capacity for JOPOs and keep a com-
ponent safety stock available in the factory.
The operations strategy behind the decision was to outsource common, 
JOPO-type bikes and produce complicated value-added products, like 
electrically assisted bikes, in the firm’s own factory. This decision fits 
well with Fisher’s (1997) article, where he categorises products’ demand 
characteristics as innovative or functional and states that functional 
products should have an efficient supply chain, whereas innovative 
products should have a responsive one.
When the economic turmoil began in 2008, the business environment 
became more stringent for BikesCo. The demand for bicycles fell be-
low expectations in the 2009 season, which worsened the firm’s prof-
itability. The factory’s cost structure was too heavy to cope with the 
decreased market demand, and hence the firm’s management decided 
to downsize the factory’s production capacity.
The downsizing of the firm’s production capacity meant that 27 facto-
ry-level workers were laid off, i.e. almost 50% of the factory employees. 
The decision was based on simulations, where the minimum profitable 
production capacity was analysed bearing in mind the production lev-
el under which the factory should be closed.
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The downsized production capacity meant improved cost competi-
tiveness for the firm’s factory. Further, the strengthening of the euro 
exchange rate against the US dollar, in the period of summer 2008 to 
summer 2010, weakened the profitability of the sourced bicycles in re-
lation to those manufactured in the firm’s own factory. At the same 
time, the demand for bicycles was recovering from the wave trough 
of the economic turmoil and the firm’s profitability began to improve.
By spring 2010, it had become clear to the firm’s management that the 
balance between the firm’s own manufacturing and sourcing should 
be considered anew. It had also become evident that the delivery chain 
of the sourced JOPO bicycles from the Far East to Finland was not 
operating as well as had been anticipated at the time when the out-
sourcing decision was made. Due to the firm’s customer requirements 
and fluctuations in demand in Finland and Europe, the operational 
flexibility in production and logistics seemed to need improvement. 
In short, the management of operations as to delivery reliability and 
quality control suffered from the long, stiff delivery chain.
In 2008–2010, the firm continuously reviewed its competitive situation 
and simulated the financial outcomes of different management deci-
sions, with the accounting model being developed as a by-product of 
our case study (as described in the next section).
During spring 2010, the firm’s management was considering revising 
its operation strategy towards enhanced market proximity. From a fi-
nancial point of view, the profitability of the firm’s sourcing had start-
ed to become more unfavourable since the strengthening of the eu-
ro-against-dollar ratio had increased the prices of the sourced bicycles 
and components.
The results of the financial modelling showed that at the prevailing 
euro-against-dollar ratio, the total landed costs of the sourced JOPO 
bicycles exceeded the production costs of JOPOs at the firm’s own 
factory in Finland. At the same time, the production of JOPOs in the 
firm’s own factory could carry the requirements to maintain minimum 
production capacity in the factory. Hence, in May 2010, the firm’s man-
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agement made the decision to repatriate the production of JOPOs 
from contract manufacturing in the Far East back to the firm’s own 
factory. Kinkel and Maloca point out that ‘empirical studies often fail 
to take into account that manufacturing offshoring does not have to 
be an irrevocable process’ (Kinkel & Maloca, 2009, p. 154), and claim that 
‘backshoring activities of once offshored capacities from foreign lo-
cations back to the domestic location are quite common phenomena, 
which have only made public in the rarest cases and not captured sys-
tematically’ (Ibid., p. 155).
In our article, we want to contribute to this research topic by presenting 
a practical firm study which explores how outsourcing and backshor-
ing decisions were made and implemented in a business environment. 
Our research includes qualitative and quantitative analyses related to 
operations management. This has been carried out in two phases, in 
2007–2008 and in 2010. Moreover, we will later include a third phase in 
our research, when we analyse how the backshoring decision affected 
the firm’s operations, i.e. the ramping up of JOPO production. Hence, 
our research phases are well scheduled with the firm’s decisions to re-
spond to changes in its market environment.
As a research strategy, we use the single case study method and fol-
low the guidelines of Yin (2009) and Eisenhardt (1989) . In her article 
on ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’, Eisenhardt writes 
(Ibid. p. 534) that ‘the case study is a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics within single settings’, and further ‘case 
studies typically combine data collection methods such as archives, in-
terviews, questionnaires and observations. The evidence may be quali-
tative (e.g. words), quantitative (e.g. numbers), or both’.
The research framework suits our BikesCo case well, because backshor-
ing phenomena cannot be studied without considering the preceding 
manufacturing relocation decisions either, as ‘Backshoring activities 
consist of an interlinking of two sequentially following relocation de-
cisions and can only be discussed in connection with the previously 
made offshoring decision’ (Kinkel & Maloca, 2009, p. 156).
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Eisenhardt writes that ‘case studies can be used to accomplish vari-
ous aims: to provide description, test theory or generate theory’ (Ei-
senhardt, 1989, p. 535). We believe that our article provides its readers 
with increased managerial utility by giving, as mentioned above, a 
description of a practical firm study which explores how outsourcing 
and backshoring decisions were made and implemented in a business 
environment.
The scope of the research
At the beginning of the action research in 2007, the firm’s profitability 
had been unsatisfactory for several years, and hence the firm’s man-
agement had raised the make-or-buy issue, i.e. whether contract man-
ufacturing is more profitable than the firm’s own production, as an 
issue of long-term survival. The management then decided to answer 
this issue by analysing the total manufacturing costs in the firm’s fac-
tory and comparing these with the total landed costs of the sourced 
bicycles at the firm’s factory warehouse. The scope of the analysis is 
shown in the figure below. The costs of the component supply and the 
profitability of deliveries to final customers were left out of the scope 
of the analysis.
 
Figure 1. Total manufacturing costs compared to the costs of sourced 
bicycles
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The analysis was implemented as a joint effort between the firm’s 
management and our project team at the Aalto University (Eloranta 
et al., 2009, p. 6). We constructed a model to support the required cost 
analyses, performing our analyses in two steps:
 · Analysis of the firm’s own production costs by using time-driv-
en activity-based costing (TDABC); and
 · Analysis of the product costs of the sourced bicycles, using the 
concept of fully loaded total landed costs (TLCs).
As a result of our efforts, our model was adopted as an operative man-
agement tool, replacing the old management accounting system.
BACKGROUND 
The concept of fully loaded total landed costs (TLCs)
To determine the financial implications of a specific supply chain 
structure, the total supply chain costs should be measured. Especially 
when comparing sourcing decisions, the TLC analysis proves useful. 
Our experience as business practitioners has often shown, however, 
that a too simplistic TLC approach to analysing sourcing opportuni-
ties may result in too low estimations of supply chain costs. A study 
from Aberdeen (Enslow, 2006) also confirms this statement. From the 
companies that were studied, 91% said that their supply chain costs 
were unexpectedly high.
Many companies calculate TLC as follows:
TLC = Unit price + average transportation cost + average handling cost 
+ duties and taxes
This metric clearly gives too optimistic a picture of the total costs. Ab-
erdeen suggests that a comprehensive analysis of total landed cost 
should include many more cost factors than the traditional calcula-
tion. The fully loaded TLC is the sum of the following components (En-
slow, 2006):
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Unit price (manufacturing costs + price of materials)
+ Average fully loaded transportation costs (incl. accessorial and fuel 
surcharges)
+ Expediting costs
+ Average handling costs
+ Duties and taxes
+ Documentation and broker fees
+ Financial transaction costs (e.g. letter of credit charges and currency 
exchange)
+ Inventory carrying costs
+ Inventory obsolescence costs
+ Product rework or damage costs
+ Customer service penalties (e.g. chargebacks)
The concept of time-driven activity-based costing (TDABC)
Cooper and Kaplan introduced activity-based cost (ABC) accounting at 
the Harvard Business School in the mid-1980s. ABC is a costing method 
based on ‘activities’. With ABC, overhead costs are assigned to activi-
ties, and then to products, orders and customers according to the con-
sumption of the different activities. ABC accounting has widely been 
implemented in various organisations. However, the real applicability 
of these ABC tools has been largely criticised by business managers 
and other practitioners (Everaert et al., 2008), since it has often proved 
difficult to describe the firm’s actual processes without adding more 
and more nuanced new activities in the model, thereby increasing its 
complexity. As a result, the requirements for the maintainability and 
computational and memory capacity of the model are progressively 
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increased. Moreover, even the relevance of the ABC methodology has 
often been criticised by business practitioners, since the reliability of 
the information concerning activities included in a traditional ABC 
model is dependent on the data, which are based for the most part on 
interviews and surveys, and hence, are sensitive to the behaviour of 
the interviewed employees.
In 2004, to overcome these practical difficulties related to the usabil-
ity of ABC, Kaplan and Anderson (2004) developed time-driven ABC 
as a revised version of ABC analysis, introducing ‘time estimations’ as 
drivers for each specific activity. Hence, the TDABC approach of Ka-
plan and Anderson does not assign resources and costs to the specific 
activities, but rather identifies the different departments, their costs 
and their practical capacity. By dividing the total cost by the practical 
capacity, the cost per time unit is calculated. Costs then are assigned 
to the order (or product or customer) by multiplying the cost per time 
unit by the time needed to perform the activity (Everaert et al., 2008).
When creating the TDABC methodology, Kaplan and Anderson (2004, 
2007) designed the concept of ‘time equations’, which is used to mod-
el how time drivers drive the time spent on an activity. As described 
by Kaplan and Anderson, by using multiple time drivers, complex ac-
tivities can be modelled without expanding the number of activities. 
Hence, TDABC seems to support the design of cost models in environ-
ments with complex activities.
DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY
The BIT Research Team has been working together with the senior 
management of BikesCo on an action research basis since 2006. The 
research has included a mixture of qualitative and quantitative issues 
related to operations management, and was carried out in two phases, 
in 2007–2008 and in 2010.
Our action research started in August 2007 as part of the RESPONSE 
project (2006–2008), and thereafter continued in the GlobeNet Project 
(2009–2011). Both projects were funded by TEKES (the Finnish Funding 
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Agency for Technology and Innovation) and implemented in tight co-
operation with a group of participating Finnish firms (Eloranta et al., 
2009, 31-34; Jussila et al., 2012, 44-54).
BikesCo contributed to the RESPONSE project as a participating 
firm during the first phase of this case study in 2007–2008. The sec-
ond phase of this study was carried out during May–October 2010. The 
third phase will be carried out later and its aim is to analyse the impli-
cations of the repatriation of the JOPO production on the firm’s oper-
ations, i.e. how the production ramp up of JOPOs succeeded after the 
backshoring decision.
 
Figure 2. Timeline of the case study
 
The implementation of the study
As already mentioned, the management of the firm had raised the 
question of whether contract manufacturing is more profitable than 
own production as an issue of long-term survival. Consequently, the 
firm’s management decided to analyse the total manufacturing costs 
at the firm’s factory and compare those costs with the total landed 
costs of the sourced bicycles in the firm’s factory warehouse. In order 
to make this cost analysis, we constructed a model to support our cost 
analyses and by using it, made the required make-or-buy product cost 
comparisons. 
When we analysed manufacturing cost allocations, we had to research 
the firm’s internal accounting methodology and files in depth by using 
the TDABC methodology. As a result of our action research, our model 
was adopted as an operative management tool, replacing the old man-
agement accounting system. This part of our research was finalised by 
autumn 2008.
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In 2008–2010, the firm continuously reviewed its competitive situation 
and simulated the financial outcomes of different management deci-
sions with the developed accounting model. In summer-autumn 2010, 
during the second phase of our study, we interviewed the firm’s senior 
management and collected the financial data produced by the model. 
The validity of the model was challenged by questions posed to the 
firm’s senior management without thoroughly evaluating the chang-
es made in the accounting model. However, based on our accumulat-
ed experience as business practitioners, we concluded that the model 
seemed to produce relevant financial outcomes and the interviews 
gave no indications to the contrary.
In the third phase of this firm study, our aim is also to re-evaluate the 
validity of the model.
Description of the model construction
Modelling manufacturing costs  
As described above, we used the TDABC methodology to analyse the 
manufacturing costs. We evaluated all allocations of working hours 
and wages paid to workers by identifying the work activities/tasks 
that were performed in the production process. This information was 
used to calculate how wages should be allocated to each bicycle model 
in the production.
Our results for the products’ manufacturing costs differed from those 
taken out of the firm’s management accounting. The old cost account-
ing model used by the firm did not match well enough with the data 
taken from the external accounting, which indicated that the produc-
tion costs were underestimated in the management accounting. The 
difference was on average more than +10% (see that of an example 
product in Figure 3 below), but there were also a few bicycle models 
whose manufacturing costs were lower than the firm had previously 
assumed.
One of the main improvements in the new model was that it took 
into account all production-related costs, such as indirect materials, 
work-related costs and support activities. Previously, these had been 
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taken into account with a multiplier that was directly related to the 
direct manufacturing costs and was of the same value for all different 
bicycle models. With a more detailed decomposition of the costs, the 
model became more reliable, took into account all related costs and 
was more accurate of a product level, as well as with the aggregated 
firm level.
We increased the reliability of our analysis by matching our calcula-
tions with the firm’s audited balance of accounts. As a result of the 
model building, we were able to improve the accuracy of the produc-
tion cost calculations, and hence our model replaced the old manage-
ment accounting system and was adopted as an operative manage-
ment tool.
 
Figure 3. Comparison between the old and new product cost model 
showing a 17% cost difference for an example product. 
Modelling fully loaded total landed costs of the sourced bicycles. 
 
 
The concept of fully-loaded total landed costs at the door of the fac-
tory warehouse was used in the analysis of the sourced bicycles. The 
sourced bicycles were purchased in USD and transported to the ware-
house in Finland by sea. Therefore, the total landed costs were very 
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sensitive to changes, particularly in exchange rates and transportation 
costs. The model incorporated the sourcing costs to the firm’s profit 
and loss statement; hence, it was possible to carry out sensitivity anal-
yses on the effects of exchange rate fluctuations and transport costs 
on the firm’s profitability. Our simulations clearly helped the firm to 
understand the implications of these fluctuations on the product and 
corporate profitability, and proved the importance of hedging the ex-
change rate risks (see below). Actually, regarding the tight profit mar-
gins of the bicycles, fluctuations in exchange rates and transportation 
costs could even swing the financial performance of the firm from 
profits to losses. 
Our cost model gave the firm’s management an operative tool for sim-
ulating how exchange rate fluctuations and changes in freight costs 
affect the purchase price of the sourced bicycles, and we demonstrate 
below how this information was used to analyse and estimate the sen-
sitivity of the purchase price to the above-mentioned changes. The 
tool was also used to understand the realised total purchase costs of 
the sourced products in retrospect, as shown below (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. The effect of EUR-USD exchange rate and freight costs on 
the total landed cost of the sourced bicycle; costs shown as indexed, 
real costs disguised for confidentiality.
Results of the constructed model. 
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The model constructed in 2008 made it possible for the firm’s manage-
ment to get better information for making business decisions concern-
ing the product portfolio and production structure, and the product 
allocations between the firm’s own manufacturing and contract man-
ufacturing.
As described at that time by BikesCo (Saarinen, 2008): 
The new stimulated costing method, aided by the process de-
scriptions, showed that the (old) product cost pricing used in 
the firm was inaccurate and did not give a realistic picture of 
the production costs. Compared with the costs of the firm’s 
own manufacturing, it was found that it was more profitable 
to use contract manufacturing as far as common bicycles 
were concerned.
With the help of the supply chain process descriptions, the 
costing of the products will be changed over to TDABC. To 
settle all the costs of the supply chain, the descriptions of 
all other departments must also be done in greater detail. By 
using TDABC, the costs of the products and the customers 
will be determined more accurately.
The model was extensively used in the daily operative use and the 
analyses stimulated the management decision to outsource the whole 
JOPO production to the Far East for the 2009 season. At the time of 
this decision, financially, contract manufacturing was clearly favoured 
against the firm’s own manufacturing.
Model improvements in the period 2008–2010.  
The firm has continued to develop and update the model according to 
changes taking place both internally and in terms of external factors 
such as material and component prices, exchange rates, etc. The mod-
el was improved and refined according to the management decisions, 
which were stimulated by the analyses made with the model.
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Concerning the firm’s external and internal factors influencing the 
refinements of the model, the economic turmoil caused by the world 
financial crisis made the firm’s market situation far more stringent; 
the factory was downscaled, resulting in a new structure and accu-
mulation of costs. In addition, the currencies fluctuated to favour Eu-
ro-based operations over dollars.
With the above changes, the results of the models changed: The pro-
duction costs in the own factory decreased significantly, and at the 
same time, the costs of contract manufacturing had gone up, with the 
result that contract manufacturing became more expensive than own 
production. In particular, the exchange rate variations and transpor-
tation and other logistics cost were shown to have a major influence 
on the balance of profitability between the firm’s own manufacturing 
and contract manufacturing, hence giving a strong motivation for the 
management to follow them actively.
The following figure 5 describes the EUR-USD exchange rate varia-
tion in the period of 2007–2011. The firm’s management’s challenge to 
manage the business risks can easily be recognised if the volatility 
of the exchange rate changes shown in the figure is compared with 
the information given in the family of curves in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 5. The EUR-USD exchange rate fluctuation during the 
analysis period. (Source: ECB16)  
16  European Central Bank
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At the time of the backshoring decision in spring 2010, the updated 
production and contract manufacturing cost comparison indicated 
that the balance between the make-or-buy alternatives was almost 
equal, subject to the assumptions used. This analysis was used as back-
ground information in the firm’s backshoring decision.
Decision 1, offshoring
The transition to offshore JOPO’s production was gradual: In 2007, for 
the 2008 season, BikesCo management made the decision to start con-
tract manufacturing of JOPOs and ordered a test lot of 2,000 bicycles 
from the Far East. The idea of contract manufacturing JOPOs was to 
order these bicycles according to the buyer’s model design and specifi-
cations, which are mainly based on the use of European components. 
This design principle is based on the firm’s desire to maintain the Finn-
ish/European image of the JOPO brand.
The process of learning contract manufacturing on both sides, sup-
plier and buyer, took time and aroused difficulties with ramping up 
all the processes which were needed for implementing the contract 
manufacturing decision, and at the same time establishing processes 
which were required by logistics and quality control. Within two years, 
however, the learning process was completed, and the supply chain 
management and quality control seemed to have reached satisfactory 
standards.
In our reseach, one of our goals was to answer the question of whether 
contract manufacturing is more profitable than the firm’s own produc-
tion. By using improved production cost allocations and sourcing cost 
analyses of the constructed accounting model, we were able to answer 
this, and hence give support to management’s make-or-buy decision.
In our analysis, we picked a set of comparable pairs of bicycles, some 
manufactured at the firm’s factory in Finland and others sourced at 
the same time from the Far East. Depending on the product, we no-
ticed that the more common the bicycle was, the more profitable the 
contract manufacturing seemed to be.
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In Figure 6, JOPOs’ manufacturing costs at the firm’s own factory are 
compared with the total landed costs of the sourced ones. In the pre-
vailing Euro-to-USD foreign exchange rate, the difference was +32% in 
favour of contract manufacturing. Obviously, labour costs were the 
main factor making contract manufacturing more profitable, but also, 
the contract manufacturers, with their larger production volumes, 
seemed able to purchase materials and components at a lower cost 
than BikesCo.
 
Figure 6. Make-or-buy comparison of JOPO bicycles in 2008.
Based also on this analysis, BikesCo management decided to outsource 
the production of JOPOs to the Far East. Moreover, as a back-up for 
this contract manufacturing decision, BikesCo decided to maintain 
both its manufacturing know-how in Finland and its contacts with Eu-
ropean component suppliers. The management has followed this pre-
cautionary strategy until the present, maintaining component safety 
stock and producing small production lots at the firm’s own factory to 
satisfy unforeseeable demand.
Decision 2: Repatriation and arguments to manufacture all JOPOs 
in Finland  
Background: Make-or-buy alternatives modelled with new cost evalu-
ations. 
When the economic turmoil began in 2008, the business environment 
became more stringent for BikesCo. The demand for bicycles fell below 
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expectations in the 2009 season, which worsened the firm’s profitabil-
ity by making the factory’s cost structure too heavy to cope with the 
decreased market demand.
The firm had continuously reviewed its competitive situation and sim-
ulated the financial outcomes of different management decisions with 
the developed accounting model. The external factors affecting the 
firm’s competitive environment were analysed with the model, and es-
pecially the influence of exchange rate variations, and transportation 
and other logistics cost were actively followed on a detailed level. The 
TDABC tool was also developed in such a way that it was possible to 
analyse how the production capacity of the factory would change the 
product cost of one specific model. Figure 7 shows how the annual pro-
duction capacity affected the production cost. This analysis helped the 
management in determining what the minimum amount of own pro-
duction should be in order to still maintain local production. Based on 
this information, the firm’s management decided to downsize the fac-
tory’s production capacity, which meant that 27 factory-level workers 
were laid off, so that the factory was reduced from 57 to 30 employees. 
 
 
Figure 7. TDABC simulation indicates how the annual production 
capacity affects the production cost.  
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When most of the manufacturing of the JOPO bicycle was taken care 
of by the contract manufacturer in Asia, the factory in Finland still 
continued to produce small batches of JOPO bicycles. The manage-
ment wanted to retain the knowledge of the production, and the local 
production was also vital for fulfilling unforeseen demand; hence, the 
production of JOPOs continued in the firm’s own factory with small 
production lots.
The downsized production capacity meant improved cost competitive-
ness for the firm’s own factory. Further, the strengthening of the euro 
exchange rate against the US dollar, in the period of summer 2008 to 
summer 2010, weakened the profitability of the sourced bicycles in re-
lation to those manufactured in the firm’s own factory. At the same 
time, the demand for bicycles was recovering from the wave trough 
of the economic turmoil, and the firm’s profitability began to improve.
With the above changes, the results of the models also changed: The 
production costs in the own factory had decreased significantly during 
the period, and at the same time, the costs of contract manufacturing 
had gone up (see Figure 8 below). At the time of the backshoring deci-
sion in spring 2010, the updated production and contract manufactur-
ing cost comparison indicated that the balance between the make-or-
buy alternatives was almost equal, subject to the assumptions used 
(4% in favour of own manufacturing). 
By spring 2010, it had become clear that the financial balance between 
the firm´s own manufacturing and sourcing had changed. The demand 
for bicycles was gradually recovering from the economic turmoil in 
2008–2010, which had worsened the firm’s profitability. Demand for bi-
cycles had fallen below expectations in the 2009 season, but thereafter, 
the demand had started to grow, and buying a JOPO became a trend. 
 
It had also become evident to the management that the delivery 
supply chain of the bicycles should be as flexible as possible. 
Improved flexibility in the deliveries of the component suppliers 
and the production in the firm’s own factory had made the supply 
from the factory more flexible than before.  
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Figure 8. The updated comparative analysis of production and con-
tract manufacturing costs of JOPO bicycles in 2010.
 
The repatriation decision and arguments to manufacture all JOPOs in 
Finland. 
On the other hand, the supply chain of the sourced bicycles from the 
Far East to Finland had proved to be too long and inflexible. Regard-
ing the requirements of the firm’s customers, and fluctuations in de-
mand in Finland and Europe, the operational flexibility in production 
and logistics seemed to need improvement. In short, the management 
of operations suffered from the long and inflexible delivery chain in 
terms of delivery reliability and quality control.
As described above, the firm had continuously reviewed its competi-
tive situation and simulated the financial outcomes of different man-
agement decisions with the developed accounting model. During the 
spring of 2010, the firm’s management was willing to revise its alloca-
tion of operations locations towards enhanced market proximity.
From the financial point of view, the profitability of sourcing had also 
started to become more unfavourable since the weakened exchange 
ratio had increased the prices of the sourced bicycles and components. 
The results of the financial modelling showed that at the prevailing 
exchange ratio, the total landed costs of the sourced JOPO bicycles ex-
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ceeded the production costs of JOPOs at the firm’s own factory, and at 
the same time the production of JOPOs in Finland could, for its part, 
carry requirements to maintain minimum production capacity at the 
factory. Therefore, in May 2010, the firm’s management decided to re-
patriate the production of JOPOs from contract manufacturing back 
to the firm’s own factory.
In short, the drivers behind the make-or-buy decision can be described 
as follows:
 · JOPOs are produced/sourced against the forecast, well before 
spring, the sales peak season;
 · Quality has to be the same for both options;
 · JOPO is a well-known Finnish brand, and hence the domestic 
production is an important argument for marketing;
 · The firm’s own, small-scale factory can provide the firm’s cus-
tomers with flexibility in the supply of JOPOs, but compared 
with the total sales volumes of the firm, the flexibility of vol-
umes in the firm’s total production is practically unaffected.
The formal arguments for the backshoring decision were that it would 
give BikesCo:
 · More flexibility and agility to respond to customer require-
ments and demand fluctuations in Finland and Europe;
 · Increased operational efficiency in production and logistics;
 · Better delivery reliability; and
 · Improved quality control and management of operations in 
general.
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This decision was supported by the financial analysis, which indicated 
that the production of all JOPO bicycles at the firm’s own factory was 
financially more profitable at the prevailing Euro-to-dollar exchange 
rate than importing them from the contract manufacturer.
The figure 9 below illustrates how the exchange rates change the bal-
ance of profitability in the make-or-buy question with the updated 
cost models for own production and contract manufacturing.   
Figure 9 Make-or-buy comparison: The effect of the EUR-USD  ex-
change rate changes in the cost of JOPO bicycle at the factory ware-
house
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Third phase
The third phase of the firm study will take place later in 2011 when 
the repatriation decision has come into effect and own production has 
been rescaled to fulfil the higher production need. In this phase, we 
will focus on how well the firm has been able to ramp up the produc-
tion and what the commercial implications of the backshoring deci-
sion have been.
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Other case studies
Future research should investigate other cases where companies have 
first decided to outsource their production, and later have decided for 
some reason to repatriate production. This should analyse what the 
decision process has been and the main reasons for it in these cases.
CONCLUSIONS
This article gave a description of a firm’s operational responsiveness 
for immediate actions aroused by continuous changes in its business 
environment. It described how the management’s decisions needed to 
be continuously re-evaluated as the business environment evolved.
Both financially and operationally, there were many reasons to support 
the offshoring decision: The suppliers to whom production was out-
sourced had a price advantage over the case company, with lower labour 
and other manufacturing costs. The outsourcing decision was strongly 
favoured by at that time prevailing euro-against-dollar exchange ratio 
of 1.5, which furthered cost advantage to imported bicycles. In addition, 
the firm’s supply chain for the sourced bicycles seemed to be operation-
ally and financially more flexible than the firm’s own production.
Because of the supplier’s larger production capacity, the production 
time was shorter and could be adjusted to the seasonal demand, which 
lead to lower overall inventories, faster capital turnover and a more ef-
ficient use of capital. An efficient supply chain, as described by Fisher 
(1997), would be the right alternative for this typical functional prod-
uct. However, after the outsourcing decision, there were many changes 
taking place in the firm’s business environment that prove that oper-
ations location decisions are not one-off decisions, but are rather dy-
namic in nature. When the economic turmoil began in 2008, the de-
mand for bicycles fell below expectations in the 2009 season, and thus 
the firm’s profitability worsened. The cost structure of the factory had 
become too heavy to cope with the decreased market demand. Conse-
quently, to improve the cost competitiveness, the production capacity 
of the firm’s own factory was downsized and the production processes 
made more efficient.
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With these actions, the production costs decreased and hence the 
profitability of the firm’s own factory improved. At the same time, the 
offshore manufacturing became less attractive, mainly because the ex-
change rate development increased the costs of imported bicycles by 
over 20%. In addition, the offshore supplier had increased pricing after 
having locked in the new customer and the firm was not fully satisfied 
with the manufacturing quality.
All these changes in the business environment worked in favour of the 
firm’s own factory, and soon the management took the decision to re-
patriate production, which had financially and operationally become a 
sound option. Moreover, after the outsourcing decision, the customers’ 
perceptions of the traditional JOPO bicycle were changing. The fact 
that the JOPO bicycle was a Finnish product had become paramount, 
and the end-customer was willing to pay a premium if it was produced 
in Finland. In addition, the characteristics of the product had changed. 
Initially, the firm had seen the JOPO bicycle as a functional product 
with predictable demand and a limited number of variants, but as the 
product became a trend, it gained more characteristics of an innova-
tive product.
The unforeseen demand for different colours and other product var-
iants made demand forecasting harder and increased the number of 
these variants, which further led to stock-outs and long lead times for 
many of the various product variants of JOPOs.
Strategically, the JOPO product had been transformed from a low val-
ue adding product that was essential to support the growth strategy 
of new and technically more advanced products, into a product with 
high sales figures and improved profitability. The management could 
not predict this change in the customers’ tastes before the outsourcing 
decision, and did not fully understand the increasing strategic impor-
tance of the JOPO product for the whole firm. Hence, this firm study 
shows that in addition to the need to re-evaluate the operation location 
decisions from a financial and operational perspective, these decisions 
should also reflect the changes in customer perceptions, competitive-
ness and market position, and the overall business strategy of the firm.
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At BikesCo, despite an outsourcing decision of the JOPO model, the 
firm carried on with production of other models and decided to main-
tain a minimum production capacity for JOPOs. This flexibility, built 
in the production, eventually enabled the backshoring decision. In oth-
er cases, where production capacity is entirely or to a large extent run 
down, backshoring might no longer be possible due to the significant 
reinvestments that would be required. Therefore, in a global economy 
where markets are continuously changing, it is more important than 
ever to have a dynamic supply chain.
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